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The Story of the Seabees

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THE FIGHT FOR AIR POWER

THE CASE AGAINST THE ADMIRALS

THE CASE AGAINST THE ADMIRALS

*Why We Must Have
A Unified Command*



WILLIAM BRADFORD HUIE

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PART I

I

THIS IS A CRUSADING BOOK. ITS PURPOSE IS TO ATTACK THE cabal of admirals which is obstructing consolidation of our armed services; its hope is to enlist your support in the movement to give America a single, more progressive, more economical, and more efficient organization for war.

I don't want to write this book and you don't want to read it. Yet I *must* write it and you *must* read it.

I don't want to write it because the war is over and I've got my discharge and I'm tired. My digestion is shot from too many tin-can meals. I've no mind for crusading; crusading is a thankless exercise anyway. All I want is peace.

I know that you feel the same way. You're fed up with the war and all its inconvenience. You're sick of war pictures, war broadcasts, war shortages, war insolence and war books. You want peace and order and freedom and a place to live. You want to reunite the family at the hearthstone and laugh and sing and feel comfortable again. The last subject you want to consider is preparation for the *next war*; the last book you want to read is one about human cussedness in the military morass.

Then, too, I hate to write a book in which the Navy hierarchy is the *bête noire* because my own war service was in the Navy, and when I traveled as a civilian correspond-

ent, I enjoyed the Navy's hospitality. There are no personal reasons for my criticizing anybody in the Navy; quite the contrary. The Navy was good to me; the admirals whom I know are my friends; my only brother is a Navy officer; I wrote two successful and complimentary books about the Seabees; I'm as proud of the fighting Navy as any American. I don't enjoy criticizing people with whom I have broken bread and lifted glasses and spun yarns.

Similarly, I know that you are reluctant to contemplate criticism of the leadership of a Navy which at this moment is returning from the battlegrounds to be honored by a grateful nation. At the banquet celebrating the victorious football season no one rises to censure the coach. Is it fit to level critical fingers at the Navy leaders just when they are taking their curtain calls for their part in the victory?

In projecting this book I wrestled with all of these considerations, and I concluded that it's precisely because of such considerations that reform in the Army and Navy has been so difficult to achieve. *During* the war reform must wait until *after* the war. Immediately after the war, while the victory is being celebrated, to suggest reform is to be guilty of ingratitude or bad taste. And once we get comfortable again—well, it's a big, confusing problem so we assign a commission to study it while we forget it. Why bother repairing the roof while the sun is shining!

During each of our wars we Americans have highly resolved to improve our war organization when the war was over; then promptly, with peace, we have lost the name of action. Our Congress since 1919 has appointed twenty-six different boards to study the Army and Navy problem and

recommend changes; the boards have returned more tons of printed findings than a B-29 can heft; yet little has happened. We have passed into the Air Age and now into the Atomic Age; yet when we entered the second World War, our organization for war was about what it was when the cavalry was chasing Indians and the Navy was bearding Tripolitan pirates.

During the second World War a few hopeful reforms were effected within the War Department—but not within the Navy Department, and as this is written, Congress is considering legislation to begin at last the consolidation of the War and Navy Departments. The generals are pleading for passage of the legislation; the admirals are obstructing. The old Navy cabal is throwing up the customary smoke screen, seeking to delay and confuse until public apathy discourages the reformists. Perhaps by the time this book appears, legislation will have been passed. If so, the reformists will have made a beginning—but only a beginning—in a campaign which will require public support for at least two years if it is to be successful.

If, by the time this book appears, the unification legislation has been postponed by the tactics of the Navy cabal, then the reformists will be facing another will-breaking defeat from which only an aroused public can save them.

So whether the unification legislation has been passed or postponed, it is imperative that we rally an enlightened and insistent public support for our military reformists. We must understand and confound the ancient-minded obstructionists; we must demand a single, flexible, progressive

war organization, supersensitive to scientific development, if we are to safeguard our nation in a restive world.

The movement to consolidate the War and Navy Departments and to reorganize the whole in accordance with the realities of the Air Age was begun a quarter of a century ago by the late legendary Billy Mitchell. Mitchell, together with a group of brilliant young officers around him, foresaw how the second World War would be fought, and he urged the creation of a unified organization which would emphasize the development of air power. When the old obstructionists in the Army and Navy crushed him with their derisive opposition, Mitchell committed the unpardonable military sin of going over their heads and appealing to the American people. For this he was cashiered out of the Army and crucified, and it was not until the war which Mitchell had foreseen was upon us that Congress acknowledged the national shame and pinned the Congressional Medal of Honor upon Mitchell's ghost.

But note this! While we canonized Mitchell for being so right, we left the United States Navy in control of the very same sanhedrin which had approved his martyrdom, and we have not yet effected the reforms which he so brilliantly advocated!

Until the outbreak of the second World War, Mitchell's movement for unification was almost exclusively an "air officer" movement. A tiny group of air officers—the late General Frank Maxwell Andrews and Generals Knerr, Arnold, Kenney, Spaatz, Doolittle, McNarney, George and others—kept the Mitchell fight alive and managed, at the risk of

their careers, to agitate for reform. The Army hierarchy opposed them just as stubbornly as did the Navy. The old Ground Army brass hats delighted in joining forces with the admirals to clip the wings of "Billy Mitchell's boys."

But during the second World War, the Ground Army leadership traveled the road to Damascus and was struck by the light. General MacArthur, for instance, who was a member of the military tribunal which cashiered Mitchell in 1925, hit the sawdust trail and has become unification's most fervent advocate. He has had the courage to declare publicly that his opposition to Mitchell's proposals was the greatest mistake of his military career.

Recently, as I listened to Generals Marshall and Eisenhower pleading with a Senate committee for unification, I had before me a similar address made by General Mitchell to Congress in 1919. I was struck by the fact that Marshall and Eisenhower were using the identical arguments in 1945 which Mitchell had advanced just twenty-six years earlier! I remarked to Senator Lister Hill that this fact was both a tribute to Mitchell's vision and an indication of how far—but oh how painfully—the Army leadership has traveled.

Also during the second World War many Navy officers, including almost 100 per cent of the reservists and not a few admirals, were converted to unification. I recall the old bitter days in the Solomons when that gallant warrior and reluctant horseman, Admiral Halsey, was considerably upset over the sad state of "service co-operation." Furi-ously he threatened to strip Army, Navy and Marine officers of their diverse uniforms, brand stars on their rumps,

and decree loincloths as the uniform of the day to make them realize that they were allies in one war.

Admiral Nimitz, too, amazed reporters and service investigators alike with his vehement endorsement of the unification principle; and Admiral Yarnell, for many years commander of our Asiatic fleet, has voiced his steadfast support for consolidation. Of three Army officers and two admirals assigned to study the unification problem in the field for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of the Army officers and *one of the admirals*—Admiral M. F. Schoeffel—reported in favor of unification. The other admiral—Admiral J. O. Richardson—had been inclined to favor unification, but he changed his mind—or at least his declaration—after returning to Washington.

Now, however, the war is over, and the gold-braided rulers of the Navy—the embattled Old School Ties—are busy shoring up the throne. Admiral King has denounced unification as both “revolutionary” and a “step backward.” Admiral Halsey clears his throat and explains that, well, he’s an old man now; he, too, has been back to Washington for conferences; maybe the situation in the Solomons never was as bad as it seemed; and yes, he sees more clearly now, and he’s dead set against unification “unless the Army wants to join the Navy.” And Admiral Nimitz, well, he was just plain mistaken; he, too, sees more clearly now, and what he sees tells him to oppose unification.

Subsequently I shall explain in detail these Halsey, Nimitz and Richardson vacillations, but the point here is that the only remaining opposition to the reorganization of the services is the Navy hierarchy. They have arrayed

themselves squarely across the course of any movement which threatens their coveted command position.

Therefore, the first business here is to examine these Old School admirals. Against them I shall make a five-fold charge:—

1. That they obstructed the development of long-range war planes—strategic air power—until Pearl Harbor was in ashes; that during the war they sought to obscure and minimize the effectiveness of our strategic air power; and that even now they are trying to dodge and minimize the implications of the atomic bomb.

2. That they insisted upon, and thus were at least partially responsible for, the outmoded, wasteful and inefficient dual organization with which we entered and fought the war.

3. That during the war and in the very presence of the enemy they engaged in a fratricidal struggle for command; they obstructed most of the efforts to attain unity in the field; and to strengthen their command position, they wasted the nation's substance on numerous deliberate duplications of means.

4. That the Navy's rigid caste system, with its lavish officers' quarters and clubs and the cynical abuses of power by regular Navy officers, did more than any other aspect of the war to engender bitterness and disillusionment among our civilian service men.

5. That now, after the atomic bomb and the lessons of the war again have demonstrated the necessity for a single, progressive, economical and flexible organization for war, this Navy cabal is still delaying, still obstructing, still shouting that Nothing-Has-Changed, still putting command position before common sense.

These are grave charges, and I do not make them lightly.

I make them only after personal observation as a war correspondent, as a Navy enlisted man, and as a Navy officer in all the major war theaters; after considerable study of inter-service conflict and Congressional records, and after long consultation with high-ranking Army and Navy officers.

But why, you ask, must a *civilian* make such charges? If such charges need to be aired before the public, why are they not presented in a forthright manner by responsible officers within the Army or Navy? If books such as this must be written, why are they not supported by the names, the authority, and the prestige of the professional military servants of the nation?

To understand the answer is to understand further why reform in the Army and Navy is so difficult to achieve. Freedom of critical expression simply does not exist for our professional Army and Navy officers. Indeed, most of these officers lack even the urge to public expression because this normal American urge has been educated out of them. For too long they have been taught that in the service one must live apart from the "public"; that information must be spoon-fed to the "public"; and that no matter how fierce the intra- and inter-service arguments become, they must be kept within the bounds of the Army-Navy Club.

Even before Congressional committees, the Army and Navy leaders employ forensic double-talk, gloss over everybody's mistakes, avoid every appearance of criticism, and seek to give only their "broad opinions." Getting straight talk out of them is like pulling teeth. The pro-

tracted Senate hearings on unification developed little more than the Army's opinion that it would be a good thing because it would eliminate duplication and the Navy's opinion that it would be bad because it would be "bad for the Navy."

In all the Army and Navy disputes since the first World War—disputes in which the safety of the nation was involved—I know of only two officers who have dared to go to the people with blunt facts. These two were General Mitchell who was cashiered for it, and General Hugh Knerr who was persecuted in a manner which I shall describe. Other officers—particularly the air officers—who have "sneaked out" information to Congressmen and journalists have been hounded and discriminated against in the matter of promotions and assignments.

When the necessity for this book was being discussed in Washington in November 1945, I urged several Army and Navy officers to write it. I explained to them that the book would be much more effective if one of them wrote it. I offered to help any one of them write it; I offered to secure a publisher and to make a substantial contribution to the book's promotion. Each one in turn shook his head helplessly. Each one showed me a legal opinion pointing out that he'd be subject to court-martial, censure and loss of pension rights if he dared to speak his mind to the people.

This is why the American people cannot depend upon their military leaders for information. It is why Congress often has had to legislate in the dark on military matters. It is why the retired officers who become our "military analysts" must regale us with so much supercilious drivel.

It is why non-military writers like me must front for books like this—books which should be written by military men whom the nation has educated and entrusted with power.

In our democracy we, the people, settle matters of political dispute only after requiring our political disputants to clash before us in the pit of public opinion. But strangely, we have imposed no such requirement on our military managers. In disputes affecting the military management, we allow military leaders to clash in some curtained alcove, and we attempt to make intelligent decisions guided only by the noises which reach us through the curtains.

Yet mark this! For here is my first reason why you must not avoid this book nor others like it. While the military insists that blunt argument and facts must be guarded assiduously from the people, whenever a Pearl Harbor occurs the military rushes to inform us that the *people are to blame!*

The people were not managing the military establishment at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Military professionals, educated, maintained and trusted by the people, were in charge at Pearl Harbor, and they are the ones who are guilty of what Billy Mitchell called "criminal negligence"—as I shall explain subsequently.

But if the professional military insists on sharing the blame for Pearl Harbors with the people, then the American people must concern themselves with military management to an extent we have never before thought necessary. And there are other reasons why this is so.

I believe I can prove in this book that had some of our between-wars military decisions been made by Gallup Poll, the decisions would have been more intelligent than those made by the professional military. This is a harsh statement, but I am convinced it is true; and I am convinced further that if intelligent decision is to be made in the future, an enlightened public must stand ready to correct the military at all times.

In choosing the military means for securing a nation, I believe that the group instincts of a free people are more reliable—in the long run—than some of the studied major decisions of a professional military.

We Americans must now begin choosing the military means for making our nation secure. We can't avoid *choice* any longer. During the war we avoided choice simply by spending billions on every idea that someone thought might be helpful. We can't continue this policy. Now we must *choose*. We can't spend billions developing atomic and rocket warfare and still have billions left to spend on some of the older means of warfare. What weapons, what means shall we choose? It's a time for military decision.

There are some who will insist that we must develop and maintain all the means of warfare, but this course will lead us to the hopeless predicament of Paraguay. Recently I read in *Time* magazine that the nation of Paraguay now spends considerably more money on its military organization than it does on public education. Here, to me, is resigned hopelessness. Whenever this America of ours must spend more in peacetime on its military organizations than

we can spend on public education, then at last we must agree with H. G. Wells that catastrophe has outrun education and it is, indeed, the end.

We are now precariously near to Paraguay's position of hopelessness. If we are to avoid this position and still safeguard our nation, we shall have to choose our weapons wisely and demand full value received for every dollar spent. We shall have to create the most efficient and economical type of organization; we shall have to eliminate all duplication; we shall not be able to afford the luxury of dual hierarchies; and we shall have to restrict our expenditures to those weapons which seem most likely to be decisive in the wars of the future.

I hope that this book can prove helpful by showing how we can remain strong and still avoid Paraguay's plight.

One last introductory warning. If Congress has passed the unification bill by the time you read this, you will be tempted to stop here and assume that the battle is over and won. Such an assumption will be a mistake. The unification bill only opens the way to reforms which this book envisions. The reactionaries who oppose these reforms only will have begun to fight when the bill is passed, and the reforms will be lost unless you, too, continue to fight.

II

EARLY IN 1942, BEFORE I ENTERED THE NAVY AND WHILE I was still associate editor of *The American Mercury*, I met a remarkable man. His name is Hugh Knerr. You may never have heard of him, yet on his record, he is America's ablest planner of aerial warfare. No man contributed more than he to the development of the great four-motored bombers—the B-17, the B-24, and the B-29—which were the decisive weapons of the second World War; and today, as a powerful figure in the Army Air Force, General Knerr is planning the weapons for the third World War.

When I met Hugh Knerr, he was a 55-year-old civilian; a retired Army colonel, tall, taciturn, fearless; he was working with the Sperry Gyroscope Company perfecting new instruments for bombing planes. He was a civilian because he had been kicked out of the Army in 1938. He had graduated from Annapolis in 1908, then had resigned from the Navy to devote his life to the Army Air Corps. He had held the most responsible commands in the Air Corps; he had developed our doctrine for aerial bombardment; he had become the leader of the big bomber advocates; he had helped to design the Flying Fortress; he had been in charge of experimentation at Wright Field from 1933 to 1935, when all the four-motored bombers were

projected. As the Air Corps' spokesman before the War Department General Staff in the years just before the outbreak of the war, he had fought for the big bombers; and he had been "retired" from the Army for his efforts.

When I met civilian Hugh Knerr in 1942, he was a disappointed man. The nation was fighting for its life; the Air Force was frantically training 18-year-old boys for duty; yet Hugh Knerr, Father of the Flying Fortress, could not get a job in the Air Force. Not even General Arnold, head of the Air Force, could get Hugh Knerr restored to active duty! It was a strange and interesting situation.

Late in 1942, Hugh Knerr was restored suddenly to active duty—as a lieutenant colonel. *I* had been responsible for his restoration. Where General Arnold had failed, *I* had succeeded. And Hugh Knerr made the most of his new opportunity. He was ordered to reorganize the vast Air Service Command, largest section of the Air Force, about four times as large as General Motors. He did the job quickly, thoroughly. As a major general he became deputy commander of Strategic Air Forces in Europe; keeping in the air the thousands of bombers with which we were battering Germany was his responsibility. Then, after V-E Day, as director of the Air Technical Service Command, General Knerr assumed charge of all Air Force experimentation with new weapons; and, as this is written, he is devoting his full time to planning for the next war.

Isn't that a strange story? An Annapolis graduate resigns from the Navy to become a brilliant member of the Army Air Corps; war approaches and this brilliant officer is fired out of the Army; war comes and he is desperately needed,

yet powerful figures can't get him back into the Army; then the unexpected happens and a *civilian* gets him back in, whereupon he is entrusted with the most responsible assignments in our military organization!

Why this remarkable Annapolis renegade was forced out of the Army in 1938, why he couldn't get back in after the war began, how I was able to help restore him to active duty, and his plans for the third World War if it should come—these revelations will form a portion of this book.

Does your memory go back to 1934 when the Army Air Corps was ordered to carry the mail? Remember how, during the course of Senator Black's battle with the commercial airlines, the air-mail contracts suddenly were voided and the Air Corps was ordered to fly the mail? That was only eleven years ago—five years before the war began. General Knerr was in charge of the procurement and maintenance of all the planes used in that venture. He discussed the experience with me.

"We were faced," he said, "with exactly the situation which we had been predicting in case of emergency. Up until that time there had been almost no money for equipment. We didn't have an airplane that had more than half of its instrument board operating at any one time. None of our aircraft was designed for anything except short, tactical flights. To carry tons of mail across the continent in the midst of the worst winter in years, we had to rely on old Keystone trainers and on pursuit planes of the Keystone vintage. These ships were steel-tubing-and-fabric biplanes with a cruising speed of ninety miles an hour. They were

so unstable you had to fly them every second. The only blind-flying instrument we had was the turn-and-bank indicator, which was bow-and-arrow equipment even then. We had no radios and could get none from the Signal Corps.

"When General Westover called me to Washington, I begged for time to get the planes in shape. We got ten days and we worked twenty-four hours a day trying to get the aircraft ready to take over a job on which the private companies had spent ten years and unlimited money. I knew we were going to kill good men and pile those flying junk heaps on a dozen mountain tops.

"We had no sooner begun the flights than the crashes began to pile up. It could not have been otherwise. We were working with planes at least seven years behind the commercial planes. We were asked to do an air-power job with a few old ships that had been built to 'co-operate' with ground troops.

"Not only were the aircraft deficient but the personnel equipment was so poor that the pilots suffered frozen feet and hands and some of them got pneumonia before it was possible for us to accumulate ordinary decent clothing. Nothing that I can remember so well illustrates the long injustice done the Air Corps. Men who later were to carry the B-29's to Tokyo were forced to fly over the Allegheny Mountains through snow and ice in open cockpits, without even a pair of fur-lined boots.

"As soon as the Army began carrying the mail, the stamp collectors in the country had a field day. They stuffed the mail pouches with twice the weight the com-

mercial companies had been carrying. Yet, somehow, we did the job. The effort was not the complete flop that some of the politicians said it was. Actually we completed about the same percentage of flights that the commercial companies had completed during the previous winter. But we killed some good men. It was a case of making up in blood and fortitude what we lacked in machines.

"It was a tragic experience. But except for this experience the Air Force would have been caught even shorter when the war began. During the weeks we carried the mail, we had more money for accessory equipment than in all our previous history combined. Our crews obtained invaluable training. The Baker Board and the Howell Commission were appointed to investigate the Air Corps, and the General Headquarters Air Force was the outgrowth of their recommendations."

Now it is absolutely necessary that you understand the significance of this air-mail episode. Because it was a disaster, it called the people's attention to the fact that we had no air power; the people demanded that something be done; in response to the people's demands, the President appointed two boards to investigate; and thus the men who believed in air power got another opportunity to appeal to Congress and to the people for support against the Army and Navy hierarchies who were determined to throttle the development of the long-range airplane.

This process by which the air-minded men appealed to the people was first used by Billy Mitchell in 1919 when he returned from France, shouting that we must have air power. Mitchell engaged in all sorts of acrobatics with the

crude planes of his day, trying to rally the people against the mossbacks. He failed. The people, by and large, believed what Mitchell was saying, but in their surge to get back to peace and forget the war, the people neglected to save Mitchell from martyrdom. Even General Pershing aided the mossbacks with a statement that the airplane did not affect the outcome of a single engagement in the first World War, and a stupid inference that it would not affect the outcome of the next war.

Then, after Mitchell's martyrdom in 1925 and after Lindbergh's flight in 1927, there was another long period of doldrums for the believers in air power. General Knerr's statement as to the condition of our planes in 1934 tells the story of what happened during those doldrums. Then suddenly, the opportunity to carry the air mail; the disaster; the resulting public furore in response to which the President created the Baker Board—headed by Newton D. Baker, Wilson's Secretary of War—to investigate the Air Force problem. And thus Knerr and Andrews and Kenney and Spaatz and all the other inheritors of the Mitchell mantle came again to Washington to appear before the board and appeal for the people's support against the mossbacks who resented nothing so much as the invention of the airplane.

The Baker Board sat for a month, heard 105 witnesses, and piled up 4,283 pages of record. In addition, 536 officers of the Air Corps filed written pleas. These officers did not ask for a separate air force or for a single Department of National Defense. They aimed for limited objectives. They

asked only for a separate budget and for *freedom to develop long-range airplanes*.

But, you inquire, didn't the Air Corps already have *freedom to develop long-range airplanes*? Couldn't the air officers develop any type of aircraft they chose as long as they observed their budgetary limitations?

The answer is an emphatic *No!* The types of planes which the air officers could develop had to be approved by the General Staff, and the General Staff was dominated by officers who were opposed to long-range airplanes, who did not believe that planes "acting alone" could be effective, and who insisted that the Army's airplanes must be designed to "co-operate with the infantry."

General Hugh Drum, executive vice-chairman of the Baker Board and Deputy Chief of Staff, had declared that he saw no reason why an Army airplane's range should exceed *three days' march by the infantry*.

Moreover, the Army General Staff had an agreement with the Navy Command whereby the range of Army aircraft was to be restricted so that Army planes would not intrude in the Navy's sacred sphere of influence offshore! Admiral King had declared that *Army aviation must end at the shore line!*

This was why General Knerr had airplanes designed only for "short, tactical flights" when he was ordered to carry the mail in 1934. And this was the issue before the Baker Board in 1934. At Wright Field, General Knerr already had the Flying Fortress on the planning boards; the Air Corps wanted to develop big bombers and long-

range fighters; but the Army-Navy restriction on range had to be broken before such planes could be developed.

General Knerr and the others pleaded before the Baker Board for permission to develop a long-range, fighting Air Force for the United States—an Air Force which could be more than just an *auxiliary* to the infantry or the fleet—but the high priests of the Army and Navy volleyed and thundered against them. And the Baker Board handed down a detailed decision which the board hoped would “determine the air policy of the United States for *the next ten years.*”

Here are the highlights of the Baker Board’s decision. They should be memorized by every American who is concerned about the future of his country.

1. The limitations of the airplane show that the ideas that aviation, acting alone, can control the sea lanes, or defend the coast, or produce decisive results . . . are all visionary, as is the idea that a large air force is necessary to defend our country.

Read those words carefully again. Those words expressed the considered judgment of our Army and Navy hierarchies, and this judgment prevailed until bombs began to fall on Pearl Harbor! Read those words and think of them in connection with Churchill’s announcement that the Luftwaffe by 1941 had “closed the sea lanes” of the Mediterranean to the British Fleet. Think of them in connection with Midway and the Coral Sea where *aviation*, with our surface fleet two hundred miles away, “produced decisive results” and “defended the coast” and drove off the Japanese fleet and saved Hawaii and Australia from

invasion. Think of those words in connection with the facts that the B-17's and B-24's produced "decisive results" in Europe and the B-29's knocked Japan out of the war, made an invasion of Japan unnecessary, and saved half a million American lives!

2. In the World War . . . independent air missions had little if any effect upon the issue of battles and none upon the outcome of the war.

Here, incredible as it seems, is evidence that in 1934 the Army and Navy hierarchies still were using General Pershing's contempt for the airplane to confound the men who were fighting to build an American air force. The argument here is that because the airplane did not influence the outcome of the *last war*, it will not influence the outcome of the *next war*. Here is how backward-looking military hierarchies can lead a free people to destruction unless the people intervene. Here is Maginot-mindedness at its worst.

3. The fear that has been cultivated in this country by various zealots that American aviation is inferior to that of the rest of the world is, as a whole, unfounded. The public, ever fearful for the national security, as well as receptive to the idea of centralization as a means of securing economy and efficiency, gives credence to comparative statements of strengths, powers and limitations of air forces which are often at variance with fact.

Now there's a good one. Remember here that the moss-backs of the Army and Navy had insisted before the Board

that our planes were "superior" despite the fact that Army Air Corps equipment had just proved unequal to the task of carrying the mail across continental United States. And note, particularly, the effort to discredit the public clamor for centralization and improvement. The Board, as well as the Army and Navy commands, knew that the American public was aroused and that the people supported the air officers, and the report bulges with efforts to discredit this public sentiment. Note the following:

4. Some of the proponents . . . of the separate budget . . . advance as a reason that the public psychology existing at the moment would probably secure larger appropriations from the Congress for a separate air corps . . . but the Board feels that it would be unsound to sacrifice the fundamental principles upon which the security of a nation rests in order to take advantage of a temporary public psychology.

And further:

5. The committee realizes the hold aviation has on the public, but it does not believe such considerations warrant sacrificing sound national defense principles or placing unnecessary financial burdens.

Here is the supreme jest of the whole bitter tragedy! The obstructionists in the role of protectors of the people's purse from the people's folly! Just because the gullible public is anxious to spend money for the development of air weapons is no reason why we, the omniscient brass hats, are going to allow you "Air Corps zealots" to do it! We refuse to sacrifice "fundamental principles" to allow you

to take advantage of a foolish "temporary public psychology!"

Do you wonder now at my charge that had some of our military decisions been made by Gallup Poll they would have been more intelligent than the decisions insisted upon by the professional military?

Do you not agree now that in choosing the military means for securing a nation, the group instincts of a free people should be able and prepared to correct the decisions of the professional military?

If we Americans ever concede that our military knows best; if ever we neglect for any considerable period of time to intervene against our military fundamentalists and in favor of our military "visionaries," then we can expect to lose our nation.

The military's favorite excuse for our military impotence in the early years of the war was that "the people wouldn't give us any money." "Sure," they explained, "we could have had airplanes, but airplanes cost money, and the Congress and the people wouldn't give us any money."

Yet here, in a document which was to become military policy, we have the military sneering at the public because the public was so foolish as to want to spend money developing airplanes!

I commend this to the historians of the future who will pass judgment on the ability of a free people to anticipate danger.

The Baker Board approved the Army and Navy arguments against unification in these words:

6. Unity of command has been assured in all operations at sea and ashore, including the defense of the coast against actual attack. So the War and Navy Departments have opposed every proposal to unite them into a single department, both realizing that it is far better to concentrate on its normal and customary missions rather than adopt a system based upon occasional and short-lived operations.

Those two words *normal* and *customary* really sum up the twenty-year opposition of the Army and Navy hierarchies to the men who believed in air power. In a world that was being changed by the airplane, the Army and Navy believed it was "far better to concentrate on normal and customary missions." This, I might add, they were doing on the morning of December 7, 1941.

And so by 1934 "unity of command had been assured in all operations at sea and ashore," had it? The three thousand men who died at Pearl Harbor would be glad to know that.

The most undeserved insolence to the air officers was contained in the Baker Board's answer to their plea, not for a separate air force or a unified Department of Defense, but for an air force within the War Department which would have a separate budget and freedom from the General Staff's having to approve the types of airplanes which were to be developed. The Board answered:

7. Testimony before the board would appear to indicate that the officers of the Air Corps largely desired legislation to free them from the requirement that the General Staff approve the types of airplanes to be developed. It is not improbable that this apparent unanimity was influenced by action of those

formerly advocating complete separation of the Air Corps from the Army but who had become convinced that such action could not be consummated. The manner in which these written opinions, generally identical in expression, were gathered tends to support this belief and to weaken greatly the effect of the testimony.

Here the obstructionists are sneering at the advocates of air power. They had been too smart to be fooled by this newest tactic of the "agitators." Because the air officers had conferred among themselves and had presented a solid front for a limited objective, they were informed by the obstructionists that they had "weakened greatly" the effect of their testimony.

The Board closed its answer to the air officers with more rebukes.

8. The board is not greatly impressed with the validity of the several imputations against the General Staff . . . the board has studied the present situation and is convinced that the Air Corps should be subject to General Staff control . . . this board is the fifteenth committee or board which has studied this problem during the past sixteen years, and it is the hope of this board that the present study may be accepted as the basis for the development of the Army Air Corps for the next ten years and thus terminate the continuing agitation which has been so detrimental to harmonious development.

And there you have it. The old boys didn't like *agitators*; they wanted to pursue their *normal* and *customary* missions in *harmony*. They didn't believe in air power; they only wanted a few short-range planes to "co-operate with the infantry" and serve as "the eyes of the fleet"; and they

were going to retain veto power on plane types to see that the air officers didn't develop any other sort of planes. Above all, the mossbacks were going to deny the "gullible public" any opportunity to waste money on the "visionary" schemes of the air "zealots." And this ruling was to last ten years.

The Board was dominated throughout by the General Staff and the Navy Command. The report was written in the War Department and was approved by the entire membership—except one. A pint-sized Californian named James Harold Doolittle sat on the board as a civilian member. He already had flown across the continent in less than a day, and later he was to bomb the heart out of Berlin and Tokyo. Jimmy Doolittle appended a brief minority report of one which said, in effect, "Nuts!" He wrote:

I believe that the future security of our nation is dependent upon an adequate air force. This is true at the present time and will become increasingly important as the science of aviation advances and the airplane lends itself more and more to the art of warfare. I am convinced that the required air force can be more rapidly organized, equipped and trained if it is completely separated and developed as an entirely separate arm. If separation is deemed undesirable at this time, I recommend an air force as part of the Army but with a separate budget . . . and removed from control of the Army General Staff.*

* Testifying before the Senate Military Affairs Committee in November 1945, General Doolittle declared: "The ten years during which the Baker Board expected its rulings to endure expired on July 18, 1944. On that date, thanks to the scrapping of the Baker Board Report and every idea in it, the Army Air Forces comprised some 13,000 four-motored bombers; and these bombers, which the Baker Board would have outlawed, were pounding our enemies with 78,000 tons of bombs a month."

The "Navy" answered Jimmy Doolittle's dissent in these words by Admiral Stirling:

The airplane has a definite function in the gunnery organization of every ship. Airplanes will be the eyes of the fleet. Information obtained from air scouts will have a far-reaching effect upon the tactical disposition of the fleet. A united air force would in time become mostly a shore-based air force which can function only in narrow waters. The oceans that carry our trade and communications will remain free from the influence of a land-based force.

The man who wrote this, you see, thought of himself as being "air-minded." He was an airplane advocate, thought that the airplane was important to the Navy; the airplane could be of vast importance as the "eyes of the fleet." It never occurred to him, however, that airplanes would become the *guns* of the fleet, not just the *eyes*.

The Chief of the General Staff when the Baker Board report was offered as War and Navy Department doctrine was one Douglas MacArthur. Perhaps this fact will bring scarce comfort to the MacArthur idolators among us, but at least General MacArthur has made a clean confession: "The greatest mistake of my military career."

Also, the fact that an otherwise brilliant officer like MacArthur could have been so wrong on air power adds weight to my contention that the people must press constantly for reform in the military.

Only one good thing came of the Baker Board investigation. After all, some sop had to be tossed to the people who had demanded the investigation and who admittedly wanted an Air Force with better airplanes. So the Board

authorized the creation of a General Headquarters Air Force which was to have some degree of autonomy never before enjoyed by the Air Corps.

Creation of the General Headquarters Air Force was an important milestone because it marked the first public admission by the mossbacks that, in the event of attack, perhaps the Air Corps might possibly—and properly—go into action before the infantry did. Possibly it might be proper for the Air Corps to be ready to help “defend the coast” in the event of attack. Possibly the Air Corps—and this was dangerously revolutionary doctrine—might even be of some help to the Navy if our fleet should be driven back to within a few miles of our coast. Perhaps there might be some reason for our maintaining a little air force “in being.”

And this is what the General Headquarters Air Force was to be: a striking air force *in being*; ready for immediate action; the first such air force in the nation’s history.

But wait a minute! In creating the General Headquarters Air Force was the Baker Board admitting that an air force could ever properly *act alone*? No *responsible authority* in either the Army or Navy ever had admitted that airplanes could be effective *acting alone*. The airplane could be only an *accessory*. It could help the fleet or help the infantry, but it could never act alone. Was some dangerous concession being made here to the agitators?

The admirals looked at one another in horrified disbelief. Was it actually being implied that an Army airplane—a land-based airplane—could ever properly venture out into the off-coast blue yonder where the traditional “first

line of defense" would be in action? Was it actually being suggested that an Army bomber could ever *help* the fleet?

So, while the General Headquarters Air Force might be a necessary concession to a "temporary public psychology," both the admirals and the generals put the evil eye on it from the beginning. A "safe" Army man—Frank Maxwell Andrews, West Point '06 and a cavalryman before he became an airman—was named Commanding General of the General Headquarters Air Force. A jocular, smooth-tempered Tennessean, General Andrews was expected to suppress the agitators and keep "in line" with Army-Navy policy.

But General Andrews crossed up his superiors by choosing Hugh Knerr, the "big airplane" agitator, for his chief of staff, and by elevating George Kenney, another tireless agitator, to the staff. Carl Spaatz was given the fighter command; Ira Eaker, the bomber command; and Hap Arnold was given command of the First Wing at March Field, California.

They were the worst agitators in the Air Corps. How could any *sound* general or admiral sleep as long as these men were together and free to connive?

III

EARLY IN 1935 THE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE opened for business at Langley Field, Virginia, and there the "agitators"—Andrews, Knerr, Kenney *et al.*—put their heads together and began planning new and bigger agitations. They were determined to develop long-range war planes; and the Army and Navy hierarchies were just as determined to prevent the development of these long-range planes.

Why did the Navy Command oppose the development of long-range planes by the *Army* Air Corps? Didn't the Navy regard *Army* planes as strictly Army business? If the Air Corps agitators could wangle a little money out of the War Department to develop a long-range bomber, why should the Navy object? And why was the question of *range* so controversial?

Here is the explanation. Prior to the second World War, all of our military thinking was defensive. Everybody seemed to agree that we'd never have another *offensive* war. If war ever came again to these United States, somebody would have to bring it to us. And how could any nation bring war to these shores? There was only one way: a surface fleet—a vast armada of warships and transports. It was the only admitted way in which this nation could become embroiled in another war. Therefore, our only

military problem was how to repel invasion. All of our war plans, all of our war games assumed a hostile fleet moving to attack this country or one of its possessions. The only possessions we expected to defend were Alaska and Hawaii; the Philippines were to become independent.

If war could approach us only in the form of an invasion convoy, then our Navy—our first line of defense—would go into action first. Long before the war reached our coasts, long before our Army with its co-operating air arm would need to go into action, our fleet would be out there on the high seas intercepting the enemy and engaging him in the classic manner.

And when would our Army go into action? Well, obviously only after our fleet had been defeated and destroyed. During the great naval battle, the Army would array itself along the threatened coast; and as our fleet was being destroyed and the enemy pressed in closer to the coast, the Army would bring itself to readiness and finally would close with the enemy *at the coast* as the enemy attempted his landing. The first Army element to see action would, of course, be the Coast Artillery.

This was the classic, accepted, and never-challenged role of the fleet: to meet the enemy first on the high seas. Similarly, this was the accepted role of the Army: to "defend the coast"—to repel the enemy's landing attempts *after the enemy had destroyed our fleet*.

What about command in the theater where the enemy was attempting to land? Would we have any unity of command? No. Unity of command was unnecessary. Nature had made it unnecessary. Nature, very thought-

fully, had divided war between admirals and generals. The water's edge was the natural dividing line. Of course there was some little argument as to whether the "water's edge" meant the high-tide or the low-tide mark, but the Navy finally conceded low tide. When the enemy armada moved toward us, the admiral would command during the fleet action; then, if the admiral was defeated, the general would take over at the coast and "defend the coast."

It was oh, so simple—until the confounded airplane came along to create problems, confusions and agitations. The airplane threatened to upset the *sound, normal* and *customary* procedures.

Even with the airplanes of the 1920's the Army possessed a new weapon which could fly out over salt water for perhaps fifty miles, and while these planes could never, never *sink* an enemy ship they might conceivably hinder that advancing enemy armada in some slight degree. So what about this? Shouldn't the old doctrines be amended to allow Army airplanes to begin *helping* the fleet when the enemy armada had advanced to within, say, fifty miles of the coast?

It was preposterous! The admirals leaped up in all their gold-braided fury to denounce the very thought! Admiral King thundered: "Never! Army aviation must end at the shore line!" Army planes attempting to help the fleet would only confuse the Navy. Worse, Army planes wouldn't be able to distinguish friend from foe, and they'd undoubtedly drop their bombs on our own ships. Besides, no land-based airplane could make an effective attack on an enemy war-ship.

But wait a minute, admiral! What about patrol? Even if we grant that it would be foolish for a land-based airplane to attack a surface ship, what about Army air patrol? Shouldn't the general defending the coast have the right to send out reconnaissance planes to keep him informed on the advance of the enemy armada?

That question was a stopper. The Navy grudgingly had to make a series of concessions, and by 1935 the Navy had conceded the Army's right to send patrol planes out to a distance of three hundred miles off-coast. Remember this 300-mile limit; I'll refer to it again and again. Army aviation was still observing this 300-mile limit on December 6, 1941, at Pearl Harbor.

But while the Navy was forced to concede this right of Army planes to fly three hundred miles out over salt water, the Navy began battling as early as 1924 to prevent the Army from locating and maintaining air bases along the coast. By 1924 the Navy, too, had begun building coastal air bases for its carrier and scouting planes, and the Navy policy was always to force the Army inland and to secure the coastal fields for the Navy. This effort to drive Army aviation away from the coast was continued by the admirals until Pearl Harbor, and they were generally successful despite the fact that the Army was supposed to "defend the coast."

I wish I had space here to describe in detail the Navy-Army battle over each of our great tidewater air bases. For instance, until 1922 the Army Air Corps controlled North Island at San Diego. The Navy finally managed to drive the Army out. The Air Corps tried to build a base

to protect Dutch Harbor, Alaska; the Navy was able to prevent it. The Air Corps tried to build a base near Bangor, Maine, so that our planes could cover the mouth of the St. Lawrence, but the Navy convinced President Roosevelt that a base so near the Canadian border "might offend Canada."

Wherever the Navy could not prevent the location of an Army air field near the coast, the Navy proceeded deliberately to duplicate the Army facilities near by *at a waste of millions of tax dollars!* The best example of this is at Washington itself, where the Navy acquired the land *adjoining* the Army's Bolling Field and proceeded to duplicate every facility!

And here is the most tragic aspect of this fratricidal warfare. The Navy didn't want these tidewater bases in order to develop airplanes to "defend the coast." The Navy didn't believe in airplanes' defending the coast; the Navy was prevented *by law* from developing and operating land-based bombers. The Navy wanted tidewater bases only to keep the Air Corps out; its campaign for tidewater bases was simply part of its general strategy to prevent big bombers from ever invading the sacred province of the fleet.

But as the Navy acquired tidewater bases and land-based planes, another inevitable dispute arose. Who would command these Navy land-based planes as the enemy armada approached the coast in the classic manner? Well, the admiral would command them until after the defeat of our fleet, and then "at some point" the general would assume command of the Navy, as well as of the Army, land-based aviation. But where was this point?

Nobody knew. Admiral Moffat, trying to explain the problem to Congress, was questioned in this manner:

Now, Admiral, let's assume that our fleet has been defeated. The enemy armada is advancing toward our coast. A general is in command of the Army air forces; the admiral is in command of the fleet air forces. Now you say that at some point here the general should take command and "defend the coast." The question is, where is that point? Who would determine as to when the Navy forces were considered not to be sufficient to cope with the situation? Who would say when the Army should supplement the efforts of the Navy, and who would determine the point when the command would change from the Navy over to the Army?

Admiral Moffat replied:

I would say, sirs, that would have to be determined by the Navy men and the Army men. If a dispute arose between them at that time, it might be very critical. It might have to be referred to the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War and they might have to call on the President. *Of course, the battle might be over by that time.*

After this incredible statement by Admiral Moffat, General Summerall told the Congressional committee:

Development of aircraft has given rise to certain questions as to respective roles of Army and Navy aviation in coast defense, and an unfortunate duplication in respect to mission and matériel has taken place. In addition to the aviation which accompanies the fleet proper, the Navy now maintains land-based aircraft including combat airplanes of the same type as

those maintained by the Army. This duplication introduces confusion in respect to responsibilities and prevents a proper apportionment of available funds for the balanced development of our defense agencies.

The mission of coast defense is an Army mission, and except for such aircraft as may be required for training purposes, the Navy should have only the aviation contingent required in connection with the operation of the high seas fleet. The use of Army aviation in support of fleet action within the zone of land-based aircraft should be subject to the same principles of co-operation that govern other joint Army and Navy operations.

And here is how General Knerr—then a major—replied to Admiral Moffat:

All Joint Agreements between the Army and Navy are vitally defective in not providing something better than a gentleman's agreement where the joint employment of Army and Navy forces becomes necessary, particularly their air arms. The naval mind is filled with the picture of its air force supporting its gun power. The army mind is intent upon the employment of its aerial arm in co-operation with infantry and artillery. Both minds fail to grasp the picture of a combined air force taking full advantage of that vital band of sea beyond the shore line.

In the interest of national defense it is absolutely essential that a formula be found that will solve this problem in a positive manner and not leave it to drift along as it has. It is obvious that unity of command would solve it, but this, unfortunately, remains against the national policy. [Author's italics]

That was in 1931; yet in 1946 we still are grasping for the solution which General Knerr recommended then.

Now, once again, why was the Navy Command opposed to the development of long-range bombers by the Army Air Corps? Why did the admirals stand ready to obstruct all efforts by the Andrews-Knerr-Kenney agitators to build bigger airplanes?

As long as the Navy was the acknowledged first line of defense, as long as no one denied that the fleet would go into action first and that the Army would go into action only if and after the fleet was destroyed, then the Navy enjoyed first consideration in the matter of peacetime appropriations.

As long as we felt confident that our fleet was strong enough to destroy that advancing enemy armada, why maintain any Army at all? It was this reasoning which caused Congress during the 1920's and 1930's to seat the Navy at the first appropriations table and to feed the leftovers to the Army and to the Army's Air Corps appendage.

But suppose it should ever be admitted that the fleet was *not* the first line of defense? What if it should be demonstrated that when the enemy armada approached our coast great bombers could intercept it a thousand miles offshore and sink the ships even before our fleet could get into action? Suppose that war did not approach us in the form of a surface fleet, but in the form of an air armada? What if it should be established that our airplanes and not our Navy could become our true and most reliable first line of defense?

Ah, there we have the nightmare which disturbed the reveries of the American admiralty. If it should ever be

admitted that big bombers were as necessary as battleships to the security of this nation, then bombers, too, would be seated at that first appropriations table. Battleships would have to share appropriations with bombers; and admirals would have to share command position with the despised Air Corps agitators.

And notice who else would be affected if bombers ever moved up to the first appropriations table. What about all the big industries which build warships and supply the Navy? Do you imagine their lobbyists were unconcerned about the threat of the big, long-range bomber? Do you suppose the heart of Big Steel leaped up at the sight of a Flying Fortress' taking the air? Do you suppose the builders of warships welcomed the suggestion that a few \$200,000-warplanes might do the job of a \$100,000,000-warship?

No, the admirals and their industrial allies were opposed to long-range airplanes, and the full weight of the Navy lobby was held ready to crush the Air Corps agitators at every turn.

What about the War Department? Didn't the War Department want to develop long-range bombers? No. And why should it? The Army's only conceded mission in 1935 was to repel enemy landing attempts, to beat off the enemy after he had hit our beaches. Big, long-range bombers would be of little value in co-operating with the infantry at the beach. Big bombers would fly offshore and *co-operate with the Navy*. With the Army already taking the Navy's leftovers at the appropriations table, why should the Army use its money to build big, expensive planes

which would "co-operate" not with the Army but with the Navy?

Besides, as the Baker Board ruled so clearly, neither the generals nor the admirals believed that big, powerful bombers could be effective.

Then who did believe in big, powerful warplanes? Only the people and that small group of agitators who were organizing the General Headquarters Air Force at Langley Field in March 1935.

The agitators believed that they could develop big bombers and long-range fighters which would be the "decisive weapon" in the next war. They believed that these powerful planes could do more than simply "co-operate" with the fleet or with the infantry in a local "theater of operations."* They envisioned B-17's and B-29's, and they could see these planes blasting the heart out of the enemy when the fleet and the infantry were a thousand miles away.

And the people of America—as the Baker Board admitted and deplored—believed in such airplanes. The people wanted to give their money for the development of such airplanes; and the agitators were anxious to take advantage of this "temporary public psychology." But between the people and our men of vision stood the cabal of admirals and generals, men who had the power and who were determined that no Flying Fortress and no B-29 and no

* The term "theater of operations" as used here means only the battlefield, the immediate area in which your forces are engaged with the enemy forces.

long-range Mustang fighter would ever take wing in this America.

It's the ancient formula by which nations are lost and free men become slaves.

Here, I believe, is the place to inject that much-misunderstood term: Air Power. The people of America were told in 1935 that we had a lot of air power because the Army, Navy and National Guard all together possessed perhaps two thousand airplanes. But these two thousand planes did not constitute air power. Every one of these planes was of the short-range tactical type designed only to "co-operate" with a ship or with an infantry battalion in the narrow "theater of operations" in which a ship or infantry unit must operate.

We had no air power at all in 1935! To have air power you have to have big, powerful airplanes capable of carrying the war to the enemy at three hundred miles an hour; you have to have air fleets which can pick up tons of bombs and fly completely out of the local "theater of surface operations" and smash the enemy at his heart; and you have to have an organization for the development, operation and maintenance of such air fleets. You have to believe in the independent function of the warplane as well as in its co-operative function.

We had short-range, tactical planes in 1935 to perform the co-operative function; but we had no planes and no organization in 1935 to perform the independent function. So we had no air power at all, and this was because the admirals and the generals who controlled the Army and Navy regarded Frank Andrews and Hugh Knerr and

George Kenney and Jimmy Doolittle as "visionaries" and "dangerous radicals."

The organization of the General Headquarters Air Force in March 1935, was the first step taken by this nation to create air power.

IV

THE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE, YOU RECALL, WAS the War Department's reluctant concession to the "temporary public psychology" which supported the air officers. The generals and admirals had conceded that there might be a "brief aerial phase" between the outbreak of war and the time surface forces could go into action. So General Andrews and Colonel Knerr were ordered to organize the General Headquarters Air Force and "maintain it in readiness" at all times in the "strategic areas of defense"—the East Coast, the Gulf Coast, and the West Coast. The air officers interpreted the order to mean that, for the first time, they were being given the opportunity to create air power for America.

The task faced by the officers of the General Headquarters Air Force was gigantic. First, they had to build an organization for air power—an organization to handle big, long-range aircraft that could make war independently. Next they had to build the plant or the machinery for air power—the great land bases throughout this country and our possessions from which the organization and the instruments of air power could be operated effectively. Then they had to build the instruments—the airplanes. Finally, they had to devise a training system which would turn

out pilots capable of flying such big planes over long distances through fog and darkness. Pilots trained to handle "light, tactical" planes within a "theater of operations" could never take a B-29 to Tokyo and back.

The first equipment inventory disclosed 412 aircraft of all types. Of these, 174 were found to be "modern and suitable tactical" types—the sort designed for "co-operating" with the ground Army. And of these 174, about forty were two-motored bombers of the Martin B-10 and B-12 types.

The old stick-and-wire Keystone biplanes had survived to carry the mail in 1934, but as early as 1930 Colonel Knerr and Colonel C. W. Howard at Wright Field had begun promoting the conception of a low-wing, all-metal, multi-motored bomber. The Martin Company had built the B-10 to this conception; Boeing had built the B-9; Keystone had built a big, unsuccessful plane; and Ford had built a high-winged monoplane which had cracked up on its first flight. Of this group, only the Martin B-10 was successful. Twelve B-10's had been delivered by 1934, and Colonel Arnold and Colonel Knerr had taken them on the widely-publicized test flight to Alaska. The faults discovered in them were corrected in the Martin B-12, a two-motored bomber which survived as a useful airplane until 1940 when the British used them in the early fighting in Africa.

From experience gained with the B-10 and the B-12, Colonel Knerr, Colonel Howard and other bombardment engineers had drawn up a ten-year plan for the development of bombardment planes. The plan called for four

planes, each progressively larger, faster, and able to deliver bigger bomb loads at longer ranges. The first of these four planes to be completed was the Boeing B-17, or Flying Fortress; it was nearing completion when the General Headquarters Air Force was organized; and it was the Flying Fortress which Generals Andrews, Knerr, Kenney and their associates expected to make the first instrument of American air power.

The first Flying Fortress was delivered to Wright Field for test during the summer of 1935, and every officer of the General Headquarters Air Force who could make the trip was present on the fateful afternoon when the plane was to make her first Army test flight. Also, many admirals and generals had come out from Washington to witness the folly.

The air officers milled nervously around the big ship, talking in tense voices, for every one of them knew how much depended on the ship's being successful. They knew that the ship had cost \$230,000 of the precious experimental fund, that every admiral and most of the generals of the General Staff had opposed it savagely.

"Colonel, what possible excuse is there for spending \$230,000 on such an airplane?" an admiral asked Colonel Knerr.

"Well, sir, we need a plane with range enough to reinforce Hawaii in an emergency," Colonel Knerr answered.

"Reinforce Hawaii!" the admiral sputtered. "We've already got the most powerful fleet in the world out there. Only crazy men would think of reinforcing a fleet with land-based airplanes!"

As the air officers watched the test pilots and engineers climb aboard the B-17, they knew that if anything happened to the airplane it would be a long time before they could get the money to build another like it. Captain Pete Hill, chief of the Flight Testing Section, crawled into the pilot's seat and began to warm up the four motors. The tail controls of the ship were so large and so heavy that they were held up by spring locks when the plane was on the ground with her motors dead. The pilot couldn't hold the heavy controls in place unless the motors were blowing the slipstream into them. As soon as the pilot turned on the motors, he pulled a lever on the instrument panel which disengaged the locking pins holding the tail controls, and the controls handled easily in his hands.

Before Pete Hill started down the runway at Wright Field, he pulled the lever to disengage the locking pins on his tail controls, but it was time for another one of those whims of Fate which influence men's lives and the courses of empires. The locking pins did not disengage, though the lever worked and Hill thought they did. The great plane took off at a steep angle, and the locked controls held it to that angle. Hill, of course, was helpless as the plane stalled, fell to the ground, and burst into flames. Lieutenant Donald Putt, the co-pilot, got out alive, but Pete Hill and a Boeing engineer were burned to death.

The General Headquarters Air Force, with all its brave plans for American air power, almost folded up under the impact of that tragedy. It was the bitterest day our men of vision had experienced since that day in 1925 when Billy Mitchell was cashiered. The opposition loosed a barrage of

I-told-you-so's. Such big planes, they said, were death traps, unwieldy and impractical, and a waste of good money. Besides, what would we use them for?

Hugh Knerr came back to Washington with his hat and the explanation for the disaster in his hand. Amazingly, he found help in the most unexpected quarter. General Hugh Drum, the Deputy Chief of Staff, listened to Knerr and suddenly floored Knerr with the announcement that he would obtain authorization for three more B-17's! Knerr couldn't believe his own ears. This was General Hugh Drum, the man who had testified against Billy Mitchell, who had declared that the range of Army airplanes should be restricted to "three days march by the infantry"; and who had written most of the Baker Board report! Yet this same General Drum was agreeing to go to bat for the discredited Flying Fortress!

Nobody knows why General Drum chose that particular day in 1935 to experience a change of heart, but it must be recorded to his credit that it was he who approved the expenditure which resulted in the first successful flight of a Flying Fortress.

By 1937 the General Headquarters Air Force had received and tested and eliminated bugs from its three B-17's. It had made considerable progress in building an organization for air power. Now it was ready to begin training young crews to handle four-motored bombers; it was ready to expand the airfields on our Pacific possessions so that they could handle B-17's; it was ready to take a stride forward in the creation of American air power.

General Andrews and Colonel Knerr prepared a program to submit to the War Department. This program called for the construction of 108 B-17's; it called for the enlarging of Pacific fields so that big bombers could operate all the way across the Pacific to the Philippines; and it called for the training of the number of crews which could be trained with these airplanes.

What was this expansion program to cost? Only \$21,000,000. Less than the cost of one light cruiser. But the air officers realized that without the help of another "temporary public psychology" they could never hope to get this amount of money from the War Department; so how was this temporary public demand to be generated?

The old argument as to the efficacy of warplanes against surface ships had never been settled. If the General Headquarters Air Force could stage a well-publicized demonstration and convince the people that bombers could be effective against surface ships, then Congress might overrule the Army and Navy commands and force the War Department to allocate the \$21,000,000. Colonel Knerr, as chief of staff of the General Headquarters Air Force, had agitated so effectively for this demonstration that the President finally ordered a joint Navy-Air Corps bombing test.

Colonel Knerr described the experience to me. "The President," he explained, "determined that a series of four tests be conducted involving the units of the General Headquarters Air Force and units of the Navy. Two of the exercises were to be held on the East Coast and two on the West Coast. The exercises were to be progressive in that the aircraft would start by bombing land targets, then

proceed to the bombing of targets towed by naval vessels, and finally to the bombing of the battleship *Utah*.

"We were anxious to devise tests that would settle the controversy. The tests were of vital importance to the Air Corps and to the country because, by demonstrating the effectiveness of the bombing plane, we hoped to be able to get the \$21,000,000 appropriation to build 108 B-17's and extend our pilot-training program.

"General Andrews wanted to take full advantage of the exercises to give tactical training to all of our bombardment units. Targets simulating surface ships in outline dimensions were set up at Langley, Barksdale, and March Fields, and our bombardiers began working out on them. Meanwhile, we proceeded with the necessary negotiations in the War Department.

"My point of contact was the war plans division of the General Staff. They, in turn, were dealing with the Navy. I made it very clear at the outset that the Air Force desired to obtain the maximum amount of training, but as far as the Air Force was concerned there was no element of competition involved. The Air Force was quite confident of its abilities; we wanted training and the chance to demonstrate.

"To my amazement, however, I discovered that the Navy was attempting to handicap the Air Force in every possible way. And to my further amazement I discovered that men on the War Department General Staff were apparently agreeing to the Navy's tactics.

"For instance, we encountered considerable difficulty in obtaining the types of bombs we were expected to use

on the Navy targets. In the land phase of our tests we used standard Air Corps bombs on silhouettes of the *Utah*, and the results revealed a very high order of accuracy. But for our attempts on the towed targets and on the *Utah*, we would, of course, have to use the standard Navy water-filled bomb which would not tear up the decks or injure parts of the ship's structure. Many days of acrimonious discussion ensued over why we couldn't obtain an adequate supply of these bombs for practice before proceeding to the water targets. General Emmons, who commanded the First Wing on the West Coast and who was to direct the attack on the *Utah*, received a supply of these bombs only hours before the actual test.

"Many other arguments arose. We contended that since the President wanted accurate data on bombardment we should hold the tests during those summer months when the weather was clearest, and that the target should maneuver within a small area so that the bombers would not have to consume too much time in search. But we lost all the arguments. The Navy specified the foggiest month of the year and gave the *Utah* an area one hundred by three hundred miles in which to maneuver. Instead of testing bombardment accuracy the Navy wanted to play hide-and-seek.

"Eventually we accepted all the handicaps and began firing first at the towed targets. These targets represented heavy cruisers and were towed by destroyers. Our bombardiers were at a great disadvantage because they could see the flat target only when it popped up on top of the waves. I spent considerable time in the air studying the

problem of adjusting bombsights on these disappearing targets. Finally we persuaded the Navy to attach smoke-pots to the targets so that we could see them—as we could certainly see a ship. In spite of such difficulties our percentage of hits was most satisfactory, and we moved to the final phase of the test.

“According to the rules the *Utab* was to disappear in the Pacific, and at noon on a specified day was to begin maneuvering anywhere within an area extending roughly from Santa Barbara to a point several hundred miles off San Francisco. The bombers would endeavor to find her and attack at will up to noon of the following day.

“General Emmons ranged his B-10 bombers—at that time we had only three B-17’s—at strategic points between Los Angeles and Sacramento with the idea that when his intelligence reported the approximate position of the *Utab*, a squadron could speed quickly to the scene. But it appeared that the Fates had sided against the Air Corps again. Dense fog hung over the Pacific all during the first afternoon, and next morning it was no better. As the hours ticked off, it became obvious that the intelligence scouts were not going to locate the *Utab* before the noon deadline. Of course we had no radar then; if we had there would have been no question of search.

“In desperation, Emmons played a hunch. Turning to Bob Olds, who commanded the Second Bombardment Group, he put his finger on the map and said: ‘I’ll bet that’s where she is. Go get her.’

“Olds took off with his unit and headed for the area

that Emmons was gambling on. When he got over the spot the fog was heavy. There was only a few minutes left before the noon deadline, and he was in the process of turning his planes back toward land when he looked through a hole in the fog and spied the *Utah*. Her decks were filled with sailors. All precautions had been abandoned if, indeed, any had been taken what with the protecting blanket of fog.

"Olds was in a spot. There he was over his target with a load of water bombs and three minutes left to go, but his target was full of sailors! If he went back without bombing the target, the Air Corps' goose would be cooked. We'd never get any more money for bombers. But if he let go, somebody might get killed. He ordered his planes to attack.

"Fortunately, no one was killed. Several sailors were injured. One was badly hurt when peering out of a gun turret during the attack. A water bomb struck the turret right at the gun port, and had the attack been real, that one hit probably would have finished off the *Utah*. There were other direct hits, however.

"When Olds got back to Emmons and reported what he had done, he expected to find himself in serious trouble. But instead, Emmons handed him a radiogram from the captain of the *Utah* saying, 'Well done!'

"The following day General Andrews asked the Navy for permission to bomb the *Utah* off Santa Barbara with no question of search involved in order that complete factual data on the bombing of a moving warship from various altitudes could be collected. After some delay the problem was

arranged. The *Utah* was bombed systematically from altitudes ranging from eight thousand feet up to the ceiling of the B-10, which was about eighteen thousand feet.

"When the exercises were over, we prepared an extensive report. We plotted the results on two charts. On the first chart we recorded the hits within the outline of the deck surface of the *Utah*. On the second chart we recorded the highly effective near-misses which hit within fifty feet of the *Utah*.

"Naturally, we submitted the report to the War Department and the Commander-in-Chief with great expectations. We believed that when the report reached Congress we would get the help necessary to assure us the \$21,000,000 we needed to continue the development of four-motored bombers, to purchase the 108 B-17's, to enlarge the Pacific airfields, and to expand our training program.

"The air officers waited patiently for an official pat on the back for having delivered the goods. But the pat on the back never came; and the President finally dashed our hopes in the fall of 1937 by announcing that he would not release the report either to Congress or to the people. So we had to go to bat in the War Department on our \$21,000,000 program without either the public or the Congressional support which we needed so badly."

I'll refrain from comment on the suppression of this report until I demonstrate the effect of the suppression in the following paragraphs.

Sick at heart over the suppression of the *Utah* results, but still undaunted, Colonel Knerr and the officers of the

General Headquarters Air Force resolved to fight the battle for the Flying Fortress.

"We knew it was getting late," Colonel Knerr told me. "It was the fall of 1937; the results from the Spanish proving ground were in. So we were determined to sink or swim that year. We had flown the B-17's; we knew what they could do. We knew that, properly developed, those planes could take on anything in the world that flew or floated. But it takes time to develop airplanes. And we had to have them in quantity so that we could train crews to operate them. It takes two years to train a crew to handle a big bomber expertly, so we had no time to lose."

The battle for the Flying Fortress and American air power now moved to the War Department in Washington, and if you are to understand what happened next—and if you are to prevent its ever happening again—you must understand how the Army finance machinery worked.

The Air Corps prepared its budget through an agency called the Air Corps Procurement Board. Usually this board was composed entirely of air officers. They submitted the proposed Air Corps budget to the G-4 officer of the General Staff—the officer in charge of finance. This G-4 officer was always a good, sound Army man with his feet and his mind on the ground. He knew the General Staff's attitude toward the airplane—the theater-of-operations, combat-arm attitude—and it was his job to cut out everything that looked like independent-mission air power. It was his job to keep the airplane chained to the caisson, and the best way to accomplish this was to keep the planes small and short-ranged.

The G-4 officer always cut the Air Corps' throat, not to save tax money, but to keep the Air Corps "in line" with the infantry and the cavalry and the artillery. The G-4 officer then sent the mangled budget on to the General Staff Budget Committee where it underwent further operations designed to hold the airplane to the ground officers' conception. The Secretary of War, always dominated by the ground Army hierarchy, stood ready to caution against any "unwise experimentation" as Mr. Baker had done in his report.

Only after the War Department had pruned the Air Corps budget to ground Army conceptions did it pass the budget on to the Bureau of the Budget and, subsequently, defend it before Congress.

And did the air officers get a chance to plead before Congress? Of course not. The air officers were majors and colonels. No air officer had ever held the permanent rank of general. No air officer had ever filled an important position on the General Staff. The air officers were small fry; it was generals who did the War Department's talking before Congress. On the few occasions when an air officer had been invited before Congress, he—perhaps a major or a lieutenant-colonel—had been confronted by such an array of brass and gold-braid that, in comparison, he looked like an upstart schoolboy.

And note this! Until the formation of the General Headquarters Air Force, the General Staff had allowed the air officers to constitute the Air Corps Procurement Board. But in 1937 the General Staff, noting the emergence of the Flying Fortress and therefore fearful that the air agitators

might be getting out of hand, decided to begin the throat-cutting process in the Air Corps Procurement Board itself. Accordingly, the General Staff appointed its G-4 officer, a General Spalding, to the chairmanship of the Air Corps Procurement Board. It was a gross and intended insult to the Air Corps.

General Spalding was appointed to the Procurement Board for the sole purpose of stopping the development of the Flying Fortress and the attendant pilot-training program!

With Colonel Knerr the Air Corps spokesman on the Procurement Board and with the air officers determined to get those 108 B-17's or bust, there is no need pretending that the meetings of the Procurement Board were not noisy affairs. Hugh Knerr is a man with courage to match his convictions, and he had been fighting the old brass heads too long to take another licking philosophically.

"General Spalding and I broke into bitter conflict at every meeting," he told me. "Spalding was a very able ground officer; he had an inkling of what I was talking about; and I think he was out of sympathy with the job the General Staff had given him of cutting our throats. But he was a good soldier, so he proceeded with the throat-cutting.

"Finally, as we came to the budget deadline, Spalding said to me: 'Knerr, just how many of these goddam big airplanes do you want?'

"I answered: 'One hundred and eight! Give us 108 of these planes by 1940 and we can build a striking air force that can protect this country from attack. We can develop the fire power of these planes; we can experiment with de-

fensive weapons; we can learn how to extend their range; and we can train crews to use them in the field.'

"I then presented a program costing \$21,000,000 a year which by 1941 would have given us a compact, effective, long-range striking arm.

"At the next meeting General Spalding handed me the fateful announcement."

And here it is. The War Department's decision on American air power in December 1937. Read it slowly and carefully:

The War Department cannot approve the program for developing the B-17's. Instead of the B-17 you are ordered to build a light, responsive, less expensive type of bombardment plane with a range not to exceed 300 miles.

Can you believe it? There is the ruling which nipped the development of American air power right in the bud. There is your explanation for Pearl Harbor; there is your reason why we were so impotent in the Pacific when the chips were down. There is your reason why as late as March 1943, your Air Force had not yet been able to begin the destruction of Germany.

America came to the second World War just as defenseless in the air as France was, and this was because American air power's throat had been cut on the very eve of the war. The throat-cutting was done by the Maginot-minded men in the Army and Navy who, except for our geographical position, would have delivered this nation into slavery just as France was delivered.

Today the alibi of these Maginot minds is that Congress

wouldn't give them any money in 1937. Do you believe it? In a period when billions were available for government-financed public works, this \$21,000,000 a year could have come out of the "petty cash" of the President's contingent fund. It wasn't Congress that killed the B-17; the B-17 was killed within the War Department; the responsible authorities in the War Department refused to submit the \$21,000,000 item to Congress.

And do you notice that *300-mile limitation* in the ruling? Who do you suppose insisted on that? Why, our old friends, the admirals. The gold-braided Maginot boys who didn't want land-based airplanes flying over their battle-ships. The boys who agreed with Admiral King that "Army aviation must end at the shore line!" Since it was illegal for the Navy to develop land-based aviation for combat, the limiting of Army bombers to three hundred miles was certain to keep *the oceans free from the influence of a land-based air force*. Remember that line in Admiral Stirling's reply to Jimmy Doolittle?

And now, who do you suppose persuaded Mr. Roosevelt to suppress the results of the bombing of the *Utah*? General Andrews and Colonel Knerr had expected to use those results to persuade Congress to insert the \$21,000,000 item in the War Department appropriations bill over the objections of the War Department. Several Congressmen went to the President and asked him to release the *Utah* results to Congress. Newspapermen begged the President for the report. Who persuaded the President to suppress the results from both Congress and the people?

Who was it who wanted to prevent big bombers from

competing with warships at the appropriations table? Who was it who had the ear of a President who once had been Assistant Secretary of the Navy? The Navy Command is guilty! They feared and resented that "temporary public psychology," which they knew would favor the men who wanted to build big bombers. They are guilty of imposing that ridiculous 300-mile limit which still was being imposed on Pearl Harbor Day; they are guilty of handicapping the Air Corps in the *Utah* tests; and they are guilty of suppressing the *Utah* results as part of their calculated campaign to prevent the development of bombardment aviation.

The suppression of the *Utah* report was an offense against the American people, the seriousness of which hardly can be overestimated. The future historian, weighing the ability of this democracy to anticipate danger and protect itself, will note here again that had the *Utah* report been submitted to Congress and to the people, the whole course of the second World War might have been affected.

In 1946, with the Navy committed to a test of the efficacy of atomic weapons against surface ships, the American people should be on guard. Efforts may be made to rig the test or to suppress or falsify the results.

DURING 1938—THE YEAR WHEN FRANCE AND BRITAIN HAD TO grovel before Hitler at Munich because they had no air power—a strange and terrible situation existed in the United States. The American people were being deceived in the same manner as were the French. We were being told that we were the most “air-minded nation in the world.” Headlines heralded “our growing might in the skies.” Secretary of War Harry Woodring, billed as “air-minded” and a “great friend of air power,” was telling us that by 1940 America could boast 2320 military planes.

Here is the tragic truth. At the very time when the people were being doped with such drivel, American air power was lying with its throat cut and our men of vision were in chains. The very Secretary of War who was so “air-minded” and who was making such extravagant boasts was the man who had signed the death bill for the Flying Fortress and had approved the decree for *light, responsive, less expensive bombers with a range not to exceed 300 miles.*

For that ruling which halted the development of big bombers and specified “a lot of little airplanes” was a political “natural.” Little bombers could be built quickly; they counted up fast; pilots could be trained quickly to fly them; they didn’t require expanded airfields to handle them.

Little airplanes suited the Army; they suited the Navy; and, because they could be had in numbers, they suited the political purposes of the Administration.

The people, meanwhile, were being sold the lie that because we were building a lot of airplanes we were building air power.

Where were these "light, responsive" bombers when we met the enemy over Berlin and Tokyo? How much of Germany and Japan did they reduce to ashes?

Here's how the lie was further implemented; and somebody ought to go to jail for this.

The Air Corps Procurement Board was ordered to purchase a large number of basic training planes, and the General Headquarters Air Force was ordered *to mount a machine gun on each of these planes so that they could be counted as combat fighters!*

Similarly, the General Headquarters Air Force was ordered *to fix bomb racks on Douglas passenger planes so that they could be counted as bombers!*

Listen to General Knerr on this: "Nothing in the long experience of the air officers was so bitter or so ironic as our being forced to be a party to this grim joke on the American people. Repeatedly, General Andrews and I went to General Malin Craig, the Chief of Staff, and protested with all the vehemence we could command; but the hoax continued.

"The American people, facing the gravest hour in our history, were led to believe that we had 2320 combat planes, when actually the four-motored bomber program had been throttled and we had less than three hundred combat

planes of all types which could be called 'modern.' A large percentage of the remaining planes were trainers-with-a-machine-gun and passenger-planes-with-bomb-racks.

"That experience constitutes my bitterest memory as an officer in the service of the United States."

Shackled by the 300-mile-range decree, despondent over the suppression of the *Utah* report, and embittered over being forced to help seduce the American people with the 2320-combat-plane lie, the air officers had only one last hope: Congress. Unless Congress would unshackle them from the War Department budgetary jail, there was no hope that any long-range planes could be developed in time for the approaching war.

So the agitators of the General Headquarters Air Force laid siege to Congress—through the back door. And here is another situation you must understand because it must never prevail again. The air officers had no *right* to go to Congress; they were subordinates; they could appeal to Congress only by devious means; and when they did so they were defying their "superiors" and jeopardizing their careers.

Colonel Knerr addressed a letter to members of the Senate. "Unless those of us who believe in air power," he wrote, "can obtain the help of Congress, this nation will some day be dragged into war with a hopelessly inadequate air force. We are now desperately trying to develop the B-17 bomber, frequently referred to in the press as the Flying Fortress. These airplanes are probably the best bombardment planes in the world. We need money to develop

these planes and build more of them so that we can train crews to operate them. The money spent for one battleship will buy three hundred of these great airplanes. Give us three hundred of these airplanes and no enemy in the world could land troops on our shores.

"Our opposition charges that we are trying to compete with the Navy—that we are trying to 'muscle in' on a job which the Navy can do better. It is no fault of ours that we have been placed in this position. We don't want anything to be taken away from the Navy. We are not trying to oppose appropriations for surface ships. We are trying merely to do our duty. It is our firm conviction that in the next war land-based aviation will be the decisive factor. Therefore, we believe that the development of the B-17 airplane and the training of crews to operate it is of vital importance to the safety of this nation."

About this same time the Navy asked Congress for \$150,000,000 to construct two new battleships. In support of this plea a parade of Navy witnesses scoffed at the whole idea of the big bomber and assured Congress that the battleship was the "best of all modern weapons."

Admiral Clark H. Woodward declared: "Do not misunderstand me: we do think that the air arm is a very efficient adjunct, but it is only an adjunct and can be nothing else. Airships can never win a war; they can never win a battle."

(I wonder how Admiral Woodward felt when he read the detailed reports of the Battles of Midway and Coral Sea—those decisive battles of the Pacific in which our Army and Navy airmen wrecked the Japanese fleet while our

own surface fleet lay two hundred miles to the rear with its big guns silent and useless?)

Admiral Leahy, then Chief of Naval Operations, told Congress that the battleship was "the best of all modern weapons," and seemed confident that as long as the nation invested in these "best weapons" we needed no long-range bombers.

Colonel Knerr then addressed a second letter to Congress. "The strengthening of our fleet is both necessary and laudable," he wrote, "and I urge Congress to appropriate the money for the full Navy program. But our air defense should not be overlooked in the meantime. The Air Corps is struggling to develop bombardment airplanes of the B-17 type because we believe that they will be the decisive weapons of the next war. We need Congressional help to obtain, first, the permission to develop these planes, and then the amount of \$21,000,000 a year."

The air agitators then caused to be introduced in the House a bill which would give them the limited objective they sought before the Baker Board in 1934: not a separate air force but simply a separate budget within the War Department. The separate budget, you see, would free them from the General Staff 300-mile-range limit and would allow the development of big bombers.

The bill was referred to the House Military Affairs Committee, and was conceded an excellent chance of being reported out of Committee and passed by the House. General Andrews explained to the Committee how further development of American air power was impossible under the restrictions imposed by the War Department, and he im-

plored Congress to come to the rescue of the imprisoned "agitators."

Here is what happened. Chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee at that time was Lister Hill, now the Democratic whip in the Senate and a powerful member of the Senate Military Affairs Committee. As this is written, he is carrying the flag for unification. Hill and the Air Corps are old friends, as evidenced by the fact that the Air Corps' great tactical training center at Maxwell Field, Alabama, is in Hill's Congressional District. He was all set to lead the fight for the separate budget and the B-17.

But Hill was also an "Administration stalwart." He seldom bucked the President. On the night before Hill's House Committee was to report the Air Corps bill favorably, he had a visitor. One Charles West, a liaison man for the President, brought Hill instructions from the White House to kill the bill. And so the bill which would have enabled the Air Corps to continue developing the Flying Fortress was throttled in Committee.

Who do you suppose persuaded the President to kill that bill? Do you suppose it was the same gold-braided advisers who persuaded him to suppress the *Utah* report?

Because I am so anxious for my fellow Americans to understand what I am trying to explain here, I wish that I could have avoided any reference to Franklin D. Roosevelt. I know that for so many Americans objectivity goes out the window at the mention of his name. One group of us insists upon his divinity; another group is determined to prove him both a fiend and a fool. As an "original Roosevelt man" I am hardly one of those who wishes to blacken

the President's name, so here I hope that both you and I can be objective.

After the President had halted action on the bill which would have saved the Flying Fortress, several members of the House Military Affairs Committee tried to arrange for General Andrews and Colonel Knerr to see the President. Rep. Mark Wilcox, of Florida, a member of the Committee, wrote to an interested constituent: "I am trying desperately to arrange a conference with the President for General Andrews and Colonel Knerr. I think it is imperative that these two men be allowed to present their views directly to the President. But it is doubtful whether I shall be able to arrange such a conference within the next sixty days."

A few weeks later Congressman Wilcox reported again: "I am still working to bring General Andrews and Colonel Knerr in contact with the President. But thus far I have been unsuccessful. In the first place the President is tremendously engrossed at this time with his various reorganization and reform measures. In the second place the President's answer always is that he will not consider reforms or reorganizations within the War Department unless and until it has received the full consideration of the Department, and he has been advised of the Department's attitude."

There you have it. The admirals had our men of vision fenced off, and the President lacked the time and the inclination to reach over the fence.

It seems incredible that a man like Mr. Roosevelt, so gallantly revolutionary in other respects, could have been

so blind to the necessity for change in the armed forces. He took his political and economic advice from the radicals, but when he wanted military advice, he condemned agitators and gave his ear only to the reactionaries.

Billy Mitchell visited the President in 1935, a few weeks before Mitchell's death. The great air "visionary" probed the President at length in the hope of finding some evidence that this great revolutionary leader grasped the potentialities of air power. When the interview was over, Mitchell walked away from the White House very tired and very depressed. He wrote to Hugh Knerr: "You know, while I sat there and talked to that man, I examined his desk closely. I have never seen a desk so cluttered with miniature ships and little things taken out of ships. Everything on the desk bore some relation to a ship. It depressed me. If only I could have seen one model airplane among those mementos, I'd feel a lot better about the safety of the country."

Undoubtedly, like many sincere men, the President was blinded to the potentialities of air power by his love of the sea and ships, and by his early association with the Navy. The first Roosevelt loved the great ships of the line, and he sent them around the world to impress other nations with America's growing naval might. The reason that President Wilson made Franklin Roosevelt Assistant Secretary of the Navy was that an adviser told the President that "the Roosevelts love the sea." Franklin Roosevelt's friends in Washington during the first World War were the naval officers his own age. By the time he became President, these officers had become the admirals in the Navy Command.

Another "naval" influence in the President's life was Josephus Daniels, first World War Secretary of the Navy and the President's "chief" at that time. To the end of his days, Mr. Roosevelt referred to Mr. Daniels as "The Chief." Mr. Daniels was even blinder to the potentialities of the airplane than was Secretary of War Baker. He took Billy Mitchell's sinking of the battleship *Ostfriesland* as a personal affront, and he spent years heaping abuse on Mitchell's head. He resented and hated the "flying machine," and Mr. Roosevelt had a deep respect for Mr. Daniels' judgment.

Mr. Daniels has lived long enough to try to correct this error of his past; as this is written, he is assailing the Navy Command and fighting for air power, unification and reform.

After seeing Mitchell in 1935, the President closed his door to the air power agitators and took his advice only from the safe, solid and sound admirals who scoffed at air power and restricted airplane range to three hundred miles. He never met General Andrews and Colonel Knerr. In the crucial years between 1936 and 1940 he not only did nothing for air power, but he struck four solid blows against it. He suppressed the *Utah* report; he killed the bill which would have saved the long-range-bomber program; he apparently approved the 300-mile-limit nonsense; and he publicly seconded Admiral Leahy's assertion that the "battle-ship is the best of all modern weapons."

There is no escaping this judgment: On the question of air power, the President was one of the reactionaries. His appreciation for the majesty and romance of great ships

left no room for appreciation of the flying machine. Far from provoking the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, he was as astonished by the nature and result of that attack—and by the nature of the Battles of Midway and Coral Sea—as was any of his gold-braided cronies. Like the admirals, the President had to learn about air power the hard and expensive way.

What a pity that wars forever could not have been decided by the majesty of tall galleons with the wind in their sails! What a pity that the second World War could not have been decided by flashing cavalry sabers and by the booming of great ships of the line!

Mrs. George S. Patton told me that the saddest day in the General's life was that afternoon in 1938 when Colonel Patton—dashing horseman and champion swordsman—stood at attention with tears rolling down his cheeks while his old cavalry regiment finally marched by him and stacked their sabers.

And it is such a day that the admirals tremble to think on. They look at the giant battlewagon *Missouri*—majestic platform for surrender ceremonies—and they have such pride in her might that they cannot consider the detail that in all the battles which brought our enemies to surrender, the *Missouri's* mighty sixteen-inch batteries fired not a single effective shot!

With the throttling of the separate-budget bill in the House Committee, the air officers, by the summer of 1938, had fired their last shot in the battle to develop the Flying Fortress. They were beaten; they had nowhere else to turn.

So they were helpless before the inevitable counterattack launched against them by the General Staff.

General Andrews, Colonel Knerr, and the staff of the General Headquarters Air Force had committed the unpardonable sin of appealing to Congress over the heads of their superior officers. In addition, by his "vehemence" in protesting against the 300-mile limitation and against the counting of trainer planes as combat planes, Colonel Knerr had made a bitter and lifelong enemy of General Malin Craig, the Chief of Staff.

General Andrews was summoned to Washington and treated as no general officer had ever been treated before. He was informed that his entire staff was to be fired; that he no longer would be allowed to choose the members of his staff; that, instead, his staff would be appointed by the General Staff. The General Staff, he was told, found the Air Corps agitators "insufferable."

Here is what happened. Note carefully the names of these men.

Colonel Hugh Knerr, chief of staff of the General Headquarters Air Force, most brilliant engineer in the Air Corps, father of and spokesman for the proposed four-motored bomber program, later to assume responsibility for all of our planes bombarding Germany, and then to resume the direction of all Air Force experimentation—such a man was reduced in rank, exiled, and then "retired" from the Army. ("Retired," in this instance, is a euphemism for "fired.")

Lieutenant Colonel George Kenney, member of the staff of the General Headquarters Air Force, later to become the most brilliant aerial tactician of the second World War and

the man who was to convert MacArthur to air power—his punishment was to be sent as an instructor to the Infantry School at Ft. Benning!

Lieutenant Colonel Joe McNarney, member of the staff of the General Headquarters Air Force, later to be the war-time Deputy Chief of Staff to General Marshall and then to succeed General Eisenhower in Europe—he was exiled to an unimportant post on the West Coast.

A few months later, in February 1939, the year the war began, Major General Frank Maxwell Andrews, commanding officer of the General Headquarters Air Force, later to become commander of all American forces in Britain and who, except for his death in a plane crash in Iceland in 1943, would probably have had the Eisenhower role in Europe—this man was reduced in rank from a major general to a colonel, exiled to an unimportant post in Texas, and marked for early “retirement.”

With the removal of General Andrews, the War Department then *abolished the General Headquarters Air Force entirely*, and refused any longer to admit the necessity for maintaining an air force in “readiness.” We would have only small, short-range airplanes, and these would go into action with the infantry when it became necessary to “defend the coast.”

I hope that I have been able to make this explanation clear enough so that you can grasp all the implications. Here it is, in summary:

1. The air-mail fiasco in 1934 revealed a weakness to the people.

2. The people were alarmed; they sensed a need for air power; they demanded the creation of air power.

3. The War and Navy Departments, through the agency of the Baker Board, sneered at the "temporary public psychology"; labeled as "visionary" all claims as to the potentialities of air power; castigated the agitators for disturbing "normal" and "customary" procedures; *but* made one tiny concession to the public demand.

4. This one concession, the General Headquarters Air Force, permitted our men of vision to assemble and to begin efforts to create the organization for and the machines to implement air power. They deemed it imperative that they develop long-range bombardment airplanes.

5. From 1935 to 1939 the leaders of the General Headquarters Air Force struggled valiantly to build an air force which would be ready to strike our enemies through the air in the event of war. These leaders were opposed at every turn by the Army and Navy Commands; they received no help from the President; and the President and the Army and Navy Commands were able to prevent the air officers from obtaining help from Congress.

6. Then, *just eight months before the day Hitler marched into Poland*, the General Headquarters Air Force was destroyed; the one tiny concession made in 1935 to the "temporary public psychology" was withdrawn; our men of vision were scattered, disciplined and cashiered; and our Army and Navy hierarchies denied even the propriety of air power.

The result of this tragic sequence of events was that when Hitler cast the dice for the world or nothing, *we had no air power at all!*

We had nineteen B-17's—the Air Corps had managed to keep buying a few of these planes to preserve the model—but they had not been developed to a point of readiness for

battle. They had no gun turrets, no guns at all in their tails, no self-sealing gasoline tanks, no protective armor; and this was not because the need for such things had not been foreseen, but because of lack of money.

Where were the crews to handle big bombers if we finally decided to build them? It takes two years to train a crew. And where were the airfields to handle them?

Besides the under-developed B-17 model, we had a few squadrons of two-motored attack planes; we had no long-range fighters at all, and what fighters we had were so inferior that during the Battle of Britain in 1940 the British left the fighters we had shipped to them sitting, uncrated, on the docks at Liverpool. Some of those "Woodring Specials"—trainer planes with a single rusty machine gun mounted forward—were still parked on our airfields and counted as "combat craft."

America, home of the airplane, had allowed herself to come down to Gethsemane with her military reactionaries monopolizing the seats of the mighty and with her men of vision in exile.

VI

BEFORE MOVING ON TO AN ANALYSIS OF THE FAILURES AND fratricidal conflicts which developed after our entry into the war, I must explain briefly a few developments between September 1, 1939, when Hitler began the war in Europe, and the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

The blockade against the development of American air power began cracking in the fall of 1939 when General Marshall replaced General Craig as Chief of Staff. One of General Marshall's first acts as Chief of Staff was to rescue General Andrews from exile, to prevent his being retired, and to appoint him head of one of the four divisions of the General Staff. This marked the first time in history that an Air Corps officer had ever held so lofty a position, the first time that an air officer ever had been admitted to the privy council which determines the policies of the War Department.

It was General Marshall who began unloosening the fetters which bound the Air Corps to the caissons. In 1941 he effected the vast reorganization program under which the Ground Army, the Air *Force*, and the Service Forces became equal units within the War Department. The word *Force* here is important. Prior to this reorganization, it had been the Air *Corps*, equal in importance only to the cav-

alry, the infantry, the artillery, the Signal Corps, etc. But after the reorganization, the Air Force became equal in importance to the whole Ground Army put together. You can well imagine how the old Ground Army reactionaries fought this development.

Finally, after America had entered the war and under the War Powers Act, General Marshall obtained for the Air Force virtual autonomy within the War Department. The air officers were given complete freedom in the selection and development of aircraft, and General Marshall chose as his Deputy Chief of Staff none other than Joe McNarney, one of the General Headquarters Air Force agitators who had been disciplined and exiled in 1938.

To complete this sequence of revolutionary development, it is General Marshall and his successor, General Eisenhower, who in 1946 are leading the fight to elevate the Air Force to a position of equal importance with the Army and Navy, and to weld them all into a consolidated Department of War. In short, it is Generals Marshall and Eisenhower and MacArthur who today are leading the fight which Billy Mitchell began in 1919, and which Frank Andrews and Hugh Knerr continued so courageously all the way down to Pearl Harbor.

But while this hopeful cycle has occurred within the War Department, strangely there has been no such phenomenon within the Navy Department. During the entire war and to this moment, the old bitter-enders have remained firmly in control of the Navy. From the point of age they remained, throughout the war, the oldest military command in the world. And today they are still denying

the propriety of the autonomous Air Force, still decrying the principle of consolidation, still longing for the good old days when they could limit airplanes to three hundred miles.

That is why the fire in the remainder of this book must be concentrated on the Navy. Up to this point, up to the appointment of General Marshall as Chief of Staff in 1939, the War Department was just as jealous of its separate command position as was the Navy. The War Department was as stupid, blind and stubborn as the Navy. But miraculously the War Department changed; the Navy didn't.

While General Marshall moved quickly to relieve the organizational handicaps of the Air Force, unfortunately he could not so quickly provide *developed* airplanes and trained crews. Under the best conditions it takes from three to five years to develop a particular airplane; and because of the opposition to the model, it took from 1935 to 1943 to develop the B-17 and its companion model, the B-24, to where they could bomb Berlin in daylight. Developing an airplane is a long, difficult and expensive process of trial and error.

Colonel Knerr's dismissal from the Army in 1938 didn't stop his fight to develop the four-motored bomber. As a civilian technician he moved to Sperry Gyroscope Company and began working to perfect the power turret and the computing gunsight, as well as to improve the famous bombsight. And it was as a civilian technician that he was assigned to help prepare and deliver the first B-17's that were sent to England.

"In the fall of 1940," Colonel Knerr told me, "a number of B-17C's were transferred from Langley Field to Wright Field to be refitted for service in England. I couldn't look at them without feeling a keen sense of resentment and regret. They were like living creatures to those of us who had flown them and fought for them. With such tremendous possibilities, they were still so poorly equipped for combat. They had no self-sealing tanks, no power turrets; their gunnery was crude.

"At Wright Field they were fitted with self-sealing tanks, and fifty-caliber machine guns were installed at four positions. There were two side gun ports, another at the top 'slide,' and the fourth was in the 'bathtub.' This 'bathtub' was simply a depression in the bottom of the plane with a gun pointing aft. The gunner lay on his stomach. All the guns were hand-held; the sighting equipment was rudimentary. The fact that the guns were hand-held made them ineffective, as one can realize by sticking his hand out of a speeding automobile. At high altitudes which sap the strength, no gunner could swing the guns in the slipstream of a plane for more than a few seconds. There was no tail-gun position.

"In the spring of 1941 these ships were ferried to England. Another Sperry engineer and myself went over to explain to the British how to use them. The British were given specific instructions that the planes were to be used *only for training purposes*. We explained to the British that crews had to be well trained to handle these planes; that a crew should drop two hundred practice bombs with the bomb-sight before attacking a real target; that the planes were de-

signed to fly in formation for protective purposes; and that, by using these under-developed planes for trainers, trained crews could be ready to handle the new, properly-equipped Fortresses when we could deliver them.

"But the British were impatient to send the planes into action. Our officers at the field objected strenuously, but the British turned the planes over to green crews and ordered them to go on missions. The British pilots had less experience than the average graduate of Randolph Field. The casual attitude that the crews had toward the job of handling the Fortresses was most discouraging.

"As a result of this British mishandling of the B-17's, most of them were lost quickly. One plane burned on the ground from pure carelessness. Four others were shot down over Narvik by Messerschmitts. One of the remaining planes carried a very gallant and brilliant young American to his death. Lieutenant Bradley, son of General Bradley, was at extreme altitude, testing equipment in that region of turbulent air currents and fast-forming ice when the airplane broke in two. Only one man, a doctor, was able to bail out. When two more of these planes were lost over France, the British withdrew the rest from the active line and sent them to the Middle East.

"The effort to blame American air officers for this experience was unjustified. Nobody was more conscious of the limitations of the B-17C than our own air officers. We knew it was not combat worthy, for we had only been able to build a few experimental models. To my certain knowledge, the British were told of the plane's limitations and were urged not to send them into combat. But this expe-

rience was used in the effort to discredit our theory of daylight operations by four-motored bombers, and was just another handicap which we had to overcome before we could begin large-scale daylight operations over Germany in the fall of 1943."

During the summer and fall of 1941, frantic efforts were made to rush the development of the Flying Fortress. The British experience had emphasized three needs: the system of gunnery had to be changed; the planes had to operate in considerable numbers so that interlacing fire could be directed at an enemy fighter approaching from any angle; and the crews had to be trained thoroughly as units. The British could use green crews because the British bombers were simple instruments designed to ferry bombs to the Ruhr under cover of darkness and drop them with little regard for accuracy. But the B-17 was designed to operate by daylight, beat off swarms of fighters, and drop its bombs with precision accuracy. Only well-trained, intelligent men working together as a unit, could handle such an airplane properly.

The answer to the gunnery problem seemed to be another precision instrument. A gunner's swinging his guns in the slipstream by main strength and firing tracer bullets "by guess and by God" was an outmoded operation. It looked dramatic in the movies, but it was ineffective. Colonel Knerr and the Sperry Company, taking a rough idea from the British, set to work developing the power turret and the computing gunsight. It was these two developments which made the difference between the pitifully helpless B-17C's of 1941 and the remarkably effective B-17F's

which were the "decisive weapon" in the skies over Germany in 1943 and 1944.

The power turret and the computing gunsight had not been perfected, however, in October 1941, when it was decided to rush twenty-six B-17C's to the Philippines to meet the anticipated Japanese attack. The first turrets and gunsights were just coming off the assembly lines, and these were flown to Hamilton Field, California, where the twenty-six B-17's were being outfitted. Time was so short that civilian and Air Force mechanics swarmed over the planes twenty-four hours a day, installing the new gun turrets. There was no time for the gunners to practice with this new equipment; there was not even time to print instructions for its use. When the planes took off on October 17, commanded by Colonel Gene Eubank, civilian mechanics were riding in the planes, working feverishly to check the turrets while the planes were in flight.

These B-17C's, you see, were the same airplanes which had proved hopelessly inadequate in England in the summer of 1941. And here, in October 1941, with war at our own threshold, the Air Force was trying desperately to make the planes combat worthy to meet the Japanese attack. All the guns on the planes sent to England, you recall, were hand-held; there was no tail-gun position; there was only the "bathtub" with a hand-held gun in the belly. The Sperry Company had developed the belly turret to replace the "bathtub," but not even the company technicians had had time to test the belly turret. The Air Force ordered it installed anyway. Thus the planes going to the Philippines had these improvements over the planes used in England:

top turret and a belly turret, both with computing gun-sights; but there was still no tail-gun position and our gunners had had no time to practice with the turrets. *Indeed, the gunners had not even had an opportunity to read printed instructions on how to use the complicated turrets and gunsights—if such instructions had been available!*

These airplanes arrived at Clark Field in the Philippines on November 19, just eighteen days before the attack, after a perilous flight. Remember, the General Headquarters Air Force was never allowed to develop the Pacific airfields to handle B-17's, so landing B-17's on the wet, slick grass of narrow, soft, makeshift airfields on the South Pacific route was a hazardous procedure. The brakes wouldn't hold the big planes on the slick grass, so the pilots would have to set them down, let them roll to the end of the clearing, then gun the motors on one side, throw on the brakes, and spin the big ships on their landing gears like tops to stop them. No big plane could stand much of that treatment.

A familiar and heartbreaking sight in the Pacific in 1942 was the skeletons of wrecked bombers which lay at the end of these too-short airfields. The people at home had made the bombers, but the planes had never reached the battle line because the Pacific had been the domain of the battleship, and big bombers would not be needed out there.

In the Philippines, Colonel Eubank found that he had arrived with a few 1938-model airplanes to fight a 1941-model war, and that his ground facilities were 1917-model. Of all the spots on American territory, the Philippines were the most poorly prepared for defensive aerial operations. In defensive aerial operations three words are all-important:

warning, dispersal, and concealment. For years the air officers sent to the Philippines had pleaded for permission and money to build airfields on northern Luzon on which airplanes could be dispersed and concealed, and from which reconnaissance planes could warn the main base at Clark Field. There was no radar then, of course. But nothing was done, and when the chips were down, Colonel Eubank and General Brereton, who was MacArthur's air officer, had no warning system, no chance for dispersal or concealment.

Realizing their hopeless vulnerability and knowing that the Japanese attack was coming—one look at the Formosan ports was proof of this—both Eubank and Brereton pleaded with MacArthur for permission to strike the first blow. One good blow delivered against the Japanese troopships in Formosan harbors early in December by Eubank's bombers would have changed the whole course of the Pacific war; but this was impossible because of our defensive psychology at home and because of our moral code as a nation.

Our bombers just had to sit on the spot at Clark Field, terribly exposed, with their chins stuck up in the air, waiting for the Japanese to wind up and take a free-swinging sock. And the first sock at Clark Field was as disastrous for us as it was at Pearl Harbor, even though the attack at Clark was anticipated and there had been five hours' warning from Pearl.

Critics of General MacArthur and of the Air Force have made much of the fact that MacArthur was "caught with his planes down" even after he had five hours' warning from Pearl. The criticism is unjustifiable. The moment the news of Pearl Harbor reached Clark Field, both Brereton

and Eubank renewed their pleas to MacArthur for permission to bomb Formosa. But General MacArthur could not grant this permission, because even though we had been attacked at Pearl Harbor, *our nation was not yet at war with Japan!*

You must understand that even though General MacArthur knew of the attack at Pearl Harbor, he did not have the authority to order an offensive strike at Japan until he received notification from Washington that the United States was at war with Japan. I shall refer to this later in my argument for a change in our procedure for declaring war.

There was little that could be done to protect our bombers from the Jap attack. The anti-aircraft equipment at Clark Field was rudimentary. The idea that the planes simply could have taken to the air and stayed there is false. There was a limited number of trained crews. The B-17's had to operate in large formations, so that they could provide interlacing fire for one another, or they were helpless in combat with the highly maneuverable Zeros. They were well-nigh helpless in any case.

Brereton and Eubank had tried to give their gunners a ten-day "quickie" course in the operation of the new gun turrets. The results were most discouraging. The turrets would jam, the guns would jam, and the gunners, experienced only with the old open sights and hand-held guns, found the computing sight awkward. The tension was too great for men to learn to handle the precision instruments, and when the instruments were broken, the supply of repair parts was pathetically small.

The result was that most of the gunners preferred to go into action standing in the two side ports and operating only the hand-held guns; this left both the tail and the belly of the airplane "blind" to the Zeroes.

The story of the battle to keep these planes flying and fighting is one of the bravest and bitterest chapters of the war. Bill White told it in detail in his book, *Queens Die Proudly*. It was a sacrificing, delaying action, with make-shift equipment from the beginning.

One detail will illustrate the tragic irony. When the remaining planes were forced to retreat to Javanese airfields, the belly turret became absolutely useless. When a plane took off from the muddy field, the belly turret would be covered with mud, and once in the air, there was no way by which the gunner could clean the mud from the outside of his turret. He was completely blind.

Civilian technicians, who lacked the protection of a uniform and could be shot legally by the Japanese if caught, struggled to repair the turrets, to perfect them, and to teach the gunners to use them. They worked in jungle darkness with flashlights and improvised parts; and the fighting men took the planes up by day and lost them one by one.

But even with the Fortress under-developed as it was, the Philippines could have been held if the organization for air power had been there. If Brereton and Eubank had had proper anti-aircraft protection; if they had had plenty of interceptors to fight off the Japanese attack planes; if they had had detection units located around the island coastline to warn of the enemy's approach; if they had had dispersed airfields, the result would have been different. If they had

had this organization for air power plus fifty Fortresses, 250 medium bombers and 500 fighter planes, the Japs could never have landed in the Philippines. And this entire force could have been provided for *much less than the cost of one battleship*.

On August 20, 1941, one of the most remarkable documents in American military history was received in Washington. It was a detailed description of how the Japanese would launch their attack on Pearl Harbor, and of what measures should be taken to forestall the attack. The document was submitted jointly by Major General Frederick L. Martin, Army air commander in Hawaii, and by Vice Admiral Patrick N. L. Bellinger, air defense officer of the Pearl Harbor naval base.

You've never heard of either of these officers, have you? Yet if they were in charge of the air defense of Hawaii and Pearl Harbor, why weren't they sacked along with Admiral Kimmel and General Short? I'll explain why you never heard of them, and why they were never sacked.

Admiral Bellinger was a *bona fide* airman, not just an *ersatz* airman like Admiral King, Admiral Halsey, Admiral McCain and others. The Navy had hung wings on these boys after they were fifty years old in an effort to fool the people into believing that the Navy was "air-minded." But Bellinger was a real, honest-to-God airman, so he saw things the way General Martin did, and the two men "co-operated" as best they could under the dual setup. Hence their joint document of August 20.

This Martin-Bellinger report deserves to hang in every

American schoolroom as a brilliant and courageous example of American vision. If these two men had had Admiral Yamamoto's plan of attack before them, they scarcely could have been more correct in their prophetic analysis.

The Japanese task force will contain six aircraft carriers, Martin and Bellinger told the War and Navy Departments. Since the task force must avoid detection en route, it will travel the little-used Great Circle Route and approach Hawaii from the north. The attack, of course, will be launched at dawn so that the task force can have the cover of darkness during that portion of its trip when it approaches closest to Hawaii and is thus most likely to be detected. The Japanese planes must take off at a point not more than 350 miles from Hawaii; and this means that early on the morning of the previous day, the Japanese task force must approach within 884 miles of Hawaii in order that one day and one night's steaming at twenty-seven knots can bring it to within the 350-mile striking range.

Actually, the Japanese task force contained six carriers; it used the Great Circle Route and approached Hawaii from the north; it rendezvoused and refueled during the early morning of December 6 at a point eight hundred miles due north of Hawaii; then during the *day* and night of December 6 to 7, it steamed southward at twenty-six knots and launched its planes shortly after dawn when it was two hundred miles north of Hawaii.

How did Martin and Bellinger propose to forestall this attack? *By the employment of long-range bombardment aviation to intercept a surface fleet*—the very act which the Baker Board had proclaimed could never be performed;

the very doctrine under which the General Headquarters Air Force had struggled to develop the B-17; the very principle which the Navy Command had railed against for twenty years and which they refused to accept even then in 1941!

"The key to this plan," Martin and Bellinger explained, "is found in the provision for first, a complete and thorough search of the Hawaiian area daily during daylight; secondly, an aerial attack force available on call to hit a known objective located as a result of the search; and thirdly, if the objective is a carrier, to hit it the day before it could steam to a position offshore of Oahu where it could launch its planes for an attack."

And what sort of planes did Martin and Bellinger propose to use for this *long-range* search and attack? B-17's. They asked for 180 B-17's, explaining that these planes were suitable for both search and attack, and that with 180 planes they could sweep the possible approaches every day up to a radius of eight hundred miles. They also asked for thirty-six longe-range torpedo planes.

"Our leading tacticians and strategists here concur in the opinion that this plan will solve the defense of the Hawaiian Islands, and in our knowledge it is the best and only means that can be devised to locate enemy carriers and make attacks thereon before said carriers can come within launching distance of Oahu," they declared. "We must ferret out the enemy and destroy him before he can take action to destroy us. We must be prepared for D-Day at any time.

"It is believed that a force of 180 four-motored aircraft

with thirty-six long-range torpedo airplanes is a small force when compared with the importance of this outpost. This force can be provided at less cost to the Government *than the cost of one modern battleship.*"

From this last statement by Admiral Bellinger you can see that there were younger and more brilliant officers in the Navy who did not agree with Admiral Leahy that "the battleship is the best of all modern weapons."

Martin and Bellinger called their report "The Plan for the Employment of Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu." It reached Washington almost four months before the Japs were to attack. What reception did it receive? The Air Force, of course, endorsed it; *the Navy refused even to consider it.* The Navy could not accept the plan without losing face, without admitting that they had been wrong all the time. Since 1935 the Navy had fought the development of the Flying Fortress with every weapon it possessed. It had imposed the 300-mile limitation and hurled the weight of the Navy lobby against every appropriation for land-based bombardment planes. Now Admiral Bellinger, one of its own, was urging the Navy to lift the arbitrary limitation on the offshore operation of Army planes; he was urging that Army planes be permitted to operate eight hundred miles offshore; and he was urging the Navy to accept the principle that when the enemy fleet approached Hawaii, it would have to be intercepted, not by the surface fleet in the "*normal*" and "*customary*" manner, but by the very same bombers which the Navy had sought to throttle from birth!

The Martin-Bellinger plan reached Washington just at

a time when the Navy was seeking additional millions for its "big, new battieship" program. Thus the Navy, in its "normal" and "customary" manner, sought to prevent the plan even from being circulated among the higher echelons of the War and Navy Departments! Not only did the responsible committeemen in Congress never see the plan; many responsible officers in the Navy never saw it.

General Martin never received his 180 B-17's; he got twelve, six of which were operational on December 7th. He never received permission to fly eight hundred miles offshore. On the afternoon of December 6, 1941, had his planes flown only six hundred miles in the direction from which Martin expected the attack, they would have spotted the Jap carriers steaming at full throttle toward Pearl Harbor.

When the Jap bombers struck Pearl Harbor, the Army and Navy were following their "normal" and "customary" procedures. The fleet was supposed to intercept the advancing enemy armada on the "high seas," and the Army was supposed to "defend the coast." General Martin's aircraft were supposed, not to "co-operate with the Navy" and intercept the enemy armada, but to stand by to "co-operate with the infantry" in repelling enemy landings.

Like the air officers in the Philippines, General Martin had pleaded with his superiors for additional airfields in the Hawaiian islands so that he could disperse his planes. These pleas, like his joint plea with Admiral Bellinger, had gone unanswered. When D-Day came, his planes—by order of General Short—were concentrated on Wheeler and

Hickam Fields, actually drawn up in close order, so that they could be "better guarded against sabotage."

One other concentration at Hickam was disastrous. Most of the Air Force personnel were asleep in big, modern, three-story barracks—a perfect target for the Jap bombardiers—and casualties were appalling. Who was responsible for this concentration? Not the air officers. General Andrews had urged the War Department not to concentrate trained personnel in such buildings and had pointed out that in air warfare men, as well as planes, must be *dispersed*. But he was overruled by officers who had visions of how pleasant it must have been for cavalry officers to live together in the fort when they were fighting Indians.

After the initial attack, General Martin was ordered, not to take his surviving planes and go search for the Japanese carriers, but to hold his planes in readiness to help repel landings. This explains why the Japanese task force escaped unscathed, much to the surprise of the Japanese who had expected to lose at least two carriers.

And now, since Pearl Harbor was wrecked by enemy air attack and since General Martin was the officer directly responsible for the air defenses of Oahu, it would seem inevitable that he should share the responsibility for the disaster. Why was he not sacked or court-martialed?

Well, General Martin *was* sacked at the same time General Short and Admiral Kimmel were. Some people in Washington were all set to make him the whipping boy. But he demanded an immediate court-martial, and when the first Pearl Harbor investigators—appointed only to

name a few goats to appease the public wrath—uncovered the Martin-Bellinger plan of August 20, they realized that in Martin they had, not a goat, but a bear by the tail.

Furthermore, the investigators uncovered another amazing bit of evidence. All the intelligence which Washington had been getting as a result of breaking the Jap code; all the "east wind rain" and "climb Mt. Nitaka" stuff which indicated that the Japs were preparing to strike; much of this sort of material had been received in Hawaii by Admiral Kimmel, but *not one bit of it had been passed on to General Martin*, the man who was directly concerned with the air defense of the island! And even more amazing, not one bit of this information had been disclosed to General Arnold, the chief of the Air Force in Washington!

So the powers in Washington hastily restored General Martin to duty, assured him that there was no case against him, and throughout the war they have carefully protected him from the press.

We can continue investigating Pearl Harbor until Doomsday, until we have an "explanation" to suit every political coloration in the country; but, to me, the guilty men are the admirals of the Navy Command. And yes, within limitations, I include their commander-in-chief, Franklin Roosevelt, whose pre-Pearl Harbor military vision was as myopic as theirs.

Who was it who imposed the 300-mile limit on land-based bombardment aviation? Who was it cried: "Army aviation must end at the shore line!"?

Who was it who killed the General Headquarters Air Force with its doctrine for employing land-based bombers

to intercept an enemy fleet one thousand miles offshore?

Who was it who suppressed the *Utab* report and prevented the air officers from appealing to Congress and to the people?

Who was it who contended that the "battleship is the best of all modern weapons," and who used this theory to impede the development of the very four-motored bombers which Martin and Bellinger were to plead for on the eve of Pearl Harbor?

And finally, who was it in August 1941 who rejected the Martin-Bellinger "Plan for the Employment of Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu"? And who was it who at Hawaii, on December 6, 1941, still was imposing the 300-mile limit on land-based bombardment aircraft?

It's true that to some of these questions the admirals can answer: The generals were guilty, too. But here's what they can't share with the Army. By August 1941, the Army was waking up. General Marshall was in control, and General Andrews was on the General Staff. Frantic efforts were being made to rush the development of the B-17, to make up for the mistakes of the past. The Army favored the Martin-Bellinger Plan; the Army urged that the 300-mile limit be lifted.

It was the Navy which had not waked up. It was the Navy which on December 6, 1941, still was insisting that the Army do nothing at Hawaii but "defend the coast." What happened out on the "high seas" was still the exclusive business of the Navy; the fleet alone would intercept the Japanese fleet; the fleet would accept no help from

land-based airplanes out there beyond the 300-mile limit.

With this attitude, it seems to me that the admirals were asking for it. I don't see how they can avoid the guilt. They've used their "normal" and "customary" suppression and smoke-screen to try to cover themselves, but in my book the blood of those three thousand American fighting men is on their heads.

I reject as ridiculous the contention that the President was using the fleet to "bait" the Japanese. No admiral was more surprised than was the President by the nature of the attack. He was not guilty of conspiracy, but in this instance, of lack of vision. He, too, believed that the battleship was "the best of all modern weapons"; and he had never been impressed with "the potentialities of the bombardment airplane."

I reject also as ridiculous the contention that Washington failed to warn Pearl Harbor adequately. Everybody in Hawaii, everybody in the Pacific knew the Japanese were going to attack. Only the exact date and place were in doubt. Pearl Harbor had all the *authority* necessary to protect itself; what Pearl Harbor lacked was the proper command structure, the proper weapons, and the proper doctrine for its defense.

The Japanese task force would have been sighted and intercepted on the afternoon of December 6 if our Martins and our Bellingers had been in command. That the Japanese force was not sighted and intercepted was because our Maginot boys were still calling the shots, and they had bet on the wrong weapons and the wrong plans.

That's the simple explanation for Pearl Harbor.

Before I leave the Pearl Harbor disaster I must make two further comments. While Pearl Harbor was a disaster—three thousand men lost their lives without a chance to fight—its effect on the subsequent results in the Pacific has been wildly exaggerated. If the Japanese had never attacked Hawaii, if all the surface ships put out of action in the attack had been available to us in the subsequent fighting in Malaya, the Philippines and the Indies, the results would have been the same. The popular belief that had Pearl Harbor not occurred the fleet would have been able to reinforce the Philippines and relieve Bataan is unfounded. The Death March from Bataan would have been staged as scheduled.

Here's the other point which must be made. You recall how, even though he had the news of Pearl Harbor, General MacArthur could not strike an offensive blow from the Philippines until he was informed from Washington that we were officially at war with the Japanese?

Well, suppose General Martin had received his B-17's and permission to use them to protect Hawaii. And suppose at 3 P.M. on the clear afternoon of December 6, at a spot five hundred miles north of Oahu, one of our bombers had sighted the Japanese task force steaming toward Pearl Harbor.

What would have happened? The bomber crew would have flashed the news to Pearl. The great base would have sprung to arms. The fleet would have put to sea. Martin's attack force of thirty-six B-17's and thirty-six torpedo planes would have taken off at once, to be followed by every plane Martin could throw in the air.

Meanwhile, Kimmel and Short would have begun communication with Washington. It would have been 9 P.M. on Saturday night, and the President and the service secretaries might not have been available immediately. There would at least have been unbearable delays. Martin's bombers would have reached the Japanese not earlier than 5:30 P.M., Hawaii time, with only a few minutes of light left before darkness would have obscured the Japanese for another eleven hours. Would our bombers have attacked?

Remember, we were not at war with Japan. Senator Taft and many of his colleagues were certain that the Japanese would never attack us. Senators Wheeler and Nye suspected treachery—and I don't mean Japanese treachery—even after the actual attack on Pearl. So how could our bombers afford to fire the first offensive shot? Does a "theater commander" have the authority to commit this nation to war before the nation has actually been attacked? At what point could General Short properly have given the order to commence firing? Would he have had to wait until a Japanese bomb fell on Hawaii, or until he had the word from Washington? Admiral Kimmel told the Congressional investigating committee that he had no orders which would have empowered him to fire on Japanese ships *near* Pearl Harbor prior to the attack.

I suppose the Japanese would have been ordered to halt by radio, and if they had not halted, our bombers could have properly begun firing. Or perhaps the Japanese would have opened fire on our bombers and thus provided a reasonable cause for retaliation.

My point is that this nation approached the second

World War committed to the principle of giving to those who would destroy it the advantage of the first blow, and even if our scouts had seen the blow coming, our forces would have been handicapped by confusion and delay. I think that had the Japanese fleet been sighted on December 6, there would have been at least *three hours'* delay before our bombers attacked; and this delay probably would have given the Japanese the cover of darkness, which would have meant a total delay of *fourteen hours* before we could have taken effective action.

Of course in the second World War, the bare notice that the Japanese were approaching Pearl Harbor would have prevented or reduced the measure of the disaster.

But—and here's the point which I shall discuss more fully later—if we approach the third World War committed to the principle of granting our enemies the first blow, we shall be inviting annihilation or slavery. The first blow itself may be decisive in the next war, and a delay of three hours may well be catastrophic.

In this chapter I have tried to make clear the pattern of defeat which this nation followed from 1939 to 1941.

Air power could have saved the Philippines. Air power implements and installations, *costing less than one battleship*, could have prevented the Death March from Bataan. Yet with all the battleships sunk at Pearl Harbor—with all the battleships in the world in 1942—we probably could not have saved the Philippines.

So the battleship hardly was "the best of modern weapons" for the Philippines, was it? And the men who in-

sisted that it was "the best of modern weapons" and who, therefore, obstructed the development of air power—these men were our false prophets, weren't they? They were not the ones who should have sat at the right hand of our President, and who should have dominated our seats of the mighty.

Air power could have saved Hawaii. Air power implements and installations, *costing less than one battleship*, would have intercepted the Japanese and turned the tables of disaster. But Maginot-minded men, concerned with command position and prestige and 300-mile limits, had our men of vision in chains. Outmoded doctrines prevailed, and three thousand men paid with their lives.

Throughout the Pacific there was paralyzing resignation to the proposition that Americans must be slugged from behind before they could get up and fight.

Yes, it's the pattern for defeat. We followed it into the second World War and escaped by the grace of God. If we follow it into a third, we and our ideals are likely to perish from the earth.

VII

THE OLD IDEA THAT ARMY AND NAVY SPHERES OF ACTION would never overlap; that the fleet would meet the advancing enemy on the high seas and either destroy him or be destroyed; that the Army would go into action at the coast-line only if and after our fleet had been destroyed; and that, therefore, there was no necessity for unity of planning or unity of command—that old idea was what brought us to grief.

When the admirals thought of the "high seas" fleet engagement, they thought of Jutland—great ships of the line booming away at one another with little airplanes flitting about directing fire—and the admirals, quite naturally assumed that the battleships would be the decisive weapons. This is why Admiral Leahy was so certain in 1941 that the battleship was the "best of all modern weapons." He believed that when the proverbial enemy armadas approached our shores, the battleship would decide the resulting critical battles.

But the air officers, as I have demonstrated, were certain that when the enemy armadas moved toward us, the ensuing sea battles would not be fought in the pattern of Jutland. There would be no booming of great ships of the line. Instead, the critical "sea" battles would be air battles,

and the airplane, not the battleship, would decide them. The bombardment airplane, not the battleship, would be the decisive weapon—the “best of all modern weapons.”

Therefore—and follow the air-officer reasoning—if airplanes were to be the decisive weapon in the critical “sea” battles, this would mean that, for the first time in history, Army and Navy spheres of action would overlap. And if Army airplanes were to operate in conjunction with Navy surface ships and Navy airplanes, then unity of command would seem to be imperative. But because the admirals and the old ground generals would not admit the premise, would not admit that land-based planes either would or *should* be a factor in the “high seas” engagement, these men could not see the necessity for unified command.

And so we come to those long-heralded and long-debated critical sea battles. In 1942, at Coral Sea and Midway, the proverbial enemy armadas approached our bases with intent to land and conquer. The ensuing battles will be studied for a thousand years, because they were a new kind of “sea” battle. How were they fought? Were they fought according to Admiral Leahy’s conception, or were they fought according to the air officer’s conception?

First let me give you an air officer’s conception of how Coral Sea and Midway would be fought. In 1931, Major Hugh Knerr was at the Army War College. He was a bit lonely there, because he was only one of *four* air officers given the honor of admission to the War College that year as against 121 ground officers! That gives you an idea of how important the War Department thought the Air Corps was in 1931.

For his final paper at the War College, Knerr chose to discuss the nature of future naval battles. He addressed the War College faculty and student officers, and I propose to present copies of this address to West Point, Annapolis and the War College in suitable form for hanging on walls. Major Knerr declared:

Gentlemen, history has been made by brilliant commanders whose talents refused to be circumscribed by the conservative and the orthodox. Such commanders have won victories with inferior forces because they have been willing to employ new weapons and altered tactics. The next war will be won by the commanders who know best how to employ air power.

It is my opinion that the airplane will alter completely all past conceptions of coast defense. Therefore it seems incredible that the General Staff at this *late date* should not be fully alive to the value of its air arm in coast defense. As long as ground commanders restrict the airplane to co-operation with the infantry and the artillery, we cannot develop the airplane properly for coast defense.

I call your attention to the fact that as yet in all history no naval action of importance has been fought outside of three hundred miles off the coast. So of this I feel certain. When the next war comes, our land-based air forces will be called upon to co-operate with the Naval air forces in coast defense. This co-operation will be for the purpose of supporting the fleet air arm in a major operation, or it may be occasioned by the defeat of our fleet. In either case the presence of a powerful land-based air force will be the decisive factor.

I ask you to envision the off-shore engagements of the future. The attacking fleet will approach with its aerial arm on carriers. In seeking an engagement it must enter the zone which offers the defending fleet the support of shore-based aviation. The attacking fleet must *assemble as a unit* before

entering this zone, or risk defeat in detail. Superiority in the air is essential to the attacking fleet before entering the hostile zone, and since the fleet cannot avoid contact with defending air forces once within the zone, the carrier element of the attacking fleet becomes the most vital element. If the carriers are destroyed, the attacking fleet must withdraw from the hostile zone without accomplishing its purpose.

It is apparent that the aerial support of the defending fleet should be largely bombardment, and since shore-based bombardment is more practicable than carrier-borne bombardment, the aerial force backing up the defending fleet should be shore-based.

The defending nation should have all the advantage in such engagements, *since shore-based aviation equipped with five hundred airplanes costs the same as one carrier accommodating only fifty airplanes.* [Italics are those of the author.]

In the engagement between such forces in the future, here is what will happen: First, information will be furnished by scouting planes from the outer cruiser screen or shore bases. An immediate effort will be made by the defending fleet and shore-based aviation to get the attacking fleet's carriers, which by this time will have discharged their planes. The contest for aerial superiority will thus gravitate to the vicinity of the attacking fleet's carriers, inasmuch as the bombardment effort of the defending fleet will be primarily employed against them. If these carriers are damaged, the attacking fleet cannot afford to remain in the hostile zone.

Thus the necessity for the development of shore-based aviation to back up our fleet in the future is imperative.

There you have the quality called vision, the rarest and what should be the most sought after quality in any nation. If Hugh Knerr had described the battles of Coral Sea and Midway to the War College in 1943 with the detailed re-

ports of the battles before him, he could have been no more accurate than he was in 1931—eleven years before the battles were fought. Yet his paper and his address were shrugged off at the War College as the circumlocutions of a visionary.

What makes Knerr's prophecy of 1931 more remarkable is that he, at that time, had never flown a bombing plane which could cruise at more than ninety miles an hour. He had commanded units of all types of our bombardment aviation from 1927 to 1931, and his best planes were stick-and-wire-and-canvas Keystone biplanes which flew like unwieldy boxkites. The surface thinkers looked at these Keystones and scoffed at the suggestion that planes could intercept surface fleets. But when Knerr looked at those Keystones, he saw not unwieldy boxkites, but the great planes which could come after them if only he and his fellows were given the power of development and creation. Note how he says that 1931 is a "late day." It was getting late to begin the development of American air power.

Compare each detail of Knerr's prophecy with the description of Coral Sea and Midway which follows.

During the three months following Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Navy scored a series of successes, and these successes intoxicated their naval commanders with arrogance. They had defeated the "invincible American Pacific fleet" so easily that they planned early visits to Washington. The Japanese Navy was in a position similar to that of the Luftwaffe after the fall of France. The Luftwaffe figured England would be easy after Poland and France; and the Japa-

nese Navy figured the same way about Australia, Midway and Hawaii. But just as the Luftwaffe underestimated the RAF, so did the Japanese Navy underestimate American aviation.

By the time the Japanese were ready to push toward Australia and Midway, our air officers had had time to arrange for land-based planes to support what carrier aviation we had. And when the long-expected Jap armadas approached these coasts, they found themselves opposed, not by American surface ships, but by the combined carrier and land-based air force which Hugh Knerr had so clearly foreseen.

For days during the battles of both Coral Sea and Midway, Navy propaganda led the people at home to believe that great "naval" battles were in progress. Anyone reading the Navy communications would have assumed that our great ships of the line—and we still had plenty of them—were out there on the "high seas" blasting away in the traditional manner. I imagine that a large percentage of our people still have the impression that Coral Sea and Midway were "naval" battles, that our ships were firing at Japanese ships.

The truth is that at no time during either battle did an American surface ship come within two hundred miles of a Japanese ship. And those big, majestic naval guns—the kind which look so powerful in the movies as they roar at some phantom target—these guns fired not a single shot.

In these two critical sea battles, the only American naval guns fired at all were anti-aircraft guns. Our surface ships were occupied solely with the *defensive* task of protecting

themselves from Japanese aircraft, and every offensive blow struck the Japanese was struck by an American airplane.

Both battles were fought to the same pattern, but Midway was by far the larger and more decisive. The Japanese approached the islands* of Midway with an armada made up of eleven battleships, seventy-six other combat craft, and sixteen transports carrying twenty-two thousand Marines and infantrymen. Having broken the Japanese code, we had fore-knowledge of the attack and were able to concentrate all available Army, Navy and Marine aircraft at Midway. Our aviation, of course, was handicapped by the old divided command, but all units "co-operated," and our superb and heroic personnel made up in blood and skill what they lacked in unified training and direction.

Around 9 P.M., June 3, 1942, patrol planes sighted the enemy eight hundred miles off Midway, just as Knerr had envisioned in 1931. Nine B-17's based on Midway were ordered to attack. They reached one of the Jap columns around midnight, and bombing by moonlight, they damaged one cruiser and two transports. Four Navy flying boats attacked the same column two hours later and torpedoed one of the battleships.

Near dawn on June 4, Army medium bombers, carrying both bombs and torpedoes, and Marine dive bombers and torpedo planes took off from Midway and engaged the Japanese heavily. Four Army mediums attacked a carrier successfully, but two of the planes were lost. Six Marine seaplanes, carrying torpedoes, hit another carrier, but five of these unwieldy planes were lost. Sixteen Marine dive

* Midway is not one island, but two.

bombers went after two cruisers and scored hits, but eight of these planes were lost.

Meanwhile, on June 4, just as Knerr had foreseen, Jap carrier planes attacked Midway. They were engaged by heavily outnumbered Marine fighters. The gallant Marine force shot down forty enemy planes and damaged many others. The Japanese bombs dropped on Midway did little damage, both because all of our planes were in the air and because the Japanese were under attack by our fighters.

Our dawn attack on the Japanese fleet had caused it to shift course, with the result that the first American carrier group met with disaster. The carrier planes, seeking the Japanese, ran short of fuel and a number of these planes were forced down at sea without having engaged the enemy.

A second group of our carrier planes found the Japanese about noon, however. Fifteen torpedo planes of this group attacked and reported hits by radio, but the extent of damage done by these planes was never known because none returned.

During the afternoon of June 4 all types of American planes, both land-based and carrier-borne, operated against the Japanese; and their carrier planes, attacking our fleet, gave the carrier *Yorktown* her death blows. Our Navy dive bombers attacked relentlessly and scored hit after hit on the four Japanese carriers.

On the morning of June 5, the enemy was in full retreat. And why? The Japanese still had, undamaged, eight battle-ships, at least ten cruisers, and more than a score of destroyers. This is a formidable fleet. Why were they run-

ning instead of continuing their advance? They had lost their aviation. Every Japanese carrier was either sunk or out of action. For them to have pressed on toward their objective would have meant certain annihilation by our planes. Just as Knerr had foreseen, the enemy had to retreat the moment he lost his carriers.

During the day of June 5, our B-17's made three attacks on the retreating Japanese and hit two cruisers. Land-based Marine planes damaged another cruiser. Our carrier-based planes were hampered by bad weather on this day, but on the following day, June 6, they sank one cruiser and one destroyer.

Total Japanese ship losses at Midway were four carriers, two cruisers, three destroyers, and several transports sunk, and three battleships, four cruisers, and several destroyers damaged. They also lost 275 planes and about five thousand men.

The argument as to whether Army or Navy or Marine flyers sank the most ships at Midway will never be settled because too many of the men who scored the hits never returned. Some Japanese reports credit the land-based planes with being most effective; but my own opinion is that the Navy dive bombers struck the most telling blows. Many of the dive-bomber crews rode their bombs almost to the decks of the Jap carriers. But this argument is of no concern here, because, far from challenging the quality of American Navy aviation, I emphasize that it is magnificent. The men who flew the Helldivers were the same brand of boys as those who flew the B-25's at Bismarck Sea, and who flew the B-29's over Tokyo. Here I am look-

ing for false claims, improper doctrines, and organizational handicaps.

The false claim about Midway is that it was a "naval" battle and a "seapower" victory. American airplanes fought the battle, fired all the offensive shots, and won the battle. Just who commanded the various groups of planes and what uniforms the personnel wore, these matters are important only to service hierarchies, only to men concerned with command position. All the airplanes belonged to the American people; all the personnel were Americans. They all fought valiantly, skillfully, and effectively.

So it was American airplanes which won the critical battles of Midway and Coral Sea; and it was the American fleet which supported the American airplanes in these battles. The fleet *supported* the land-based planes by safeguarding the supply route to the land-base. The fleet *supported* the carrier-based planes by supplying and trying to safeguard the floating bases. The fleet performed its vital role valiantly and efficiently, despite the loss of two big carriers. But let's make no mistake about it: *the fleet did no fighting except its defensive fighting against enemy aircraft*. The anti-aircraft gunners on the islands of Midway, fighting to drive off the Jap bombers, did exactly the same sort of fighting during the battle as the fleet did.

Thus—Admiral King's claims to the contrary—American seapower did not win Coral Sea and Midway. American air power, divided and improperly developed as it was, won those battles. And the American fleet—American seapower—*supported* American air power.

I emphasize this explanation because Navy propaganda

—intent upon preventing the admirals from being relegated to the command of supporting operations—spent millions of dollars during the war confusing the people on this point.

In a battle there is always a group of boys who are up forward smashing the enemy in the face and delivering the *decisive* blows. Then there are all sorts of groups who, in one form or another, are engaged in passing the ammunition and protecting the dumps and communications. All of these latter groups are *supporting* groups. Supporting groups are vital, maybe “just as important” as the group up front, but the group up forward, the group delivering the decisive blows—this group, quite properly, has always claimed the privilege of over-all command.

There you have the burr under the admiral’s blanket. The admirals want to sit back on the battleships, two hundred miles from where the decisive action is taking place, and still exercise their over-all command! Once the admirals are forced to admit that the airplanes are *decisive*, and that the fleet, with its battleships, are only a *supporting* group, then the admirals must surrender their privilege of over-all command; they must “lose prestige” to the air officers.

That’s the sum and substance of all the wrangling between the Army and the Navy. The old days when the fleet was the majestic “first line of defense” are gone forever. Developments in the air have relegated the commanders of surface ships forever to inferior command positions because these developments have relegated fleets to supporting roles. The admirals are cringing from the handwriting on the wall. By confusing the people and by divid-

ing the country's aerial resources, they have hoped to escape the fate which to them is worse than death: *inferior command position*.

Who was up forward sinking the Japanese ships at Coral Sea and Midway? And who was two hundred miles back in the ruck, valiantly passing the ammunition and trying to protect the dumps and communications? Who was *decisive* and who *supported* at Midway and Coral Sea?

And if the battleships were back there two hundred miles from where the decisive blows were being struck; if the big naval guns were never fired; if the battleships could find nothing better to do than try to survive under Japanese aerial attack, or at best, to try to help protect the dumps—then battleships hardly were the “best of modern weapons” when the chips were down, were they? And Admiral Leahy and his brother admirals were a discredited group of admirals.

I believe you will agree that this is a significant fact: no man in the United States Navy holding the rank of admiral—even a rear admiral—ever approached within two hundred miles of the “decisive theater” at Midway and Coral Sea.

Yet seapower, we are told by Admiral King, *won* the war in the Pacific.

One other aspect of Midway deserves your attention. Of the Army, Navy and Marine aviation engaged, Navy aviation—carrier aviation—suffered by far the heaviest losses. The \$75,000,000 *Lexington*, with all of her planes, had been lost at Coral Sea; and at Midway our principal loss was the \$75,000,000 *Yorktown* with most of her

planes. While the *Lexington* was sinking, her planes had continued to land on her deck so that the personnel could be saved. The planes lacked the range to get back to a land base. Every time a plane landed on the sinking deck, another \$40,000 and desperately needed airplane was added to our losses. At Midway many of the *Yorktown's* planes ran out of fuel and went down before they could get back to the sinking carrier.

Compared to carrier and float plane losses at Midway, our land-based aviation suffered only slightly. The Army and Marine planes had ample range to go meet the Japanese and then return to the land base, and the land base itself was damaged hardly at all by Japanese bombing.

So the question of Midway is, why didn't our carrier planes operate off the land base? Our fleet at Midway furnished expensive targets for the Japanese planes. Why didn't we hide the fleet *east* of Midway where the enemy couldn't find it, and send the carrier planes to operate off Midway itself? Then the Japanese bombers would have had no target but the unsinkable islands; their losses would have been the same; and our own losses would have been so much less.

The answer is that the carrier planes did not have the necessary range. Midway had to be fought the way it was fought because we were desperate and had to employ everything we had that would fly. Because the carrier planes lacked the necessary range, the carriers had to be deployed between Midway and the approaching Japanese, and the protecting fleet had to accompany the carriers.

But why was this so? Why were not the carrier planes

equipped with disposable auxiliary fuel tanks to extend their range so that they could have operated from the land base?

The explanation here will madden you. According to the agreement which divided aviation between the Army and Navy, any bombardment plane which operated off the land would have to be under Army command. So by restricting the range of its bombardment aircraft, the Navy emphasized the dependence of these planes upon carrier bases and precluded the possibility of such planes ever falling under Army command.

Why were there no long-range, land-based torpedo planes for use at Midway? You recall that General Martin and Admiral Bellinger had pleaded for such planes to protect Hawaii. Why didn't we have them at Midway? In 1932, the air officers asked the Navy to co-operate with them in the development of a land-based torpedo bomber. The admirals informed the Air Corps, in effect, that the torpedo was a "Navy weapon," and therefore the Army Air Corps had no business experimenting with it, and all torpedo planes should be carrier-based.

A land-based torpedo plane, you see, would have been a "non-conforming" plane, a plane which could not conform to the plan by which aviation was divided between the *land* and the *sea*. A land-based torpedo plane, by law and the agreement, would have to be under Army command; it would have to be flown by Army personnel; but Navy torpedomen would be the logical men to handle the torpedoes! So, of course, such a plane was absurd. We

couldn't have a respectable "Navy" torpedo flying through the air under the command of some Army general.

You see how tragically ridiculous this becomes!

Now go back to the blow-by-blow account of Midway and view the result of such nonsense. "Six Marine seaplanes, carrying torpedoes, hit another carrier, but five of these unwieldy planes were lost." Of all the planes used to attack surface ships, the torpedo plane takes the most cruel risk. It must fly straight at the ship it is attacking only a few feet above the water, so it is vulnerable to every gun on the ship. Certainly it should be of the fastest, most maneuverable design possible.

Then why were these Marine torpedo planes equipped with floats? Why were they seaplanes? Nothing limits the speed and maneuverability of a plane more than floats. These planes were based at Midway; there was no reason why they should not have had retractable wheels instead of floats. No reason, that is, except the reason of *command*! If a torpedo plane didn't operate off a carrier, it certainly should operate off water, because the torpedo, you see, is a "Navy" weapon.

So six gallant Marine pilots had to carry the handicap of floats when they rode their torpedoes toward the side of that Japanese carrier. They hit the carrier all right, but only one pilot came back to tell the story.

There is one other reason why the carrier-based bombers were so disastrously short-ranged. The Navy planners had been certain that whenever carrier planes went into action, the enemy targets would be within the "theater of action"

—meaning within gunshot of the battleships. Why, then, did carrier planes need an operating range which would take them clear out of the “theater of operations?”

Thus it seems to me that the inescapable conclusions of Midway are:

1. Like Coral Sea, it was a victory for American air power, with American seapower in support.

2. The risking of our fleet and the loss of the *Yorktown* were necessary only because of the desperate shortage of land-based aircraft, which was due to jealous conflict and lack of vision within the Army and Navy commands.

3. The Navy exposed the flyers under its command to risks which could have been prevented had the Navy Command been concerned more with the nation's welfare and less with Navy command position.

4. Air power proved at Midway that it *can* intercept a surface fleet; it *can* control sea lanes; it *can* do everything which the generals once thought it couldn't do, and which the admirals still insist it can't do.

5. Air power won the battle in spite of all the handicaps which had been imposed upon it by its ancient-minded enemies who had throttled its development and had sought to repress it into the outmoded mold of our dual land-sea organization.

VIII

I MET CIVILIAN HUGH KNERR IN 1942 WHILE HE WAS working for the Sperry Company, trying to improve the power turret and the computing gunsight so that our four-motored bombers could survive in the skies over Europe. Assisted by Generals Arnold and Andrews, he had made two efforts to get restored to active duty in the Air Force, but both efforts had been unavailing. Here's why.

General Marshall had made heart-lifting progress in reorganizing the War Department, in shunting the Maginot boys to jobs where they couldn't do any harm, and in rectifying the mistakes of the past. But there remained one unreduced citadel of Maginot-mindedness. The War Department has a committee which passes on all applications by retired officers for return to active duty. And who do you suppose was boss of this committee in 1942? None other than General Malin Craig, the former Chief of Staff who had presided at the throttling of the B-17 in 1938, who had turned a deaf ear to Knerr's "vehement protests" against having to put machine guns on trainer planes so that they could be counted as "combat craft," and who had broken up the General Headquarters Air Force, fired Knerr out of the service, and "disciplined" Generals Andrews, Kenney and McNarney.

Malin Craig, the high priest of the reactionaries! And hell hath no fury like a reactionary who has been proved wrong. He was determined that Hugh Knerr never again would wear the uniform of the United States Army, and as late as October 1942, he still had the power to enforce his determination.

When I met Colonel Knerr in 1942, he was disturbed by several things that were going on:

1. We had been in the war for nearly a year; yet our bombers had not yet been able to mount an attack against Germany. This fact played into the hands of all the old enemies of American air power. The people, as I have shown, had been told that we had "thousands of airplanes" in 1939. The people thought of the Flying Fortress—the term itself was misleading—as an "old" airplane; they had seen it in the movies in 1939; so, naturally, they had assumed that it was fully developed, that we had hundreds of trained crews, and that American air power was ready to fight when the war began.

As the war moved toward its second year, with our air force in England still unable to match the British effort, the critical rumblings grew louder. It became fashionable to sneer at the "Flying Fortress." Navy propaganda was encouraging this groundswell of disillusionment, and certain Army ground officers were using it to support their efforts to reduce the amount of trans-Atlantic shipping allotted to the Air Force.

Our British friends, too, were adding fuel to this fire. They were ridiculing our doctrine of daylight bombing as "visionary," and insisting that we abandon the doctrine

and adapt our planes to accompany the British planes on their night missions.

Many Americans who should have known better were losing faith and joining the critics. This defection continued until the summer of 1943, when our big bombers were ready at last to begin cutting the heart out of Germany. In March 1943, I defended the American doctrine of daylight bombing in a debate on *Town Hall of the Air*. I explained the delays and urged that General Andrews, our commander in England at that time, be given a chance to demonstrate the soundness of the Air Force bombardment doctrine.

My opponent in that debate was my good friend, Allan Michie, the *Reader's Digest* correspondent in England. Influenced by his friends in the RAF, Michie urged the abandonment of the very techniques which later were to prove decisive in Europe. This illustrates the extent and the seriousness of the criticism of our Air Force in 1942 and 1943. There was real danger that the Air Force might be hamstrung again, at the moment when it was about to overcome at last its long series of handicaps.

This possibility greatly concerned Colonel Knerr, and he wanted to do something about it. He wanted to explain the delays to the people. He wanted to tell how and why our big bombers were undeveloped in 1941, how it takes two years to train a crew to handle an American bomber, and he wanted to ask the people to give the Air Force a little more time.

2. Colonel Knerr was also worried about the fratricidal struggle for command which was being waged by generals

and admirals in our most vital defense zones. He had just returned from visiting General Andrews in the Panama Canal Zone, and he knew of the Navy's efforts to obstruct unity of command at that most vital of all our outposts. (I'll discuss this in detail in a later chapter.) He thought the people should be warned of this situation.

3. Colonel Knerr found the Navy propaganda about Coral Sea and Midway unbearably galling.

So I persuaded him to do some writing. He didn't persuade easily; he is extremely modest. Despite his great courage and vision, he has never sought to attract attention to himself. He is a poor showman. He is an engineer—military, naval, mechanical and aerial. He has been scrapping with the admirals ever since he was graduated from Annapolis in 1908. He left the Navy and joined the Air Corps, as did several of the present Air Force leaders. He had been scrapping with the Army and Navy reactionaries for thirty-five years, but he had never let the public in on his scraps. Now he was a civilian and had every right to say what he pleased in public, but he resisted my arguments until one day he found in his files a letter from Billy Mitchell in which Mitchell had warned him always to appeal to the people when the Air Force needed help. Then he weakened.

In July 1942, Colonel Knerr's articles began appearing in *The American Mercury* and in newspapers served by the North American Newspaper Alliance. I wrote the articles—writing is my trade—but the ideas were all his. They were remarkably sound articles which explained the reasons for the delay in our bombardment of Europe,

which correctly analyzed the Pacific battles, and which pointed out the dangers inherent in the struggle for command then being waged in the Pacific theaters. Since the articles were being censored in Washington, the statements had to be guarded and there was little opportunity to cite chapter and verse.

But a great many people were attracted to the articles, and the "Washington reaction" was not long delayed. The old military mentality will never tolerate criticism if it has the power to destroy the critic.

Early in September a gold-braided representative of the Navy Department called at the Sperry Company and delivered an ultimatum. The company's engineering consultant, one Hugh Knerr, was to be fired immediately or the company would have trouble with its Navy contracts.

The president of Sperry is a man of integrity. He resented the ultimatum and put up an argument. Whatever Knerr had written had been passed by the proper authorities in Washington and printed in responsible journals, and thus it was none of Sperry's business. Besides, Knerr could not be replaced. No man in America had his engineering knowledge of the four-motored bomber, and at this moment he was working eighteen hours a day to eliminate the "bugs" from such equipment as the power turret and the computing gunsight—instruments on which the lives of thousands of Americans depended. The Navy had no right! . . .

But the Navy applied the knout, and on the bitterest day in the life of the man who had to announce the decision, Hugh Knerr was informed that he was fired.

I visited Knerr that evening at his home at the Pennsylvania Hotel. He was working over some blueprints, remarkably unruffled.

"It's no more than I expected," he said. "I've been fighting those buckaroos so long that nothing they do surprises me. I don't mind losing the money, but I hate like hell to have my work interrupted. It's getting *late, late, late!* Then, too, I hate to see decent men like the Sperry officials have to submit to that rubber hose. It isn't a very nice spectacle."

After duly informing the Navy that Knerr had been discharged and after removing his name from their books, the Sperry Company worked out a camouflage plan by which Knerr could continue his work. They found it necessary to call him in for consultation "several times a week," and this allowed his work to go on even though Sperry could present its books for Navy inspection at any moment and prove that Knerr was not on the payroll.

Meanwhile, Colonel Knerr and I had decided to write a book. We thought we might as well inform the people as to why we didn't have any air power when the war began, why it took so long to get cracking in England, and what the trouble was in the Pacific. We called the book *The Fight for Air Power*; it was to be published in November 1942, by L. B. Fischer Publishing Company. We rolled up sixty thousand words of manuscript, got galley proofs, and dropped them on the proper desk in Washington for censorship. The book was to be signed by me as the author *with* Colonel Hugh J. Knerr.

That did it! When that book hit Washington it was

"Action Stations" for every member of the Ancient and Worshipful Protective Association of Brass Hats. Rachitic frames which once had bestrode quarterdecks or graced horse shows bounded out of bed and manned all guns. Already Secretary of War Stimson had been routed out in order to halt a speaking tour by Knerr, a move unprecedented in American history and for which the able Secretary had questionable legal authority.

I came down to Washington with my lawyers, and we spent the first two days listening to high-pitched accusations of treason. Then, when the voices had subsided to a medium decibel rating, we tried to get down to cases. It became apparent that the "Government's strategy" was:

1. To suppress the book entirely.
2. Failing this, to remove Knerr's name at all cost and thus rob it of its military authority, and then to delay the book and slash it to pieces.

What was wrong with the book? Were the statements in error? If so, I was ready, anxious to be corrected. Was I betraying secrets to the enemy? If so, I was even more anxious to remove the offending material.

I'll never forget the experience of combing that manuscript page by page with the old gentleman who was assigned to wield the ax. He was a goodhearted old fellow; he later did me several favors. But how he sweated! He'd read a paragraph, grimace as though he had bitten into a green persimmon, then turn to me pleadingly: "Huie, what the hell you want to dig up this old stuff for?"

"Why, I think the people ought to know about it, sir," I'd come back. "You know that old newspaper slogan:

'Give the people light and they will find their own way.' "

"But this is in the past!" he'd snort. "We've corrected this! If you print it now it'll divide the people during war-time!"

"But this explains why we didn't have any airplanes when the war began, and why we haven't been able to get going in England. And the people are sturdy; they can take it."

When he'd come to a bitter truth about the old Army-Navy "teamwork," he'd grimace even more painfully and exclaim: "You can't print this! You'll cause a lot of mothers to worry! You'll cause the folks to lose confidence in their leadership!"

"But sir, how are the people ever going to reform these old systems if they don't hear the whole truth? Must we forever mesmerize ourselves with that old hymn to teamwork and co-operation? Give 'em the truth, and the people will find ways to correct some of these evils."

"But these Army-Navy squabbles are like poverty; we'll always have 'em. It's not right to talk about 'em in war-time!"

And so it went. During the week the "Government" played an ace. It seems that there is an old law which makes it illegal to quote from War or Navy Department "documents" during wartime without official permission. Much of my best material had come from the files of some agency of the War Department. Even all of Colonel Knerr's personal correspondence had been on letterheads of an "agency of the War Department." So the "Govern-

ment" used this old law to rip out the guts of the manuscript.

Then came the matter of Colonel Knerr's name. I was informed that his name "absolutely must not be associated with this book in any form or fashion."

It was my cue to do a little shouting. Colonel Knerr had not requested that his name be withdrawn; he was a free, white, and 21-year-old American *civilian* and could make his own decisions. Unless he requested in writing that his name be withdrawn, the much-mangled manuscript would still go to press with his name on it. And the "Government" could go to hell! With that I picked up the tatters of *The Fight For Air Power* and went back to New York.

But the "Government" still had unplayed aces. A land mine exploded somewhere, and Colonel Knerr was summoned to the office of the Chief of Staff and informed—to his delight and astonishment—that as of that moment he was *recalled to active duty*! And his first orders were to get his name off that book.

Do you get the irony of it all? Knerr had exhausted every resource to be recalled to active duty, but he had been stopped cold by General Craig. And now somebody in Washington was so anxious to sabotage a book that they had pressured either General Marshall or Mr. Stimson into beating down the opposition so that Knerr could be recalled!

Under these circumstances you'd think that Knerr would be returning to a custom-built doghouse. He re-entered the service as a lieutenant colonel, his permanent rank.

He'd be sure to go no higher, would serve out the war in Siberia. But no! He quickly went to a two-star general's berth—deputy commander to General Spaatz of U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe—and by the end of the war he was director of the Air Technical Service Command, the most responsible engineering job in all the armed services!

When the "Government" had obtained Knerr's recall to active duty, the "Government" assumed that its book troubles were over. But the Colonel quickly blockbusted this assumption. Of course, he said, now that he was on active duty he'd quit writing and talking for publication, but—and this was the blockbuster—he obviously had no control over material which had been assembled and disposed of during the period he was a civilian!

But the "Government" still had its last ace. In me and in Knerr the "Government" had caught a couple of Tartars, but there remained a third and more vulnerable link in the book chain: the publisher, Mr. Fischer.

You probably don't know Mr. Fischer. For fifty years his house was the largest and most reputable publishing house in Europe. He published Thomas Mann, Ernest Hemingway, Franz Werfel and many others. But the Fischers are Jewish, and they had escaped to America after the Nazis had confiscated their properties. Mr. Fischer is a *big* man, a man of courage and tremendous integrity. You'd hardly call him inexperienced in the matter of "Government" censorship.

Mr. Fischer had published my first novel, and he had given me so decent a deal that I had taken *The Fight For Air Power* to him. He had met Colonel Knerr and was

impressed, as is everyone, by that man's earnestness and obvious ability. He was ready and anxious to publish the remains of the book.

But after the "Government" had failed to persuade either me or Colonel Knerr to remove the Colonel's name from the book, Mr. Fischer found himself in contact with the "Government's" agents. And here the "Government" *really* stooped to conquer. Mr. Fischer was blandly asked to reflect that he was not yet an American citizen, that he was in no position to displease the "Government."

I never got mad until that foul blow was struck. As Colonel Knerr remarked of the Sperry officials, it isn't nice to see a man of integrity hit with the rubber hose.

"I thought I'd get away from this sort of thing when I came to America," Mr. Fischer remarked to me, "but I guess some of the poison has spread over here."

Well, we were licked. We didn't have much book left anyhow. While the engravers sawed Colonel Knerr's name out of the plates, I hastily tried to fill in the big gaps. The improvisations were disheartening. Late in December, the worst possible time to publish a book, we published the skeleton just for the record. We made no effort to promote it. Despite the emasculations, *The New York Daily Mirror* and one of the London papers serialized it; and *The Washington Post*, long a staunch friend of the air underdogs, gave it considerable editorial attention.

That's how General Hugh J. Knerr, aerial visionary and crusader for big bombers, failed to write a book but won the right to return to the service of his country.

I tell this sordid story here only to call attention to a

situation which I believe should be corrected in the national interest. In peacetime, at least, shouldn't it be made possible for a professional member of the armed forces to express his critical views directly to the American people without jeopardizing his career? By their very natures military organizations, especially in peacetime, tend to ossify at the top; the disciples of orthodoxy are automatically promoted to power; and they, in turn, suppress the "agitators" who dare to question the judgment of "superior officers." How can a free people intervene in favor of the "agitators" unless the "agitators" are privileged to make a public appeal without risk to themselves? How can a free people be forewarned of Maginot-mindedness?

I tell this story also as a prelude to a suggestion I want to make to the United States Naval Academy. When the Academy gets around to considering which of its distinguished sons of the second World War it will honor by hanging their pictures on its hallowed walls, I hope that Hugh Knerr, class of 1908, will not be overlooked.

Nimitz, Leahy, King and Halsey all had distinguished careers in the second World War. They belong up there with Farragut and John Paul Jones. They had ability, and Halsey had the stuff to make men want to fight by his side. But it was Knerr who had the vision. More clearly than any of the rest, he envisioned how the battles of the second World War would be fought, what weapons would be decisive. In the military doldrums of the twenties and the thirties, while the rest were sitting in comfortable ward-rooms meditating on Jutland and Trafalgar, Knerr was at his drawing boards with his mind already at Midway and

in the skies over Germany. And while the rest were safely yessing their superiors, Knerr was out on the hustings yelling: "Damn the torpedoes, boys; full speed ahead."

This time Annapolis can best honor itself by honoring a renegade.

IX

I SHALL NOW EXAMINE WHAT I HAVE CALLED "THE FRATRICIDAL struggle for command," and shall further demonstrate why and how this struggle must be eliminated.

To understand this struggle, you first must understand the wartime evolution and aspirations of your Navy. What do you think of when you think of the *Navy*? You think of the fleet. Ships. The operation and maintenance of ships. The necessary bases. Aircraft carriers. The irrepressible Marines; a small, elite force which serves as the Navy's police force and performs incredible feats of valor. The Navy: the sea-fighting force which clears the sea roads for America's commerce, which stands ready to destroy any opposing fleet, which delivers the Army to the land battlegrounds, and which then safeguards the sea lines of communication.

This traditional conception fits the Navy which fought so valiantly and effectively in the war against Germany. The role of the Navy in the Atlantic was simple and clear. It fought the German submarines; it kept open the sea lanes to Britain; it safeguarded the delivery of the Ground Army and the Air Force to Britain, to Africa, to Sicily and Italy, and to France; it helped to keep the supplies rolling over the beaches.

There was no question of where the Navy fitted into the European command picture. There were four great divisions of effort in the European theater: the air forces, the ground forces, the sea forces, and the service forces. Remember these four divisions because they are the inevitable divisions of effort in the wars of our time.

As an American and as a Navy man, I'm proud of our Navy's role in the war against Germany. It was my privilege to be with that part of the Navy which approached Omaha Beach in the dark morning hours of June 6, 1944. I saw the Navy demolition men hit the beach called Easy Red with their explosives strapped to their bodies. I saw the Seabees fighting those four-foot waves to bring in the tanks. I watched the beach battalions take their cruel losses; and I saw those destroyers damning the torpedoes as they lunged to within point-blank range of the Boche batteries. It was magnificent—all that Stephen Decatur and John Paul Jones could have expected of their sons.

But the Navy—and here I mean the Navy Command, the admirals—found little comfort in the Navy's role in the war against Germany. The older officers tried to avoid service in the European theater. The European theater was for the reserves and for the younger Annapolis men. Why?

The Navy's role—magnificent as it may appear to you and me—was still a *supporting* role. Of those four big divisions of effort, the Navy was only the sea forces and a small part of the service forces. And—oh gall and wormwood!—the Navy, in the person of Admiral Stark, did not even sit at Eisenhower's *right*! The Navy was relegated

to the *left* because the Air Force—the striking, decisive force—was monopolizing the right.

Moreover, the Navy Command was embarrassed by the Atlantic situation because there the accent was on small ships. Corvettes, destroyer-escorts, destroyers, small escort carriers. The big ships—the heavy cruisers, battleships and big carriers—had virtually no part in the war against Germany. And it takes big ships to support big rank. You can't become an admiral by messing around with destroyers; a destroyer isn't big enough for an admiral to run up his flag on.

It was painfully obvious that the battleship was a dodo in European waters. A battleship loses its reason for being when it doesn't have another battleship to fight. You may employ it for lesser chores, but when you do, you are driving tacks with a sledgehammer. The Normandy landing is convincing proof that battleships are of little use in a landing operation. There, in the biggest of all the shows, where the opposition was supposed to be the toughest, we had the three oldest battleships in the fleet. They fired a few desultory rounds, but I don't believe that Admiral Stark would insist that they influenced the success of the operation. If battleships could come anywhere near pulling their weight in a landing operation, you can be certain that the English Channel would have been full of them that morning.

And the last reason why the Navy Command was unhappy about the European theater was that Eisenhower had decided he could make his landings without the help of the Marines. Efforts to insert Marine units into the Eu-

ropean cast had been made repeatedly but unsuccessfully. And one of the reasons—perhaps the principal reason—why no Marines were used in Europe is worth a chuckle.

The Marine publicity bulldozer is a fearsome instrument. Every American who journeyed to France in 1917 to 1918 can remember how one regiment of Marines “won” that war. That little matter had rankled in Army breasts for twenty years. Eisenhower knew that if he ever allowed *one battalion* of Marines on a European beachhead, the Marines would start “winning the war” in the newsreels and public prints, and the effect on the morale of three million weary doughfeet would not be good.

Marine publicity was on hand in London all right. They were all set to win the second World War. They had a big office with their sign hung out. But they just couldn’t get one Marine ashore in France. If they ever had, that one Marine probably would have outraced Patton, broad-jumped the Rhine, and brought Hitler back alive.

Another supreme command which irked the Navy hierarchy was the one established in the Panama Canal area immediately after Pearl Harbor. The Canal was our most vital spot; General Marshall has testified that he expected a Jap attack there. So, responding to the public demand for air officers and for one-man responsibility, the President, with much fanfare, took General Andrews from the General Staff and named him supreme commander “with complete responsibility” at the Canal.

When Andrews arrived at the Canal in December 1941, an attack was expected momentarily. In this nation’s history

it was the gravest hour since Gettysburg. There were admirals on both the Pacific and the Atlantic sides of the Canal, and both admirals were there to help defend the Canal. Andrews was their new supreme commander—the man who had to co-ordinate all land, sea and air defenses, the man who would be held completely responsible in the event of a disaster.

As Americans you and I would imagine that those two admirals would have been waiting for General Andrews at his office when he arrived. Sober-faced, they would have pledged their co-operation, produced their patrol plans, and gotten down to business immediately.

But nothing like this happened. Instead, the admiral on the Pacific side refused to call on General Andrews at all, and the admiral on the Atlantic side began an immediate campaign to shear Andrews of some of his authority.

The defense problem at the Canal was essentially the same as the one which General Martin had sought to solve at Hawaii with his plan of August 20. The enemy planes would have to come on a carrier. The carrier would have to be within three hundred miles of the Canal at dawn in order for its planes to attack effectively. Thus the carrier would have to approach within six hundred miles of the Canal during daylight on the preceding day. To prevent enemy planes from reaching the Canal, our forces had to sight the carrier on the preceding day. This meant that Pacific and Atlantic arcs six to eight hundred miles from the Canal had to be searched carefully every day. Danger in the Pacific arc was more acute because Japanese carriers

were aprowl in the Pacific, while a German carrier attack was unlikely.

But General Andrews did not have enough planes to search these arcs carefully every day. It was therefore imperative that his air patrol be integrated with the Navy surface patrol. In an effort to do this, General Andrews radioed the Pacific admiral and asked him to come to his headquarters and bring his surface patrol plan.

The Pacific admiral replied that he took orders: *only from the Navy Department!*

General Andrews then pointed out the urgency of integrating the two patrols and suggested that the surface patrol plan be sent to him.

The Pacific admiral replied that he had no intention of delivering his patrol plan to the so-called supreme command because if he did so: *every spy in the Canal Zone will know the plan.*

Under war conditions it was necessary for air bombardment crews to know the position of all American warships at all times. Why? If our bombers sighted a carrier in the early morning haze, were the bombers to waste precious minutes determining whether she was friend or foe? A carrier can discharge her planes in a matter of minutes, and once those planes were off, some of them were almost certain to get to the Canal. Thus the only logical plan was for our bombers to know the position of all American ships, so that they could attack *on sight* any unidentified craft.

But before General Andrews could put the only logical plan into effect, he had to appeal to Washington and the

Pacific admiral had to be replaced. And what did the Navy Department do to the non-co-operative Pacific admiral? It promoted him.

On the Atlantic side General Andrews had his troubles, too. The key to the Atlantic defenses of the Canal was the area around the Windward Islands. The six to eight hundred mile arc through which a carrier had to pass in daylight cuts through these islands. It was in these islands that some of the bombers and search planes for defending the Canal were based.

Naturally, it was imperative that the search schedule of the planes based in the Windward Island be integrated in the search plan for all planes guarding the Canal on the Atlantic side. This is military *abc*.

But don't forget Navy prestige! The Navy Department managed to take command of "operations" in the Windward Islands away from General Andrews and give it to the Naval District Commander. General Andrews was allowed to retain "administrative" responsibility in the Windward Islands, but the admiral got "operations." This meant that while General Andrews and the Air Force supplied the planes in the Windward Islands, the planes could take off only when ordered to do so by an admiral.

You see how the cancer works? The old divided responsibility. The fratricidal struggle for command. The incredible shenanigans of supposedly responsible and patriotic men at a moment when the nation's life is in peril.

I relate this episode only because as late as December 1945, the admirals, in their efforts to preserve command position at the expense of reform, are still trying to sell

the people on "service co-operation," still chanting the Old School refrain: 'Tis Better To Co-operate Than To Merge.

To compensate for what to them was an "inferior command position" in the European theater and at the Canal, the Navy hierarchy fixed their sights on one bright goal: supreme command in the Pacific. The management of the war would be divided in halves. The glittering stars, the prestige, and the supremacy would be divided equally between the admirals and the generals.

But would a fifty-fifty division be fair? What about the Air Force, which of itself would be as large as the entire Navy organization? Was the Air Force—the new first line of offense—to have no prestige? The Army and Air Force organizations were to total 8,600,000 men; the entire Navy organization was to total four million. Would a fifty-fifty division be fair?

Fair or not, the Navy Command set out to get it. That they were partially successful is evidenced by the fact that on the Joint Chiefs of Staff the Navy had two representatives, the Army one, the Air Force one. And of men of five-star rank, the Navy got four, the Army three, the Air Force one.

At the very beginning of their struggle for supreme command in the Pacific, the Navy had to protect its command interests at Hawaii. For on the day after the disaster at Pearl Harbor, the President, in response to the public furor, had named an air officer, General Emmons, as supreme commander at Hawaii. But Emmons was only a

three-star general, so the Navy managed to get four stars for Nimitz, who was replacing the two-starred Admiral Kimmel. In addition, the Navy sent three-starred Admiral Towers to Hawaii to "build up the Navy's land-based aviation."

Therefore, while Emmons was to be held "completely responsible" for the defense of the island, the supreme command passed to the four-starred Admiral Nimitz, and Emmons became known as "the Prisoner of Pearl Harbor." Even his communications to Washington first had to be passed by the Navy supreme command.

I'm sure that the average American doesn't understand all that goes with "supreme command." There is much more than an extra star involved. The service which has supreme command controls all the means of communication; it issues all the communiques; it sets up the press, radio and movie organization; it appoints the censors; all the correspondents in the theater must be accredited to it; no correspondent can enter the theater without the approval of the supreme commander.

In short, the supreme command organization is the perfect microcosm of dictatorship. Every communication from the supreme command to the people must extol the wisdom of the supreme command, must promote the policies of the service enjoying the supreme command. Supreme commands are necessary but dangerous.

Now let's examine the Navy's supreme command position at Hawaii. Remember those cardinal divisions of effort in warfare in our time? Air forces, ground forces, sea forces, service forces. Which of these did the Navy have

in 1941? Only sea forces and a small complement of service forces. The Navy had no air forces; its carrier aviation had been designed only to support the fleet; the Navy had no land-based aviation at all. As for ground forces, the Marines were not and were never intended to be an "army."

The Navy hierarchy was determined to maintain supreme command all the way to Tokyo. But when we became ready to begin moving across the Pacific, the air forces and ground forces and their service forces would be far larger than the fleet, so how then would the Navy hierarchy justify its supreme command position?

The Navy Command had the answer. The *Navy* was going to change its character as it expanded. No longer was the *Navy* going to fit my and your conception of the Navy. The Pacific *Navy* was not going to be the simple sea forces of the European theater. The Pacific *Navy* was going to be the works: air forces, ground forces, sea forces, and service forces.

The Navy Department determined to make of itself a *super* War Department! It proposed, not only to expand the fleet out of all sensible proportion, but also to duplicate every function of the War Department!

And this is what was done. We are now in the ridiculous position as a nation of maintaining *two war departments!* During the war, our War Department controlled more ships than the Navy did, and our Navy—at our expense—proceeded to duplicate the War Department's air force and its ground force.

In considering what reforms are now indicated, you must not think of our Navy in the traditional sense. Our

Navy Department today is no more and no less than a complete war department.

Admiral Halsey boasted of this fact when he said: "If the Army wants unification, let them join the Navy. We've got everything."

And why did the admirals develop the Navy into a *super* war department? Didn't they know that this was the course of duplication and shameful waste? Yes.

But the admirals built themselves a super war department *to support the command position they were determined to have in the Pacific!*

First, the admirals built themselves a ground army of more than a million men—Marines, Seabees, etc. Then they moved boldly toward enforcing Admiral King's old dictum that "Army aviation should end at the shore line." Prior to Pearl Harbor, in an effort to prevent duplication, the Navy had been restrained from buying land-based airplanes. But right at the time when the Air Force was trying to concentrate four-motored bombers in England, the Navy began competing with the Air Force in the manufacture and purchase of B-24 bombers.

The same planes which the admirals had tried to prevent the Air Force from developing, the admirals now began snatching for themselves.

The Navy duplicated air training facilities throughout the country; on islands throughout the Pacific they built naval air stations within hollering distance of Army air fields, all in a desperate race to pile up Navy rank and strengthen Navy command position. The Navy hierarchy

was determined to duplicate the Eisenhower setup in the Pacific with an admiral as Ike.

If the Navy expected to be Big Ike in the Pacific, they had good reason to be racing, for a very grave and unexpected threat to Navy command position was developing. The threat was MacArthur and I SHALL RETURN. While Navy prestige had been falling after Pearl Harbor, MacArthur's had been shooting skyward. He had been caught in the Philippines with practically no sea forces at all, yet he and his men had made a stirring fight for it, and General Marshall was to testify in December 1945, that if MacArthur had had a hundred bombers he could have held the Philippines.

When MacArthur reached Australia and the President announced that he would be supreme commander in the South Pacific, there was great gnashing of teeth at the Navy Department. Admirals Leahy and King forgot the other wars for a week while they fought the Battle of MacArthur at the White House. They urged the President not to make MacArthur a supreme commander, but to make him subject to the supreme command at Pearl Harbor. But Mr. Roosevelt was too skillful an interpreter of public opinion to try to subject a national hero like MacArthur to the command of a then unknown like Nimitz.

Finally, however, Leahy and King did persuade the President to issue a statement "clarifying" MacArthur's position. In the "clarification" it developed that MacArthur was supreme commander only in the *Southwest* Pacific—the "Australian sector"—while the "New Zealand sector"

containing the Solomon Islands remained under the Pearl Harbor command. This is how our first offensive action in the Pacific—the invasion of Guadalcanal—came to be a “Navy show.”

Guadalcanal was the Navy Command’s first shot not only against the Japanese, but also against the “MacArthur threat” to Navy supreme command ambitions in the Pacific. And from Guadalcanal to Okinawa the Navy Command fought not only to defeat the Japanese but also to make its command position so massive that at some junction along the road to Tokyo it could “absorb” MacArthur.

What made the MacArthur threat particularly repulsive to the Navy hierarchy was that under MacArthur’s supreme command the Navy enjoyed no more—and no less—prestige than it did under Eisenhower. MacArthur, too, had his air forces, his ground forces, his sea forces, and his service forces; but here, too, the *Navy* was little more than just the sea forces and part of the service forces.

Actually, the Navy organization fared better under MacArthur than it did under Eisenhower. For MacArthur employed a few Marine units, some Marine aviation and Fleet Air Wings, and he liked the Seabees. The PT boats acquired practically all of their glamour under MacArthur. But Admiral Kinkaid and the Seventh Fleet were in the same “inferior command position” as was Admiral Stark under Eisenhower. Kinkaid was “relegated” to MacArthur’s *left*, because MacArthur’s good *right* arm was General Kenney and his striking Air Force.

The Seventh Fleet—“MacArthur’s Seventh Fleet”—was regarded as country cousins by the Third and Fifth Fleets

under Nimitz's supreme command. But when I visited the Seventh, I didn't notice that either the men or the officers had developed any inferiority complex. And the Seabees who built Admiral Kinkaid's quarters along the route from Australia to Manila assured me that the Admiral had "lived better" than either General Kenney or Big Mac himself.

MacArthur sent shivers through the Navy Department when he announced after his first successes in New Guinea that his entire strategy was based on the principle of *advancing the bomber line*. Both his ground forces and his sea forces, he declared, were *supporting* forces; they *supported* the bombers; and everybody co-operated to keep advancing relentlessly that bomber line toward the enemy's heart. Obviously this was the pattern of victory on all fronts in the second World War.

But, you see, if Admiral King ever agreed with MacArthur that *advancing the bomber line* was the proper and primary objective in the Pacific, then Admiral King would be admitting that the Navy—the sea forces—was only a *supporting* force. And if Admiral King ever agreed that the Navy was only a supporting force, then how could he maintain in December 1945, that "seapower won the war?"

I am not among the MacArthur idolators, but I don't believe that any command in the second World War used air power as effectively as the MacArthur command did. I feel quite certain that historians will credit General Kenney with being the most imaginative aerial tactician of the war. It's impossible to consider the Kenney master

strokes—airborne engineers building the fighter strip at Tsili Tsili, New Guinea, in a spot accessible only by air; supplying this field by air so that P-38's based there could accompany B-25's to Wewak; the day of "terrible Wewak," August 17, 1943, when the B-25's and P-38's swept in over the treetops, caught the Japanese flat-footed, and destroyed two hundred enemy planes in eight minutes; similar strokes at Rabaul, Hollandia, But, and Dagua, which broke the Japanese back in New Guinea and allowed our troops to march ashore time and again, without loss of a man; the massive blows at Truk to protect Nimitz's flank during the push to the Marianas; and the annihilation of the Japanese armada in the Bismarck Sea—I say it is impossible to consider such master strokes without granting that General Kenney, the once-persecuted crusader for air power, was the greatest aerial tactician of the war.

The Battle of the Bismarck Sea was a MacArthur trump in the struggle for supreme command in the Pacific, and when this trump was played, admirals all the way from Pearl Harbor to Constitution Avenue groaned in pain. For Bismarck Sea was the "perfect battle" for land-based air power against that proverbial advancing enemy armada. Bismarck Sea proved once and forever that without control of the air no surface fleet can successfully approach a coast which is defended by air power.

When the Japanese High Command attempted large-scale re-enforcement of the garrisons at Lae and Salamaua, General Kenney's bombers intercepted the convoy and annihilated it. Of sixteen warships and transports, *every single ship was sunk*, and forty thousand Japanese soldiers and

sailors were slaughtered. Had this force been landed at Lae and Salamaua, our progress in New Guinea would have been held up for weeks and our ground forces would have suffered hundreds of additional casualties. Japanese Admiral Takata called this action "the most shocking reverse suffered by the Japanese Navy during the entire course of the war."

But if the Japanese admirals were shocked by the Battle of Bismarck Sea, so were the American admirals.

The fratricidal struggle for command between the MacArthur and Nimitz organizations to see which would absorb the other was something less than inspiring to behold. Both organizations had vast publicity setups with scores of accredited correspondents. Neither organization hesitated to use communiques as a weapon against the other; foul blows were struck on both sides. Whispering campaigns as slanderous as those employed in a New York mayoralty election were launched from both camps.

The MacArthur publicity architects were the most resourceful. For months they had little else to "sell" but the "Old Man" himself, so they were forever having him strike his "Man of Destiny" pose and call on God to help him since apparently nobody else would. It was a fact that one of these little MacArthur *tête-à-tête's* with God could get more space in the newspapers than a carrier strike on Japan. MacArthur used his personality and prestige to checkmate the admirals' campaign to seize command position.

When the Navy hierarchy despaired of ever "absorb-

ing" MacArthur, they developed the master plan to "seal him off." The essence of this plan was to prevent MacArthur from I-shall-returning to the Philippines. The Navy knew that if and when there was a Philippine show it inevitably would be a "MacArthur show." So why not just avoid the Philippines? Why not go into Formosa instead of the Philippines? Formosa was nearer to Japan; why go to the Philippines at all? And a Formosan operation would be a "Navy show."

The Formosa-Philippines argument raged from MacArthur to Nimitz to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Undoubtedly there were sound and worthy arguments to be considered, but it is also a fact that a prime consideration in this argument was the question of whether it was to be a "Navy show" or an "Army show," of whether the Navy or the Army was to be in supreme command, of whether Nimitz or MacArthur was to issue the communiques.

MacArthur, of course, won the argument; and the long series of engagements known as the Battle for Leyte Gulf was the initial result. Of all the battles in the Pacific offensive, this one came nearest to being an American disaster. The chief reason it wasn't a disaster, it seems, is that the Japanese were fouled up worse than we were.

There were many difficulties. Hitler and Tojo got all the weather breaks in the second World War; we never seemed to get any. The rains at Leyte, like the storm on the Norman beaches, were the "worst in twenty years." The mud was bottomless. The Seabees and the Army engineers couldn't find a bottom for an airstrip, and there was an agonizing delay before we could get land-based

fighter cover. There was loud, full-throated American cussing—the Army cussing the Navy and the Navy cussing the Army.

The most maddening failure was in the matter of “co-operation” between the Army and Navy air organizations. Pearl Harbor was three years back of us, but we still had the same old divided command. The men flying the Army planes fought valiantly; the men flying the Navy planes fought just as valiantly, but the right hand still didn’t know what the left hand was doing.

While all this fratricidal cussing was going on in the Leyte Gulf, the Japanese admirals decided to shove in all their chips. They divided fifty-six warships—nine battleships, four carriers, sixteen cruisers and twenty-seven destroyers—into three task forces and sent them on a three-pronged pincers movement against our armada in Leyte Gulf. What is called the Second Battle of the Philippine Sea resulted, in which the enemy lost most of their ships and we lost three escort carriers.

We won the battle because:

1. Against the Japanese fifty-six ships we had 189 ships—ninety-three in the Third Fleet and ninety-six in the Seventh Fleet.
2. Against their four carriers we had thirty-two carriers.
3. While most of the fighting was done almost within sight of land held by the Japanese, they had little or no land-based air power. According to Filipino guerrilla intelligence, total Japanese land-based air power in the Philippines was 130 planes—seventy-nine fighters, thirty bombers, and perhaps a score of “heavy” bombers.

4. Two of the Japanese task forces—the one heading for San Bernardino Strait and the other for Surigao Strait—had no air cover at all. They were sitting ducks for our bombers and torpedo planes.

5. The Japanese, for some inexplicable reason, sent their ships into the narrowest waters in the Philippines. In the Surigao Strait, the waters were so narrow that their ships could not maneuver and could turn only with great difficulty. Once these ships came under our fire it wasn't war, it was murder.

The aspects of the battle which concern this book are these:

1. American planes did 95 per cent of the fighting; they were the guns that sank all but two of the Japanese ships.

2. None of our great, new, fast and \$100,000,000 battle-ships got a single chance to fire those big guns at an enemy ship. These ships looked majestic, but they just couldn't find a target.

3. However, and volumes will be written about this, after long years of waiting, an American battleship finally did get one of those rare opportunities to sink a ship. It happened in the Surigao Strait. Admiral Halsey had taken all the big carriers and had chased off five hundred miles to the north, seeking the northernmost of the three Japanese task forces, and the old battleships of Admiral Kincaid's fleet were posted at the opening of Surigao Strait into Leyte Gulf. During the night of October 24-25, what was left of one Japanese force came pushing through the Strait.

Our destroyers attacked the force with torpedoes, but about 3 A.M. the Japanese ships got within 20,000 yards of five

of our old battleguns, and they let 'em have it. It was the first time in the entire lives of these ships that they had ever had a worthy target. For sixteen minutes they blasted away, and their gunnery was perfect. They sank at least two Japanese ships, and probably damaged two or three more which were sunk by our aircraft on the following day.

But it was like shooting fat, waddling ducks in a shooting gallery. The Japanese ships approached like ten old samurai trooping out to disembowel themselves. When they attempted to turn in the narrow waters, they were helpless under our fire. And if Admiral Halsey had chosen to keep the big carriers in the area, the enemy ships never could have approached so close.

However, it was one of the battleship's two or three moments of glory in the second World War. By official Navy claim, there were only four occasions during the entire war on which an American battleship fired at an enemy ship.*

* Engagements in which American battleships fired at enemy surface craft during the second World War are as follows:

1. On 15 November 1942, a few minutes past midnight, the battleships *Washington* and *South Dakota*, as component parts of a task force assigned to interrupt Japanese re-enforcements to the garrison at Guadalcanal, were engaged off Guadalcanal. This engagement was fought almost entirely by means of radar. Between 0016 and 0019 the *Washington* fired at a range of 18,500 yards forty-two rounds of 16-inch shells at a target which burst into flame and disappeared from the radar screen and was presumed sunk. At the same time the *South Dakota* fired at a range of 15,700 yards and sank what was determined to be a destroyer. At 0025 the *Washington* fired on what was first supposed to be shore batteries and which later proved to be destroyers lying close inshore. At 0042 the *South Dakota* sank a *Kuma*-class heavy cruiser. At 0100 both the *Washington* and the *South Dakota* opened fire on what was later to be identified as the battleship *Kirishima*. This ship was sunk.

It will be noted that this engagement was fought in darkness, and thus

the visual results are questionable. As for ourselves, the *Washington* sustained no damage but the *South Dakota* was severely damaged and retired from the engagement.

2. On 8 November 1943, the battleship *Massachusetts*, operating as part of our invasion forces off Casablanca, engaged in what may be termed a naval engagement with enemy forces. In this instance the battleship *Jean Bart* of the French Navy was the enemy. The *Jean Bart* was berthed in the harbor and was receiving her electric power from the shore. The *Jean Bart* was struck by five 16-inch shells and two bombs. Only two of the five shells exploded, but the *Jean Bart* sank in her berth.

Later that morning the *Massachusetts*, along with many other American craft, fired on a group of French destroyers, and five of these destroyers were sunk. The claim was made that the *Massachusetts* sank the French destroyer *Milan* with three salvos.

3. On 16 February 1944, as components of Task Group 50.9, the battleships *New Jersey* and *Iowa* fired some of their guns off Truk. The *New Jersey* claims credit for sinking a trawler with 5-inch fire at 800 yards. The *Iowa*, in support of the cruisers *Minneapolis* and *New Orleans*, fired and scored hits on a light cruiser. Battleship fire was also employed in the sinking of a destroyer which was dead in the water and burning as the result of aerial bombardment. Only secondary batteries were employed in finishing off the destroyer. At the conclusion of the engagement, both battleships fired on a retiring destroyer at ranges from 32,000 to 39,000 yards, but no hits were claimed.

4. On 25 October 1944 occurred the Battle of Surigao Strait. In this engagement the battleships *West Virginia*, *Tennessee*, *California*, *Maryland*, *Mississippi* and *Pennsylvania* constituted our battle line and were posted at the entrance of Surigao Strait into Leyte Gulf. On the night of October 25, a Jap task force came through the Strait to within range of these ships. The Japanese strength was hardly one-third of our own and the Japs were caught in narrow waters, so our ships took full advantage of the situation. Two enemy battleships and three destroyers were sunk, but all of these cannot be credited to our battleship fire. The *Pennsylvania* never fired, and the *Mississippi* fired one salvo after the "cease fire" order had been given.

None of the big, new, fast \$100,000,000 American battleships ever fired during the entire war except in using their secondary batteries to dispatch enemy ships already damaged by American aircraft.

5. On one other occasion it might conceivably be said that our battleships engaged the enemy. On 26 July 1943, about ninety miles southwest of Kiska, the *Mississippi* and the *New Mexico* picked up on their radar

4. Admiral Halsey's decision to take our big carriers and race five hundred miles northward in pursuit of a diversionary Japanese force imperiled the Leyte landing operation for at least forty-eight hours. It left our escort carriers to face alone the Japanese force which was proceeding through San Bernardino Strait. And that our escort carriers were not annihilated was due only to heroic efforts by a few destroyers, and to the fact that the Japanese, for some other inexplicable reason, suddenly decided to turn back at a moment when they could have run through our escort carriers like wolves through unguarded sheep.

I believe that an objective appraisal of Leyte will lead to the judgment that many of our difficulties were caused by the fact that at Leyte we had to employ elements of two rival supreme commands. MacArthur's hierarchy and Nimitz's hierarchy, each plotting to absorb the other before the next show, had to "co-operate" at Leyte; and, as I say, the degree of co-operation was less than inspiring.

While the Navy Command was struggling to beat off the "MacArthur threat," another menace to their Pacific

screens what appeared to be enemy naval craft. Both ships opened fire at once, but subsequent search of the target area revealed no trace of damage. It was later suggested that perhaps radar echo had played tricks on the radar screens of the two battleships. But since Japanese ships were evacuating the Kiska garrison on this date, it seems probable that the *Mississippi* and *New Mexico* actually "saw" the enemy sneaking out through the fog, but either some radar phenomenon or miscalculation caused their fire to be inaccurate.

ambitions was developing: General Arnold and his B-29's.

Our advance around the belly of the Pacific from Hawaii to the Marianas had been for the purpose of *advancing the bomber line*. The Marianas were to become the Britain of the Pacific, the pedestal upon which we proposed to mount our decisive weapon, the greatest military airdrome in the world. True, the Marianas were fifteen hundred miles from Japan, but during the war, with the shackles at last lifted from our air visionaries, we had developed an airplane which could pick up ten tons of explosive and fly three thousand miles to shatter our enemies. The plane—the decisive instrument—would be ready by the time the bases were ready.

Once we secured the Marianas we had Japan at the same disadvantage at which we had held Germany in 1943. We could pour a steadily increasing tonnage of explosives upon her industrial heart, while our own vast industry remained safe from enemy attack. Thus Japan's collapse was only a matter of time. Actually, Japan was in a more perilous position than Germany had been in, because from the Philippines, our submarines and our bombers had cut the lifeline between Japan's factories and the raw materials of the East Indies.

But who was to control the vast B-29 fleets when they began reducing Japan? The Navy? The Nimitz supreme command had moved on to the Marianas. Was the Nimitz organization to have supreme command over the B-29's? Was the Nimitz press, radio and censorship organization to be entrusted with the job of telling the world the story of the B-29 operations?

Now this may sound unbelievable to you, but *the Navy hierarchy hated the B-29*. Time and time again, throughout the Pacific, I listened to high-placed Navy officers denounce the B-29 as a "waste of money" and "inefficient" and "they don't do a damn bit of good."

Early in 1944 I was having lunch at a well-known admiral's quarters in Hawaii. I was his guest and he was very kind to me, so I won't disclose his name. But the old gentleman worked himself into a frenzy about these "big, useless, high-flying airplanes."

"If you want to write something," he almost shouted to me, "why'n hell don't you tell the American people about this B-29 outrage? Why don't you figure out how much it costs to drop one bomb on Japan with one of them million-dollar babies? The Navy has to beg for money to build ships while these Air Force people are allowed to throw billions down a rat hole!"

You see the B-29 is only an extended B-17. And the same "Navy" which fought the B-17 from birth was still trying to throttle the B-17's children. These old Navy minds which have worn that Navy straitjacket for thirty or forty years—only a few of them can accept the idea of sinking ships and leveling cities and winning wars with airplanes.

With this attitude by the Navy hierarchy toward the B-29, was the Navy supreme command to be allowed to control the B-29 operations and publicity from the Marianas?

General Arnold thought not, and that's how the Twentieth Air Force was born. The Twentieth Air Force was

nothing at all but a device to make certain that the B-29's remained under the supreme command of the Air Force; it was another move in the struggle for command.

What were the advantages of this arrangement? It gave the B-29's "direct" communication with Washington. News releases covering B-29 operations could originate *either at Guam or at Washington*. This last, you see, was a club. If the Navy-dominated publicity organization at Guam didn't allow the B-29's what the Air Force thought was a fair deal, then Washington could always add a few details.

And what were the disadvantages of this arrangement? The co-ordination of B-29 raids with carrier strikes was not what it might have been; and the Navy publicity organization at Guam strove mightily either to "blanket" the B-29 news with more sensational "Navy" news, or else to release the B-29 news at the most unfavorable moments.

I was on Guam, accredited to the Navy, just before the Okinawa show. My roommate was a Navy public relations expert, a splendid fellow, a former newspaperman. He came in very late one night and I was already asleep. He waked me and said in a husky voice:

"We've lost!"

I bolted up in bed, thinking that he meant we had lost the war. But no, it was much worse than that. MacArthur had captured the United States Navy! Okinawa was to be the last "Navy show." After that, in spite of hell, high water, the Marines and Ernie King, MacArthur was going to become Big Ike. *

X

THIS IS MY CHAPTER ON DUPLICATION—HOW YOUR MONEY was wasted by the two-war-department system which the admirals adore, defend, and propose to continue. A complete report on duplication waste in the second World War would fill many volumes. Here I shall condense it to about three thousand words.

Just across the Anacostia River from the Capitol of the United States there are two airdromes: the Army's Bolling Field and the Anacostia Naval Air Station. They are immediately adjacent; in fact they are connected by a taxiway. Each station maintains its own fire department, with firemen and equipment standing by to quench the rare flash fires. Each station has its own ambulance, its own doctor standing by, its own little hospital with medics on duty. Each station has its own chaplain, its own recreation facilities for men and officers, its own mess facilities.

There is a control tower at each field, a weather staff at each field, a communications staff at each field, and each field maintains its own ready crews and repair and maintenance organization. Yet both fields together do not handle as much traffic as many commercial fields throughout the country.

If your city government attempted to establish two fire

departments, you'd do something about it, wouldn't you? If any man stood up in your city council and argued that your city must have two competing fire departments in order to get its fires put out, you'd brand that man a fool, wouldn't you?

Yet in the fall of 1945 the Navy Command sent witness after witness before Congress to contend that "competition" between the Army and Navy organizations is a good thing, that only by maintaining competing war departments can this nation get its international fires put out.

Every American of my acquaintance who was involved in the second World War has been sickened by the waste in manpower, money and matériel resulting from this Army-Navy competition on a global scale. The "Anacostia formula" has been applied throughout the world. On every island in the Pacific, it has been the same story.

The barren island of Adak is our biggest base in the Aleutians. Like all joint bases, it is built according to the Anacostia Plan. There is the Army airdrome and the Navy airdrome, with all the duplications of Anacostia. There are Army piers and Navy piers, Army stevedores and Navy stevedores, Army harbor boats and Navy harbor boats.

There is a big Army hospital and a big Navy hospital, each with its specialists and the types of expensive, rarely used equipment which easily could serve both institutions. There are Navy chaplains and Army chaplains, Army libraries and Navy libraries, Army officers' clubs and Navy officers' clubs, Army steam baths and Navy steam baths, Army movie houses and Navy movie houses, Army post offices and Navy post offices.

The rock on Adak is all alike: volcanic. But the Navy wouldn't crush its rock on Army crushers. Navy crushers were brought in, too. The Army built eighty-five miles of road; the Navy built thirty miles. And today, months after the end of the war, the Army maintenance crews are still maintaining their eighty-five miles of road; Navy crews are maintaining their thirty miles.

The health of the American people paid heavy tribute to the manner in which the two-war-department system wasted the country's medical skill. I know of no sadder and more disappointed group of men than the doctors who left their practices and volunteered to serve their country only to find themselves caught in a system of enforced idleness. I met dozens of these bitter men on the different war fronts, and I listened to them belabor the dual system.

On a day in June 1944, I visited the first Navy hospital opened in Cherbourg. The building had been a French high school, then a German hospital, and now the Seabees were refurbishing it for our own use. Seven very capable American surgeons were there, and they had a total of *three* patients. Yet forty miles down the road wounded Americans were "backed up" at the Army field hospitals, waiting their turns at the operating tables.

The Navy doctors, because they were Americans and human beings first and "Navy" men second, had tried to get permission to "join the Army" during the emergency, but they had been cautioned that such procedure would be "irregular" and they had better "stand by."

Standing by is an honored practice in the Navy.

At many American cities—Washington, San Diego, San

Francisco, Memphis and Charleston, to name a few—Army hospitals and Navy hospitals are located within a few miles of one another. In the interest of economy and efficiency and plain common sense, why can't these hospitals be consolidated? And to relieve the doctor shortage at home and to prevent disillusionment and bitterness among the doctors who volunteer their services to the country, why can't the world-wide medical facilities of the Army and Navy be completely consolidated?

Here are only a few of the advantages:

A better utilization of critical specialized medical personnel.

A saving in equipment for X-ray, operating rooms, laboratories, kitchens, laundries, and utilities.

A better standard of medical care through combining separate small hospitals into one large hospital with better staffs and equipment.

Greater conformity in physical standards for induction and assignment and separation from the service, with resultant elimination of confusion in the public mind and charges of discrimination.

In short, more efficiency for less money at a sacrifice only of *prestige*.

I suppose that objective discussion of the Marines is about as difficult to achieve as objective discussion of religion or Roosevelt. Certainly I have no desire to debunk the Marines; I have seen them in action. But since they are a part of the Navy's ground forces which duplicate the Army's ground forces, their function must be examined here.

Primarily, the Marines are a police force. This is their function in peacetime; it was their function during the war in all theaters except the Central Pacific. They are supposed to be a small force for use by the Navy in areas where there is no occasion for the Army to maintain ground forces. Secondly, the Marines are specialists in amphibious landings.

During the war, over Army objection, the Navy obtained authorization for a Marine Corps of 600,000 men and about 12,000 women. Previously, the Marines had been an all-volunteer corps, but during the war, in order to build up to this quota, the Navy took draftees as well as volunteers. The Marines enjoyed the most expensive publicity effort of any branch of the service; and they performed valiantly and took cruel losses at places like Tarawa and Iwo Jima.

Is a Marine any different from an Army infantryman? Is he any braver? Do Marines attack more fiercely than do Army men?

If you are to arrive at an objective answer to these questions, you must understand that in building assault teams for this war, the Marine organization enjoyed several advantages over the Army.

The most powerful advantage was that the Marines could take boys who were seventeen years old. The Army had to wait until the eighteenth birthday. This meant that the Marines could recruit the youngsters who *wanted to fight*; the rugged, combative types who wanted to rip somebody's guts; the "little tough guys" who were afraid the war would end before they could see action. For frontal

assault, these are the most valuable men you can have in any war.

In the second World War, for frontal assault, there was no substitute for youth. The Germans knew it well. The "Green Hornets of Cassino," who took such a terrible toll of our men, were German 17- and 18-year-olds. We met them again in France, and we had to kill virtually every one of them. Our Marine organization knew the value of youth; and they combed the country for the "combative types" of 17-year-olds. For officers they also combed college football squads to find "combative types."

On my last afternoon at Iwo Jima, I walked through the big Fifth Marine cemetery looking for boys I had known. The birth dates had been put on the crosses. Many of those four thousand kids had not reached their eighteenth birthdays when they died. I'd say that more than half of them had not reached their nineteenth birthdays; and the boy who had reached his twentieth birthday when he died was rare.

I was in the Navy hospital at Guam with Marine officers who had been wounded at Iwo. Most of them were platoon leaders, and the "old men" were twenty-three. So in the making of an assault Marine, you must understand that the first ingredient is youth—extreme youth—and there is no substitute for it. I say "assault Marine" here, because for its peacetime police duties the Marine Corps needs an entirely different type of man, an older man with sober judgment.

The second ingredient in the making of an assault Marine

is indoctrination and training, the training to be "tough old Marines." On the battlefield Marines must always act like "tough old Marines"; they must never take the easy way; they must scorn the slow flanking movement and always prefer the frontal assault with steel and flame; they must live tough, and talk tough, and act tough; for that's the way "tough old Marines" do it.

The third ingredient in the making of an assault Marine is the publicity—the Paul Bunyan stuff, the flag with the bands playing, the rifle ode and the Marines-get-there-first. I have no quarrel with this. I'm perfectly willing to let the Marines, to their own satisfaction, "win" all the arguments and all the wars.

But my point here is that there is nothing in the making of a Marine to indicate that we must maintain two war departments in order to preserve the Marine Corps. We can have one war department and still have Marines by the simple process of preserving them as an elite corps, by safeguarding their opportunity to recruit the "combative types" of 17-year-olds. Let the Marines always be our elite corps of amphibious experts or atomic paratroopers or whoever gets there first, but let them be one part of a single team.

And one other point. Marines will cease to be Marines if they become an army. Marine officers will testify that draftees never make Marines. And a Marine army would be an intolerable duplication of our other Ground Army. Both for their own and the nation's good, the Marines should remain a relatively small elite corps. Therefore, the ad-

mirals' contention that we must maintain one hundred thousand peacetime Marines—a larger force than our standing Army in the thirties—is probably unsound.

One of the most amazing sights in the South Pacific during the early days of the war was *eight different types* of American fighter planes drawn up on one field. Do you recall how the manufacturers of razor blades once distributed razors in which only their blades would fit? That's the way it was with those eight different types of fighter planes. The planes were Army, Navy and Marine types, and each service had tried to get planes that were a little bit different from the others, and each manufacturer had designed his planes so that all repair parts would have to be bought from him.

What made the situation even more ludicrous was that Army packages of repair parts were not marked or stock-numbered like the Navy packages of the identical parts! Thus it often happened that an Army airplane would be broken down waiting for parts to be flown from the United States, and yet the Navy stockroom, not a hundred yards from the stricken Army plane, would have had the parts all the time. But the Army mechanics couldn't determine whether or not the Navy had the parts, because the Army numbers for the parts were not the Navy numbers!

The desperate Army and Navy mechanics were like two people who speak different languages and who have no interpreter to help them. And when you realize that the Army Air Service Command carries and dispenses 500,000 different items, while Sears-Roebuck carries only 35,000

items, you can begin to grasp the magnitude of the problem. And you can begin to understand how foolish we were to go to war with a two-war-department system which permitted such a situation to develop.

In scores of American factories, Army and Navy inspectors were maintained throughout the war for the purpose of inspecting articles which were identical in performance and specification. Why couldn't the Army man have inspected for the Navy, or vice versa?

The Army developed a rocket; and the Navy, working independently, also developed a rocket. One rocket was as good as the other, but they differed one-half inch in diameter. So Army rockets couldn't be fired from Navy tubes and vice versa, and different sets of precious machine tools had to be used in the manufacture.

The Army spent much time and money developing a bomb. The Navy developed the same bomb, but our right hand never knew what our left hand was doing because the Navy called its bomb by a different name.

Much of the research done by the Army on radar was duplicated in exact detail by the Navy. And the sections of Army prefabricated houses for personnel were not interchangeable with the Navy sections.

This is the sort of competition the admirals say is good for the country.

In January 1941, the four-engine bomber program had a priority classification of A-1-c, and thus was in a poor position to compete with the program for the manufacture of Navy vessels and ammunition, which had a classification of A-1-b. This conflict was another cause for delay in the

development and building of those bombers with which General MacArthur could have held the Philippines and General Martin could have saved Pearl Harbor. It was not until May 1941 that the machine tools for the heavy-bomber program were uprated to A-1-a, the top position, and the production materials for heavy bombers were raised to A-1-b.

The B-29 program was delayed for three months because Boeing engineers were trying to develop a Navy flying boat which never flew and which would have been of little value if it had.

Such competition is wonderful, the admirals maintain.

The Army organized the Air Transport Command and made ATC synonymous with vast aerial movement. At the direction of a joint priority organization, ATC moved Army and Navy personnel and equipment indiscriminately. But the Navy, not to suffer any loss of prestige, organized the Naval Air Transport Service; and NATS began flying identical routes with ATC.

Both ATC and NATS used the same type of planes and both flew the same routes, but they generally used different airfields, different maintenance shops and different weather services, and even had different procedures for housing and feeding passengers and evacuating wounded. NATS never flew more than a small fraction of the mileage flown by ATC, and ATC continued carrying Navy personnel as well as Army, but the admirals had their own exclusive air transport.

I flew forty thousand miles with NATS, and a lot of miles with ATC. NATS was a swell airline, but I never

could understand why there had to be complete duplication. I suppose I just don't understand Navy *prestige*.

Between January 1, 1944, and June 30, 1945, ATC evacuated 86,925 Pacific patients by air. Almost exactly half of these were Navy and Marine personnel. Yet in spite of this splendid record, NATS, in March 1945, created a special squadron to evacuate Navy personnel. And note this! In order to activate this squadron, the Navy grabbed thirty-six new C-54's which originally had been allocated to ATC. In short, in order to enable NATS to begin *competing* with ATC in air evacuation, the Navy diverted aircraft away from the very agency which already had established a long and brilliant record in the evacuation of wounded.

Here are my last two examples of duplication. Both the Army and the Navy maintain separate organizations to handle the acquisition and disposal of real estate. Either organization could easily handle all such matters for both of our two-war-departments.

Both the War and Navy Departments have their own organization for handling petroleum. They make separate contracts with can and drum manufacturers, and neither service will accept the inspection report of the other.

The Army has its military police; the Navy has its shore patrol, and there is little co-ordination in the assignment of personnel to town and train patrols.

In testifying before Congress, General Eisenhower said that America's postwar military problem was how to buy the maximum amount of defense with the tax dollar. He estimated that if the War and Navy Departments could be

consolidated we might expect *a 25 per cent reduction* in the number of personnel required to assure the national safety.

The admirals, concerned with matters of command position and prestige, are determined to prevent this reduction.

XI

WHAT MANNER OF MEN ARE THESE ADMIRALS WHO SET SUCH store on prestige? Whose first concern is their own command position? Who resist change so bitterly? Who are willing to command but unwilling either to row or to bail? Who acknowledge no higher allegiance than their allegiance to their own selfish conception of the "Navy"?

I watched Admiral King denounce the unification proposal before a Congressional committee. His objections to the proposal amounted to nothing more than: "It'd be bad for the Navy."

"But, Admiral," Senator Hill interposed, "maybe this proposal would be bad for your conception of the Navy, but we think it would be good for the country. Perhaps the Navy, as you think of it, will have to make some concessions to the common good."

Without hesitation Admiral King shot back: "Any step that is not good for the Navy, Senator, is not good for the country!"

I'm always frightened by men who can so readily identify their own good with the common good, who can be so certain that whatever subtracts from their own power and prestige is bad for the country.

I already have mentioned the admiral in Hawaii who de-

nounced the B-29 to me so bitterly in the spring of 1945. I said to him: "If such an outrage as you describe is being perpetrated, if the American people are being caused to waste billions of dollars and many lives on airplanes which are proving ineffective, then why don't you speak out?"

"Oh, no, no, no," he replied, "and don't you dare quote me. I take my orders only from the Navy Department."

"Yes, I know," I said. "But don't you have a higher allegiance than the allegiance you owe the Navy Department? Aren't you an American *first*, and an officer in the United States Navy *second*? Do you mean to tell me that if you saw some great danger threatening the nation, you would not warn the nation if by doing so you had to violate Navy policy?"

He sputtered and reaffirmed: "I take my orders from the Navy Department."

To understand this remarkable attitude you have to understand the process by which a man becomes an admiral. An American youngster, a product of democracy, goes to Annapolis, and there among the things he is educated in is how to say "Yes, sir." He leaves Annapolis and spends thirty years trying to work himself up through the Navy's "selection up" system. If ever he says "No, sir" or "Why, sir," he risks his career. But if he forever says "Yes" and acquires no powerful enemies, he is likely to become an admiral.

The Navy's "selection up" system of promotion could be a good system. It could be the system by which men are promoted for merit rather than for seniority. Instead,

however, it has been perverted into a system for ridding the Navy each year of vision, initiative and curiosity, for kicking out the men who have the tendency to question, and for rewarding those who will accept without question the wisdom of their "superiors."

Do you know how this vicious system works? Each year the Navy Selection Board meets. The Board is composed of old and "safe" men—men who rate the taking of orders from the Navy Department as the cardinal virtue. They consider all the officers of the Navy, then they promote some of them and "pass over" the rest.

Who do you suppose gets the promotions? The safe and sound men who are not likely to question. And who gets passed over? The radicals, the agitators, the men who question and who suggest change. And here's the pay-off. When an officer is passed over twice, he is automatically out of the Navy.

The Army has a "selection out" system which is not as vicious. Actual cause—more cause than just being a questioner—has to be shown before an officer can be kicked out of the Army. This explains why the "air agitators" could survive in the Army, and why the Navy had no comparable group of agitators. An agitator can last just two years in the Navy; then he is automatically out.

This system, through the years, has resulted in the expulsion from the Navy of many of the brilliant and imaginative men who have entered Annapolis. A great many of these men, knowing and fearing the system, have left immediately upon graduation. The safe and sound men have

remained, and therefore the wonder is that the Navy was able to produce the few imaginative men that it did produce in the second World War.

The Navy "caste system" is built on the assumption that the ensign always will be a young man who has had some advantage of birth, and for whom the Government has provided an expensive education in the art of being an "officer and a gentleman." The system further assumes that the apprentice seaman always will be a young yokel from the hills who never reached the eighth grade.

The system assumes a Dives-and-Lazarus gulf between the officer and the enlisted man; and if the gulf is actually there, it doesn't appear to be improper for the officers to live topside in comfortable private quarters and to be served by Negro and Filipino valets and messboys. The men live in the hold below, have no privacy, and shift for themselves.

Everything about the system is designed to clothe the officer with dignity and authority, and conversely, is designed to keep the enlisted man at a psychological disadvantage. The enlisted man's uniform, like most everything else a relic of Britannia-Ruling-the-Waves, is designed to keep a man forever feeling like a 17-year-old yokel.

So in all the peacetime years since the Civil War—the U. S. Navy hardly exercised itself in 1898 or in 1917—the Navy managed to keep the Dives-and-Lazarus gulf both wide and deep. Rare indeed was the man who ever crossed it.

But in the second World War the Navy suddenly swelled its ranks to nearly three million Americans, and the *actual* gulf between officers and enlisted men became very

narrow. The enlisted men were no longer 17-year-old yokels; there were many educated men who had held good jobs, and some of them had had their own businesses. These men had not joined the Navy "to see the world," but to get the war over as quickly as possible so that they could return to their civilian pursuits.

In the new Navy, about the only gulf which existed between the officer and the enlisted man was the artificial gulf, and this the Navy Command endeavored to keep as wide and as deep as ever.

On what the Navy called "Island X," there were two distinct ways of life. One way went on in "Officers' Country," a moated citadel from which enlisted men were warned to Keep Out. This was a gay, comfortable and dignified way of life. There was the officers' club, with whisky, music, ice, tinkling glasses, comfortable chairs, and lackeys—usually colored but sometimes white. There was the officers' mess, with white table cloths and more lackeys. And if there were any white women on the island—nurses, USO, Red Cross or what-have-you—they were here in Officers' Country. The enlisted men in their bunks could hear music and gay laughter—both masculine and feminine—rolling out from Officers' Country, until far into the night.

The other way of life on the island was the enlisted men's way—the womanless, whiskyless way. Where men stood in endless lines to get food flung into their messkits; where there was no privacy, and life was primitive and drab; and where the Marine Guard searched your "gear" for contraband whisky.

One muddy, icy day in the Aleutians, just after the Attu

show, I sat on a bunk and listened to a hurt man pour out his heart to me. He was a valuable man, an electrician in his early thirties. He was a proud, dignified man; he owned his own home in Hershey, Pennsylvania; he had had charge of wiring the big hotel at Hershey; the Hershey company sent him the company newspaper, and the general manager wrote to him occasionally. He had a nice, intelligent-looking wife and child; he belonged to the Red Men at Hershey; and the Rotary Club would want him to tell his story when he got home.

But this man had no formal education, so he had volunteered as a Navy enlisted man. He had gone to Attu and worked night and day laying communications lines in that snow, setting up switchboards. Late one afternoon, cold, exhausted and wet, he had sloshed into his commanding officer's tent to report his job done. The commander and another officer were pouring themselves stiff drinks of bourbon.

"Okay, mate," the commander had replied to the electrician's report, "that'll be all. And say, I wish I could offer you a drink, but you know the rules."

That *one* apparently insignificant incident had ruined one fine American's entire war experience. Instead of going back to Hershey feeling warm and good over having served his country, I'm sure he must have been bitter and cynical. Let nobody fool you, that man's name is legion.

At 2 A.M. on another night in the Aleutians, I went down to the docks at Adak. It was snowing and a williwaw was blowing. A Navy stevedore battalion, made up almost entirely of white men who had volunteered, was unloading

whisky. Swarming all over the ship and the warehouse was a special guard of armed officers. The officers were there to see that the men did not steal the whisky; and while they were guarding, the officers were fighting among themselves for the choice shipments. While I was watching the spectacle, one rugged stevedore remarked to me: "Do you know who I am? I'm the damn fool who left a good job to unload whisky for these gold-braided sonsabitches!"

A few weeks later I overheard a high-ranking officer complaining about how that stevedore battalion was smashing cargo. He couldn't understand why the men had become so careless. I think I could have explained it to him; but since he was an Annapolis man, I didn't bother. They don't teach human psychology at Annapolis.

One day on Guam I sat down with a score of men picked from a Navy construction regiment. I wanted them to tell me the story of their regiment; I knew it was a proud story. The regiment had been in the Pacific for twenty-six months; they had come all the way from Guadalcanal and had made three D-Day landings; all of the men had volunteered.

"Well, fellows," I said, "tell me about the one experience in your record that you are proudest of."

There was a moment's hesitation, then one chap said to another: "All right, Zeke, show it to him!" Zeke dug down into his coveralls, produced a dirty, crumpled sheet of paper, and handed it to me. It was a work order, and behind that order there is a story.

When we landed on Guam, our most serious shortage was pipe. We didn't have enough pipe for water and fuel.

A shipload of pipe had been lost somewhere. To relieve the shortage, the Navy construction men had dug up eight miles of pipe which we had had on Guam before the war. The men, working night and day, had welded and patched this old pipe in a desperate effort to provide watering facilities for the fleet.

But before these men had been able to get sufficient pipe to bring water into their own camp for necessities, they had received a top priority order to construct a tennis court for a well-known admiral. And they had been forced to use 1250 feet of precious pipe to build the backstops for the admiral's tennis court.

A little matter? Yes, in a way. But here's what makes it a big matter to me. Three thousand Americans who had volunteered to serve their country, and who therefore deserved a satisfying experience, are returning to their homes embittered and cynical because of that and similar *little* matters. And the men responsible for these *little* matters should not be held guiltless.

I, of course, have a notebook full of such stories as these. So have all correspondents, I suppose, who went to the fronts and took the trouble to get out of the officers' clubs. I saw the war on several fronts and from three different angles; I was a correspondent, a Navy enlisted man, a Navy officer, and then a correspondent again, so I suppose I enjoyed a peculiar opportunity to meet or hear about the "stinker" minority. My purpose here, however, is only to cite enough examples to make a point.

My point is that the Navy "caste system" is part of the explanation why admirals act and think as they do. When

men are nurtured on the doctrine that Rank Has Its Privileges; when they spend their lives on the privileged side of a Dives-and-Lazarus gulf; when they are willing forever to nod their heads in order to gain the privileges of rank—then is there any wonder that such men put command position before common sense? Should we be surprised that such men oppose every movement which threatens to subtract from their privileges or prestige? And should we be surprised when some of these men abuse power in the manner which I have illustrated?

I do not mean to infer that the Ground Army and the Air Force do not have their caste systems and their abusers of power. But during the war the gulf between officer and enlisted man was widest in the Navy, less wide in the Ground Army, and narrowest in the Air Force. The caste system was most iniquitous in the Navy, less iniquitous in the Ground Army, and least iniquitous in the Air Force. And it is no coincidence that the organization which clings most stubbornly to its caste system is also the organization which clings most stubbornly to outmoded methods of warfare.

Just as mechanical progress has outmoded the battleship, so has social progress outmoded the severe military caste system.

XII

THUS FAR I HAVE ATTEMPTED TO DEMONSTRATE HOW THE nation has suffered from our outmoded two-war-department system, and I have endeavored to convince you that a new and better system must be evolved even at the sacrifice of ancient practices and prestiges. In the final chapters I shall try to describe a new and better system. Before that, there is one more important consideration: The nature of the next war. The type of war organization we need depends upon the type of warfare we shall be required to wage. Here, assisted by the best authority I could find, I shall try to envision the probable nature of the next war.

I don't subscribe to the cynical assumption that there will always be wars in the world. I hope that the war envisioned here will never come; I believe that there is an excellent chance for it to be long deferred. But it is the business of war organizations to assume that there will be another war, and to be ready to destroy our enemies if and when war does come.

In order to think intelligently about the next war, we must divest our minds of many old ideas. We must cease thinking in terms of *defense*. We cannot depend on either natural or artificial *defenses*. We shall not need a Depart-

ment for National *Defense*. In fact we should erase the word *defense* from our military vocabulary.

We must create an organization for *war*, an overwhelming striking force; we must think in terms of striking first, of destroying any nation which seems about to attempt to destroy us. The next war cannot be won by counter-attack; we cannot "retreat to victory" in the next war; there can be no coming back from an atomic Pearl Harbor.

If the next great war comes, the initial and probably decisive blow will be struck *at* or *by* the United States of America. We can't escape this position. No aggressor is going to attack some lesser nation and allow us to intervene at our own good time. We were the Arsenal of Democracy in this war; we shall be in the next war, and no aggressor will be so foolish as to fail to strike directly at the arsenal. At the moment the next war begins, we must be either the striker or the struck. By no amount of head-burying-in-the-sand can we avoid this fate.

I am as reluctant to see it go as any man, but America's traditional method of declaring war by public Congressional deliberation and debate can be sent to the museum; it's as antiquated as a battleship. Once our enemy possesses atomic weapons and war appears to be imminent, do you suppose the enemy is going to remain inactive while we stage a national debate to determine whether or not we shall have war?

The Americans who are objecting to the delegation of war-making powers to the President and to his representative at the United Nations—these Americans have their heads in the sand. If the effort to build a world government

fails, then eventual war becomes inevitable, and when this war approaches, the President of the United States will have to push the button or he himself will not survive long enough to consult Congress, nor will Congress be available if the President hesitates.

As a matter of fact, if the effort to build world government fails, as part of our preparation for the inevitable next war, we shall have to establish an *auxiliary government* to take over in the probable event that our entire Washington establishment is wiped out.

I am well aware that such changes in our traditional procedures will be dangerous. I shudder to contemplate them. But twenty years from today, if war between two atomic-armed nations appears imminent, we shall be living in an exceedingly dangerous world. Never before have we had to contemplate the fact that the explosion of one bomb could destroy our entire national government and reduce us to a helpless mob.

Any discussion of the nature of the next war must begin with answers to the two questions *when* and *who*. Obviously, if we go to war in 1946 we shall begin fighting in much the same manner as we were fighting in 1945. If war is delayed five years, there will be some changes; if ten years, more changes; if twenty years, a great many startling changes. Here I shall assume that war will be delayed at least ten years and perhaps twenty years.

As to *who* the assumed enemy is, I shall use the code word "Chindia." Yes, Asia—China, Russia, India—where more than a billion people live. It's the most likely breeding ground for the third World War.

Now how will the first blow in the next war be struck? Will that old proverbial armada approach our shores? Will our battlefleet—the great ships of the line—meet the enemy out there on the “high seas?” And will the Ground Army stand ready to “defend the coast?” And if we strike the first blow will we send a surface armada steaming toward some coast? We can file these conceptions with the Macedonian phalanx.

The first blow in the third World War probably will be the result of intelligence operations. The atomic bomb need not be delivered by air. By the simple process of renting a garret or a basement room, enemy agents, working years in advance, can install a bomb on Manhattan Island which, at a chosen moment, could kill every living thing on the island. A hundred such bombs planted at strategic spots could shatter America's ability to make war and kill twenty million people. Chindia probably already has sleeper agents in this country who could plant such bombs; Germany had sleeper agents in America as early as 1933.

Therefore, *unless the world government can provide such a service*, America must have a super-intelligence service. We must know everything that goes on in Chindia. Our counter-intelligence must discover Chindia's sleeper agents even more effectively than our FBI spotted the German sleepers, and if the worst comes, our agents must plant atomic bombs in Chindia and must see that we press the buttons before Chindia does.

I agree that this sounds like an almost hopeless procedure. I assume here that every intelligent American now regards world government as the only hopeful course. However,

what I am discussing here is the melancholy alternative.

Fortunately, not even the Navy Department is opposing the unification of our intelligence agencies, and efforts already are under way to create our super-intelligence service. During the second World War we wasted intelligence energy through four different agencies: Army intelligence, Navy intelligence, the FBI, and the "cloak-and-dagger" Office of Strategic Services. Entirely or in part, all four of these will be merged to form the super agency.

After our intelligence has signaled the start of the third World War, what happens next? Well, to understand what will happen next, we must toss aside another relic: the Mercator projection of the world. Old Mercator did modern men a great disservice when he devised the map which purports to represent the world. Mercator, like Admiral King, thought in terms of seapower; he was concerned with navigation of surface ships. Mercator says it is six thousand miles from Shanghai to Seattle, but your globe will tell you that the distance is much less.

Because it gives a false conception of the world we live on, we must throw the flat Mercator maps out of our schoolrooms and install globes. We can't have global thinking as long as we think of the world as flat. The third World War will be planned and fought by the globe, so you'll have to study your globe if you are to understand the planning.

A study of the globe will show that the distances between the northernmost reaches of Chindia and America's industrial heart are not nearly so great as Mercator has led you to believe. Similarly, the distances between Alaska and

the great industrial centers of Chindia are not great. And you must understand that while surface craft cannot operate in the polar regions, aircraft, flying at a height of from ten to sixty miles, could operate as easily in the polar regions as they do in the tropics.

So after Intelligence pushes the button in the third World War, either we or Chindia will attack the other with massive showers of pilotless aircraft—"guided missiles" is the technical term. These missiles will fly in the ionosphere—that's above the stratosphere—at a height of about seventy miles from the earth. Their speed will be about 3600 miles an hour, much faster than sound. Each missile will have striking power sufficient to obliterate a city of 200,000 people, and will be accurate within one-half mile.

I do not get this information from the Buck Rogers comic strip. I get it from the most reliable source in the world: General Arnold and General Knerr and the stable of top technicians of the Air Technical Service Command at Dayton, Ohio. Among these top technicians, curiously, are several German scientists who worked on the V-2; General Knerr had the foresight to grab them and send them to Dayton before any other nation could shanghai them.

In the second World War, German engineers could have destroyed Britain with guided missiles if the RAF had not scored a lucky hit at Peenemünde, and if German production had not failed. As it was, the Germans developed the V-2 to this point: it flew at a height of sixty miles and at a speed of 3600 miles an hour, and at a range of two hundred miles, it was accurate within ten miles. From two hundred

miles away, the Germans could hit the London area with virtually every shot.

In effect, the V-2 is guided just like a mortar shell. It takes off in a "stovepipe" of beams. These beams guide the missile until it gets twenty miles above the earth, as though it were in a gun barrel. That's how direction is imparted to it.

But the V-2 at Dayton is already old stuff. It was the pilot model. The radicals among the technicians at Dayton insist that in fifteen to twenty years the guided missile will travel at 22,800 miles an hour. The conservatives say the speed won't exceed five thousand miles an hour. But everybody agrees that accuracy will be "at least within one-half mile" at a distance of ten thousand miles.

And when atomic propulsion is ready, all the technicians agree that distance will become meaningless. They could then fire the missiles at the moon.

The ATSC calls this sort of missile the "ground-to-ground" missile. It is fired from the ground at a ground target. And thus, as part of the development program, it is planned to establish bases in both Canada and Alaska from which these missiles in "massive showers" could be hurled at Chindia if and when.

The intelligence-planted bombs will be the first blow; the guided missiles will be the second.

We are also developing ground-to-air missiles and air-to-ground missiles. The former are for defense against enemy missiles and piloted airplanes, and the latter are to be fired from our piloted planes against the enemy.

An examination of our ground-to-air missiles discloses

the difficulty of the problem of defending against such weapons. If Chindia fires missiles at us at 3600 miles an hour, those missiles will approach Detroit, for example, at a speed of one mile a second. Our radar at present is effective up to only two hundred miles, and thus we couldn't detect the missile until it was within two hundred miles of its target. This would leave us only two hundred seconds to take defensive measures. In the two hundred seconds we would have to fire one of our ground-to-air missiles at an angle so that it would intercept the Chindian missile, and by using a target-seeking warhead, this might be accomplished. But unless our missile intercepted the Chindian missile at a great height, the explosion of the two missiles would cause great damage anyway.

One problem, therefore, is to extend our radar range so that the defense can be given more than two hundred seconds to get its intercepting missiles into the air.

Our first air-to-ground missiles—glide bombs—were used operationally against Cologne in May 1944. The marshaling yards at Cologne were guarded by the heaviest concentration of anti-aircraft fire in Europe. At a height of 25,000 feet, our heavy bombers approached to within twenty-five miles of the marshaling yards, and there they fired 116 GB-1 glide bombs at the target. The bombs were set to drop one thousand feet every mile. They could be controlled "in azimuth only"—right-and-left, not up and down. Of these 116 bombs, forty-eight hit the marshaling yards in one of the most devastating attacks of the war. And of course, not one of our bombers was damaged by ack-ack.

Another air-to-ground missile of ours is VB-1 or "azon."

This is a standard vertical bomb with radio-controlled fins. Azon was first used in April 1944 to smash the Avisio viaduct, key to the Brenner Pass. It was used to knock out bridges in southern France during our invasion, and in January 1945, all the Burma bridges of strategic value to the Japanese were collapsed by azon.

But already, to the wizards of Dayton, the bridge-busting azon is old stuff. They already have reached VB-4—they call it “razon”—and razon is controllable in “both azimuth and range.”

When the intelligence-planted bombs signal the opening of the third World War, the guided missiles will begin falling either here or in Chindia within an hour. We'll be firing from our bases in Alaska and in northernmost Canada. Then what will happen next?

Hard on the flaming tails of the guided missiles will go the long-range bombers. These bombers, carrying their own missiles to fire at enemy interceptors, will be loaded with atomic bombs and will destroy methodically whatever has been left by the guided missiles. These bombers will have an operational range of 10,000 miles, will fly at a speed of six hundred miles an hour, and will be accompanied by missile-firing fighters flying at one thousand miles an hour.

Does anyone doubt that we will have such planes within ten to twenty years? Already our newest bomber, the XB-36, has an operational range of 5000 miles. The fact that we can easily accept the projection to the 10,000-mile range indicates how far we have come since January 1945 when the admirals were still scoffing at the B-29.

Our third wave to attack Chindia will be fleets of great transports bearing our Army to take over. A mass army? No. How could we fight Chindia with a mass army when Chindia might be able to marshal three-fourths of the people of the earth against us? The second World War was the last world war of mass armies. In fact it was during the second World War that the use of mass armies ended.

We never employed more than twenty-four ground-fighting divisions against Japan. It was never necessary for us to meet Japan's mass army. Our air power—the fire bomb and the atomic bomb—made this unnecessary. Our ground forces moved into Japan by air only to take over management of the ruins. Then our sea forces moved in and opened the ports.

Had we delayed our invasion of France for twelve months, or had the development of our air power not been stunted in the five critical years before the war began, or had the atomic bomb been developed twelve months earlier—then the assault on the Norman beaches would never have occurred. Our ground forces would have moved into Europe the same way they moved into Japan.

But our airborne forces moving to Chindia will be ready to fight if necessary. They will look like men from Mars. They will have rocket and atomic weapons and will be prepared to anesthetize any surviving pockets of resistance. Supplies in the first hours will pour to them by guided cargo-carrying missiles and great cargo planes. The decision as to where the airborne forces are to land will have taken into account such factors as which areas have been totally destroyed, which areas are untenable because of

residual radioactivity, which areas have remaining populations to be anesthetized, and which areas can be most readily opened to supply by sea.

There is a role for our sea forces. A very important role. They will arrive at Chindian ports in the fourth wave, after the decisive blows have been struck. In the second World War, our surface fleet had a fighting role because of the nature of the war, but it seems most improbable that the third World War can last long enough for a surface ship to affect its outcome.

I am not contending here that we should scuttle our vast accumulation of warships. We should keep a portion of them, because, as I have pointed out, if war with Chindia should come within the next five years, some of our fleet would be useful. If war is delayed for ten years, however, I can't see how any surface ship could be a factor in the actual fighting. Even submarines, by far the most effective Navy weapon in the second World War, would lose their primary value because the war wouldn't last long enough for submarine raids on Chindian shipping to become effective. A few subs might prove useful for pre-war intelligence work.

If there must be a third World War it will be fought in something like the manner I have outlined here, and we will survive *unless* we allow our Maginot boys to deliver us into slavery. *Unless* we forget the tragic pattern of what was happening in those five years before Pearl Harbor and allow the pattern to be repeated. Our gold-braided boys had the power then; they sat at the first appropriations table; they throttled the development of our air power; and

for want of \$21,000,000 a year, General Knerr and his fellows were prevented from developing four-motored bombers which *might have prevented* the second World War.

And now we have the same pattern developing. Our Sea Lords are demanding that they be left in regal loneliness with their prestige, and that they be given three and one-half billion dollars a year to support themselves in the lush manner to which they have become accustomed. On October 9, 1945, they had twenty-four battleships and were still building. What in the name of heaven do they expect to use twenty-four battleships for? Single aircraft *squadrons* in both the Army and Navy sank more ships and did more damage to the enemy than our entire multi-billion-dollar battleship fleet. To land in Normandy we had our three oldest battleships standing by. Four old-timers fired for sixteen minutes in the Leyte Gulf shooting gallery. None of our war-built monsters ever fired its guns.

Yet, and this sounds incredible, the admirals continued ordering battleships at \$100,000,000 a ship even when they knew that the ships couldn't be completed until long after our planned landings in Japan had occurred.

The admirals have 120 aircraft carriers and are still building. The carrier was a useful weapon in the second World War—in the Pacific only, except for light convoy work in the Atlantic—but it was useful only because the development of American air power had been strangled. We could have had the B-29 and the fire bomb in 1941 instead of 1945 if the Maginot boys had not had the power.

Even Admiral Mitscher, the colorful little leader of

Task Force 58, has told the Navy Command that the carrier is an interim weapon, a weapon certain to be outmoded by air-power development. Certainly we should keep a number of our big carriers during the "interim," but America and Britain now have 169 carriers, and Chindia has none. And we are still building.

Will battleships be able to deliver atomic bombs to the Chindian cities? Will battleships or aircraft carriers be able to intercept the atomic missiles which Chindia will fire at us?

In contrast to the three and one-half billions demanded by the admirals, how much are General Knerr and the wizards of Dayton getting? The 1946 appropriation for guided missiles is about \$13,600,000. These are to be the decisive weapons of the third World War—the weapons which can prevent the war from starting and win it if it does start. But research and development in guided missiles is expensive. You have to employ brains, both in the Army and in the planning rooms of the manufacturers. And about the only way in which you can develop guided missiles is by building them and firing them, and when you fire your model once, it's finished.

General Knerr and General Arnold believe that about \$100,000,000 a year should be spent on the guided missile program, and they believe further that appropriation for this program should be on something like a five-year basis. The year-by-year method of appropriation is impractical for research; you can't contract intelligently for research on a year-by-year basis.

Which horse do you want to bet on in the third World

War Race? Atom bombs or battleships? The air force or the fleet? Our men of vision or our Maginot boys?

Whom do you want to seat at your first appropriations table? Do you want the admirals to get all the gravy and starve the air force, or do you want to put your air force first and let the admirals *support* it?

Do you want one war department or two? Do you want your war agencies to eliminate duplication, consolidate and give you the most protection for your tax dollar, or are you willing to continue supporting the admirals and their prestige?

Just to decide in favor of reform and consolidation will not be enough. We shall have to demand action and get it; and even after the reform machinery has been set in motion, we shall have to remain vigilant and insistent. Admirals don't surrender power readily; old hierarchies don't die easily.

XIII

WHEN THIS NATION ENTERED THE SECOND WORLD WAR, IT was apparent that our antiquated two-war-department system would cause us endless grief. It was too late to junk the system; there was nothing to do but patch it up and make it last through the war. Under the War Powers Act, the President was given the authority to apply the temporary patches.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff was one patch. Admirals Leahy and King and Generals Marshall and Arnold sat together as a group, exchanged ideas, and tried to keep the two war departments together. But these four men were not a voting committee; the Army could not bind the Navy nor the Navy the Army. When these men could reach a joint decision they did so; when they couldn't, they went their separate ways. Thus the Joint Chiefs was not a very dependable patch.

Elevating the Army Air Force to virtual autonomy and admitting General Arnold to the meetings of the Joint Chiefs was another patch. And this was only a patch; unless Congress acts, the Army Air Force, upon expiration of the War Powers Act, will revert to its pre-war status.

Then there were seventy-odd other patches put on the old dual machine in the form of joint Army-Navy com-

mittees. These were committees which tried to reconcile all the artificial differences between the two war departments, tried to keep them co-operating instead of working against one another. These committees had no power of decision; they couldn't vote on an issue and let the majority rule; the Army couldn't bind the Navy or the Navy the Army. The committees just met and tried to solve problems, but if the Army and Navy contingents couldn't agree, then the committees did nothing.

Even the more intelligent admirals recognized that the old patched-up machine was a disgrace, and that as soon as the war was over, it should be traded in for a new and more efficient machine. The only question was the particular design of the new machine.

In an effort to decide on a design for the new machine, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1944 created a Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense. This committee was composed of two generals, two admirals and one alternate, with a fourteen-man staff including three Army colonels and three Navy captains. The committee was authorized to travel all over the world and to interview at their posts all of our high ranking generals and admirals. The very sound theory behind this move was that the committee could interview our commanders on the spot, and thus could get the views of the men who were actually running the war, and—more important—get these opinions *while* the war was actually in progress.

The senior member of the committee was Admiral J. O. Richardson, and the other three members were Rear Admiral M. F. Schoeffel, Major General W. F. Tompkins,

and Major General H. L. George. The alternate was Colonel F. Trubee Davison.

The committee held eighty-two meetings, interviewed eighty witnesses which included all of our top commanders, traveled 22,657 miles, and then handed in a detailed report recommending *one consolidated department of war*.

The committee's report was to have been unanimous, as I shall demonstrate shortly, but at the last moment Admiral Richardson, who had prepared most of the majority report, decided to disagree and file a minority report. But all the other members of the committee, including Admiral Schoeffel, signed the majority report.

Now what is meant by consolidating, merging, or unifying the Army and Navy?

I could draw a lot of diagrams here and write another book, but simply it means organizing all of our armed forces according to the plan which Eisenhower, Nimitz and MacArthur used in their theaters during the second World War.

General Eisenhower, you will recall, had his supreme command and his staff, and then under him were the four big divisions of war in our time: air forces, ground forces, sea forces, and service forces. MacArthur had the same setup, and so did Nimitz.

Consolidation means the end of the "Anacostia Plan" all over the world. You recall how those two airfields, Bolling Field and Anacostia Naval Air Station, are adjacent and how both have complete, duplicating facilities. Under consolidation these two fields would become one bigger field; there would be only one fire department, one hos-

pital, one ambulance, one maintenance force, one control tower, etc.

Consolidation means that dual Army and Navy hospitals would become one American hospital, that one construction gang on Adak would maintain all of the roads, that one rock crusher would crush both Army and Navy rock, and that an identical bolt would be labeled with the same number whether it was to be used by air force, ground force, or sea force.

Consolidation means that eventually there will be one American air force, not two. Every American boy who wants to fly an airplane for Uncle Sam should enter the same primary training school. After he has learned to fly, he can get his specialized training with the branch of the service he chooses.

Consolidation means that one group of recruiting agents will handle recruiting for all of Uncle Sam's services; one group of doctors will examine all of the recruits. If a boy wants to join the Marines, he'll be welcome; if he wants to sail on battleships, he'll be welcome; if he wants to drive tanks, he'll be welcome.

Consolidation means organizing America's war-making potential on a business basis rather than on a prestige basis.

Consolidation means that no longer will the nation have to depend on "co-operation" between the services. We'll only have one service—one team—and it'll be organized, trained and commanded as a team. Instead of men being in "different" services, they'll be playing different positions on the same team.

Does consolidation mean that admirals never can have

supreme command again? Of course not. It is specifically provided that supreme command of the consolidated armed forces must be rotated among air officers, ground officers, and sea officers.

Does consolidation mean the end of battleships? No. The battleships will be kept in fighting trim as long as there is any possibility that they might be useful in the next war.

Does consolidation mean the end of aircraft carriers? No. The carriers will remain a part of the fleet as long as there is a remote possibility that we might need them.

Does consolidation mean the end of the Marine Corps? Nonsense. There'll always be Marines.

Does consolidation mean the end of Annapolis? No. That institution—with some changes, I hope—will go on forever.

Does consolidation mean the end of the Army-Navy football game? Not at all. But perhaps it can be expanded into three games, with the Air Force boys getting in their licks.

Does consolidation mean that we are creating a potential dictator in the commander of the armed forces? The President of the United States will remain commander-in-chief of the armed forces, with the power to remove and appoint any and all service officers.

Does consolidation mean that all men in the service will wear the same uniform? Probably, with suitable distinctive markings. You'll still be able to identify a Marine on sight. But unless there is one uniform, what uniform will a doctor wear who examines and prescribes for all the boys? And why shouldn't they wear one uniform? Don't the New

York Yankees all wear the same uniform? Didn't we all have on the same uniform at Omaha Beach and Iwo Jima?

No man can know exactly how the finished single war department will look. Consolidation will be a years-long process with some trial-and-error. Some functions cannot be consolidated to the same degree that others can. This will be discovered and recognized. Errors can be corrected by the President and by Congress. The important thing now is for everybody to accept the principle and the basic plan of consolidation; minute details can be worked out later.

Since consolidation is obviously the common-sense course, why have the admirals opposed it so fiercely?

The strange truth is that during the war the admirals who were closest to the fighting and who were most concerned with the fighting war did not oppose consolidation. Instead, men like Admiral Nimitz and Admiral Halsey were ardent advocates of reform and consolidation. It was only after these men returned to Washington and became concerned not with a fighting war but with Navy prestige that they changed their tune and began warning the country against consolidation.

Therefore, to conclude this book, I am going to perform an interesting operation. To all the objections to consolidation raised by the Navy spokesmen, I am going to answer with wartime quotations from Admiral Nimitz and Admiral Halsey. All of the statements attributed here to these two admirals are on the record. The statements were made in the Pacific in December 1944 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Special Committee. I shall refer to this committee as the Richardson Committee.

On December 8, 1944, the Richardson Committee interviewed Admiral Nimitz at his headquarters.

ADMIRAL NIMITZ: I favor a single civilian secretary of armed forces, with a complete elimination of civilian secretaries for the Army, for the Navy, and for the Air Force, with the idea of reducing any tendency to separation. *My experience in securing directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff leads me to believe that it will be far better to have a single commander of the armed forces who has all the authority and responsibility for issuing a directive.* [Italics are author's own.]

Now here is a remarkable situation. As I write these words, the Navy at a cost of eight thousand tax dollars has just issued a pamphlet praising the Joint Chiefs of Staff and denouncing the proposal for a single commander of the armed forces. Secretary Forrestal and Admiral King have urged Congress to continue the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to reject the idea of consolidation. And they have brought in Admiral Nimitz to second them. Yet only a few months before the end of the Pacific war, with three years of experience as a supreme commander behind him, Nimitz thought, in effect, that the Joint Chiefs system was a failure; that it was an improvised substitute for the proper system. And he had the courage to say this to the Joint Chiefs' own special committee.

ADMIRAL NIMITZ: I would expect the commander of the armed forces to be advised and to seek advice of the head of the Army, the head of the Navy, and the head of the Air

Force, then to make up his mind with his own staff, and then, having secured the President's approval, to issue the directives. In other words I would try to increase the authority of the commander of the armed forces in every possible way and *eliminate the Joint Chiefs of Staff between him and the forces that he is going to command.* [Italics are author's own.]

By virtue of his having succeeded Admiral King, Admiral Nimitz is now a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Apparently he foresaw this possibility, for he told the Richardson Committee:

ADMIRAL NIMITZ: My appearance before the Joint Chiefs of Staff started me to thinking how difficult it would be for me, if I were a member of the Joint Chiefs, to make up my mind with all the divergent opinions that were expressed. To put the heads of these three forces in there, each one looking out for his own force, *I thought it would promote irresolution rather than resolution.* [Italics are author's own.] And for that reason I favor the commander of the armed forces having a joint staff that is not responsible for anything but putting forth the best plan, the best strategic concept that they can, so that when they write a directive they are not speaking as head of the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force.

All of the admirals testifying before Congress in opposition to unification have "viewed with alarm" the idea of "placing so much power" in the hands of one man—the proposed Secretary of the Armed Forces. Here is an interesting exchange between Admiral Richardson and Admiral Nimitz.

ADMIRAL RICHARDSON: What do you think about the wisdom of placing so much power in the hands of one officer of the

Government as would be placed in the hands of the Secretary of the Armed Forces?

ADMIRAL NIMITZ: The President, in the last analysis, is the Commander-in-Chief. It should be made possible for him to change his Secretary and his Commander of the Armed Forces with great facility if he doesn't get what he wants. If we get somebody in there who dares to become a dictator, it seems that he could be removed very quickly.

Here is another significant exchange between Admiral Richardson and Admiral Nimitz.

ADMIRAL RICHARDSON: What do you think of the likelihood that for a number of years the Commander of the Armed Forces, having spent his whole life with only one of the components of a single department, would either be inclined to favor the one he has served with or, through fear of giving it too much consideration, would give it less than was due it?

ADMIRAL NIMITZ: I don't think we would have to worry about that. I think men would be found who would fill the bill. The conduct of war is the application of force, and I would expect the average officer who devotes himself with reasonable diligence to his profession, whether he grows up with the Army, or Navy or Air Force, to have acquired a complete working knowledge of his own specialty, and that as he gets older and has studied what has gone before, to have a knowledge of how to use the power that's inherent in the others.

Some of the admirals are still fighting the "separate air force." Here is Admiral Nimitz on this matter.

ADMIRAL SCHOEFFEL: Admiral, I have inferred, I might say that certain officers have said that they would favor a single

department made up of just two components instead of the three that we have proposed, the two being the Army and Navy. I have inferred from what you have said, however, that you are in favor of a three-component single department.

ADMIRAL NIMITZ: That is correct, because it is realistic. We've got three now.

When this interview was nearly over, Admiral Nimitz urged the Committee to hurry up with its plan.

ADMIRAL NIMITZ: I think the sooner you can get this thing under consideration the better it will be. I don't think you can bring out any reorganization during the war. I think when the serious fighting is over is the time to consider that, when your whole attention isn't needed to win the war. . . . I would prefer that the organization work exactly in time of peace as it does in war; that the Secretary of the Armed Forces do things which we usually expect our civilian secretaries to do and to have the Commander of the Armed Forces responsible for military matters. In other words I'd prefer that there be practically no change in passing from a peace status to a war status.

These statements by Admiral Nimitz, remarkable for their honesty and clarity, contain the answer to every objection to unification later voiced to Congress by Admiral King and the Navy witnesses—including *Admiral Nimitz*. I listened to Admiral Nimitz on the day he testified that he had changed his mind on virtually every point. He didn't sound convincing.

But here's a hopeful note. If Admiral Nimitz can regain the convictions he held on December 8, 1944—and I doubt that he ever really lost them—he and General Eisenhower should make a good team in working to effect consolida-

tion. For the Admiral Nimitz of December 8, 1944, sees eye-to-eye with General Eisenhower on every point.

Admiral Halsey was interviewed by the Richardson Committee on December 5, 1944, aboard the *U. S. S. New Jersey*. He didn't talk as much as Admiral Nimitz, but his answers were emphatic.

ADMIRAL HALSEY: I am in favor of a single department. In other words, I believe in unity.

ADMIRAL RICHARDSON: If you had a single department with three main components—the Army, the Navy, and Air Force—would you have each one of those largely independent, largely autonomous in its own field?

ADMIRAL HALSEY: Autonomous by training and minor administrative affairs, but headed up by somebody who could tell them to do this, do that.

General George then asked Admiral Halsey if he did not believe that all American forces fighting Japan should be under a unified command.

ADMIRAL HALSEY: I am one hundred per cent for that.

Admiral Richardson then explained the plan for unification in its various details, ending up with:

ADMIRAL RICHARDSON: The decisions of the President are passed to the commander of the armed forces and executed by him. What do you think of that?

ADMIRAL HALSEY: Splendid!

And here is Admiral Halsey on the question of too much power for the chief of the armed forces.

CAPTAIN STEEL: In this single department, Admiral, you set up one man as head of all the armed forces. Do you see danger in reposing so much authority in one man?

ADMIRAL HALSEY: I'm not afraid of that.

CAPTAIN STEELE: How about the political power of the single secretary?

ADMIRAL HALSEY: He'd probably have a lot, and he should have. Again, I'm not afraid of it if it gets results.

In his interview with the Committee, Admiral Halsey expressed himself as being particularly anxious to see a competent General Staff trained to serve the single department.

ADMIRAL HALSEY: Now the command setup. We have learned the hard way this time about each other's business and how to do it. I believe that promising young officers of and above the rank of lieutenant commander in the Navy and major in the Army should be earmarked very early in their careers. I have no plan laid out for it, but those men should be trained in all branches of everybody's service. They can't by any manner of means become expert in all those branches, or any one branch, but they can get a very good working knowledge of what one man is up against. And they should learn to talk the language. They should form the nucleus of a General Staff.

Admiral Richardson mentioned one very important point to Admiral Halsey. You recall that in 1938, when the War Department denied the air officers funds to develop the

four-motored bombers, the air officers did not have the right to appeal their case either to the President or to Congress. The Committee was concerned with the possibility that in a unified command one minority branch might be starved by the majority.

ADMIRAL RICHARDSON: Now we've got one thing about which we've heard a strong difference of opinion. We proposed that in reaching a decision on the size of the forces composing the armed forces of the United States, if the head of any one of the components felt that his component had been reduced so much as to be highly prejudicial to the overall effect of the armed forces, that he would have the right to present his views direct to the President, not alone but in a group. In this way the Commander of the Armed Forces would not be given the power to decide and hand his decision alone to the President in cases of non-agreement. In non-agreement, the man who represents one of the components would have the right to present his views to the President.

ADMIRAL HALSEY: It sounds like common sense to me the way politics are in the country. My personal reaction would be to let it get out.

Here is a most important point. What Admiral Halsey is saying here is that in cases of major disagreement within our war command over the development of new doctrines and weapons, he favors "letting it get out." And he is dead right. If the fight over big bombers had been "let out" in 1937-39, the whole course of the second World War might have been changed.

Maginot lines are built by General Staffs which suppress disagreement. By all means we must make certain that

future minority "agitators" and "visionaries" have the right to appeal both to the President and to the people.

If General Andrews and General Knerr had been allowed to see the President in 1938 . . . let us not forget that.

In November and December 1945, the nation was treated to a remarkable demonstration of Naval agility. Admirals Nimitz and Halsey, the two great commanders who had been so emphatic in their support of unification while the war was going on, returned to Washington to reverse themselves and denounce the very movement which they had previously endorsed.

Why? A minor reason for this remarkable about-face was that death had visited the White House, with the result that the admirals had been evicted and old Battery D had moved in. As long as Roosevelt was alive, the admirals felt assured of the lion's share of peacetime appropriations, no matter what form the military organization might take. With Truman in the White House, they felt no such assurance.

The chief reason for the about-face is Washington itself. Throughout the war, all of us who returned to Washington from the fighting fronts noted the effect which Washington has on resolution. On the fighting fronts we were all sickened by the old foul-ups. Perhaps there was something out there which caused all of us to be bigger than we were, which caused us to cry out for something better, and we returned to Washington feeling able, willing, determined to work for reform. But once we entered the hive of petty intrigue and sat down to talk with men who were con-

cerned not with living to see the next sunrise, but with power and promotion and prestige, we soon began to doubt our own convictions as well as our ability to impose them.

This, I believe, is what happened to Admiral Halsey and to Admiral Nimitz. They let the service politicians destroy their resolution. After "further consultations," Admiral Halsey appended a supplement to his testimony to the Richardson Committee, and in this supplement he sounded not like the intrepid leader of the Third Fleet but like an oily service politician on Constitution Avenue. Listen to his supplementary statement:

ADMIRAL HALSEY: I favor the establishment of a single department of the armed forces *if such establishment does not weaken the position of the U. S. Navy in the scheme of things.* [Italics are author's own.] This is not a selfish aspiration . . . the Navy must carry the load during the early phase of war and must be responsible for the launching of an invasion. The Navy is the one service that will certainly be kept up to formidable strength during the years of peace, and therefore no influence must be permitted to weaken the material strength *nor the command strength* of the Navy. I favor a single organization *provided that the Commander of the Armed Forces be a naval officer* thereby providing a fifty-fifty balance in the Joint Chiefs of Staff group—50 per cent Navy and 50 per cent composed of Army ground and air representatives. Only in that way will it be possible to prevent the outvoting of the service which carries the peacetime load and *the early brunt of the war* by the two other services.

There you have it. The old conflict over power, prestige, command position and money. The Navy Command determined to ignore the lessons of the second World War—

lessons which Admirals Halsey and Nimitz learned so well—and go back to the *normal* and *customary* procedures.

The Navy Command favors a single organization provided that the Commander of the Armed Forces be a naval officer!

The Navy Command is “the one service that will certainly be kept up to formidable strength during the years of peace!” Here is the old effort to hog appropriations; to prevent the development of air weapons; to bring us down to the third World War with nothing but battleships to protect us from destruction and slavery.

“The Navy must carry the load during the early phase of war!” Can you imagine a more stupid statement? If war comes again, how will our surface fleet protect us from atomic bombs? And will we depend upon our surface fleet to strike our enemies?

“The Navy must carry the peacetime load and the early brunt of the war!” This is Admiral Halsey talking to intelligent Americans in the year 1945. Do you believe that our fleet will carry the “early brunt” of any next war that comes?

Do you want to follow such advice from the Admiral Halseys, or do you want to follow the advice of men like Eisenhower and Knerr? Do you want battleships in the third World War, or do you want rockets, bombers and atomic bombs?

I don't want to remember Admiral Halsey in his post-war role of service politician. I want to remember him as the leader of the Third Fleet, for it was while he was leader of the Third Fleet that he made the following statement:

CAPTAIN STEELE: Do you think, sir, that six months after the war the armed forces will be well enough educated so that they can take the very large step of unification?

ADMIRAL HALSEY: I think if they can't they ought to be made to do it, have it beaten into their heads!

This advice by Admiral Halsey we can do well to follow. This time the American people must intervene and beat some sense into the admirals who are our worst military reactionaries. For, in this interim between wars, if our reactionaries are allowed to suppress our men of vision and to dissipate our resources on the wrong weapons, then America surely will be delivered to destruction and slavery.

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